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Abstract 
Justice in Climate Engineering – Towards a Rawlsian Appropriation 
Augustine Thomas Pamplaniyil 
 
Climate Engineering as a technological solution to anthropogenic climate change has been 
on the table at least since 2006. Understandably, there has been considerable activity among 
ethicists in weighing the pros and cons of climate engineering. This research approaches the 
climate engineering ethical debate from the point of view justice.  
 
The lead question of this research is, can climate engineering be developed in a just manner? 
And the research question is answered from the perspectives of distributive justice, 
intergenerational justice and procedural justice. The concerns with distributive, 
intergenerational and procedural justice are evaluated against the theoretical framework of 
the notion of distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice in John Rawls. After 
exposing the serious challenges with climate engineering to be justified from the point of view 
of justice, the thesis highlights certain essential conditions that may render climate 
engineering justifiable from the point of view the Rawlsian distributive, procedural and 
intergenerational justice. A comprehensive review of the existing literature on the ethics of 
climate engineering in general and on distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice 
in particular is a component of this thesis.  
 
The thesis is developed in seven chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the second 
chapter deals with the science of climate engineering. The third chapter dealing with the 
arguments for and against climate engineering already coined in the existing literature 
creates the platform for advancing the debate from the perspective of justice. The fourth, fifth 
and sixth chapters deal respectively with the compatibility of climate engineering from the 
point of view of the Rawlsian distributive, intergenerational and distributive justice. The 
concluding chapter revisits the research question and suggests certain directions for future 
research. 
 
The study advances the debate on the ethics of climate engineering from the perspective of 
justice highlighting a number of unrecognized concerns and suggesting some fresh 
directions.  
.  
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
An ancient Chinese proverb says that the yang – one of the two polar opposites in the 
cyclic motion of the Tao, the ultimate reality of the Chinese – having reached its climax will 
retrieve in favour of the yin.1 This proverb provides a paradoxical analogy to the changing 
paradigms of human interaction with nature. While the Baconian dictum, “I am come in very 
truth leading you to Nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her 
your slave[...]”2commanded the attitude of exploiting and conquering the earth in the 
industrial age, the general mindset of the ecological thinking in the contemporary age is to 
safe-guard the earth by refraining from harmful human interventions. Hence the 
contemporary struggles with combating the dangers of climate change particularly by means 
of mitigation. While the technological interventions have been largely causative of the 
dangers of climate change, ironically, today technology itself emerges as a potential 
contender tocombat the dangerous climate change. A technology that is still in the offing, 
called climate engineering or climate engineering, with hitherto unprecedented levels and 
scales of planetary outreach and global impact is being debated by scientists, policy makers 
and ethicists as a potential candidate to address the issue of climate change. 
 
1.1 The Climate Engineering Debate 
Climate engineeringas a technological solution to anthropogenic climate changes or as a 
supplementary tool to mitigation and adaptation has been on the table at least since 2006 with 
                                                          
1Tao Te Ching, Forke (Translator)  See, Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 2, History of 
Scientific Thought (Cambridge University Press: 1956), p. 344. 
2Francis Bacon, Works, Vol. 3, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Devon Heath, (London: 
Longmans Green, 1875), p. 528. A much stronger formulation of the negative philosophy of nature in Bacon is 
his writing in Cogitata Visa: “The mechanical inventions of recent years do not merely exert a gentle guidance 
over Nature’s course, they have the power to conquer her and subdue her, to shake her to her foundations.” 
Francis Bacon, “Thoughts and Conclusions on the Interpretation of Nature or a Science of Productive Works” 
(Cogitata et Visa) (written in 1607), in Farrington, Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1964), p. 93; see also pp. 96, 99. Some scholars differ on the popularly negative tone of these 
formulations. See for instance, Carolyn Merchant, “The Violence of Impediments - Francis Bacon and the 
Origins of Experimentation,” Isis 99 (2008): 731–760; particularly note no. 50 on page 749. 
2 
the paper by Crutzen in Climatic Change.3 Today it has moved from a fringe proposal to a 
mainstream contender among the various solutions to the dangers of climate change. The 
proposal reached the centre stage with the fifth part of IPCC’s (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change) series of climate change assessment reports finalised in October 2014. 
Understandably, the climate engineering proposal has been generating a lot of heat 
from the ethical, social and political, and public terrain. Climate engineering elicited the 
enthusiasm and attention of ethicists and policy makers especially since the beginning of this 
millennium. Paul J. Crutzen in his trend-setting paper on sulphate aerosol injection (SAI) had 
conceded that there “are many” ethical issues in store for it.4 Preston (2014) observes: “No 
previous technology has intentionally manipulated the earth at such a fundamental level, 
deliberately altering a system with so much complexity and promising such widespread 
effects. If initiated, climate engineering would take anthropogenic influence on the earth to a 
whole new level.”5 The overarching interdisciplinarity, the global outreach of the technology 
exercised in a non-encapsulated system, as well as the unprecedented levels and scales of 
impact and duration make the climate engineering controversy quite complex. Even Bunzl’s  
(2009) observation that climate engineering “falls into a special class of scientific endeavours 
that generate a set of methodological challenges…,”6despite recognizing the climate 
engineering peculiarity does not seem to be fully freed from reductionist simplification as it 
reflects only the methodological complexity of the controversy. The scientific hype as well as 
the ethical caution about climate engineering is already reflected in some of the metaphors 
coined to describe climate engineering, like “a magic bullet for climate change,”7 “emergency 
brake,”8 “a brute force way,”9 and the “Geoengineering Taboo.”10 The sharp divide already 
                                                          
3 Paul Crutzen, “Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy 
Dilemma?,” Climatic Change 77 (2006): 211-220. 
4 Crutzen 2006, p. 217. 
5 Christopher J. Preston, “The Extraordinary Ethics of Solar Radiation Management,” in Christopher J. Preston, 
Ed., Engineering the Climate: The Ethics of Solar Radiation Management (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012, 
Paperback Edition, 2014 ), p. 1 (We use the paperback edition). 
6 Martin Bunzl, “Researching Geoengineering: Should not or Could not?” Environmental Research Letters 4 
(2009), p. 2. Available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/4/045104. Accessed on October 23, 2014. 
7 Ujjayant Chakravorty, Andrew Leach and Michel Moreaux, Would Hotelling Kill the Electric Car?TSER 
Working Paper Series, April 2010, pp. 4-5. Available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069610001245. Accessed on April 14, 2014. 
8 Victor Brovkin, Vladimir Petoukhov, Martin Claussen, Eva Bauer, David Archer, Carlo Jaeger, 
“Geoengineering Climate by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: Earth System Vulnerability to Technological 
Failure,” Climatic Change 92:3 (2009): 243-259, p. 244.  
9 Mike Hulme, “Climate Change: Climate Engineering through Stratospheric Aerosol Injection,” Progress in 
Physical Geography” 36 (2012), p. 701. 
10 Albert C. Lin, “Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard,” UC Davies Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper 312, (2012). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2152131, p. 13. Accessed April 29, 
2015. 
3 
established between the proponents and the opponents makes the ethical deliberations 
exciting and intriguing.  
1.2Framing the Research Question 
This research intends to appropriate the ethics of climate engineering from the 
perspective of justice. A landscape view of the debate setting tells us that as a form of 
technology that is still at the conceptual level, a general strand that is running through various 
streams of the arguments on climate engineering is the ethical desirability of climate 
engineering. Climate engineering theorists and ethicists are engaged in analysing and 
assessing the desirability of climate engineering from the point of view of diverse ethical 
concerns. Climate engineering being a pioneering technology, the ethical engagement is to 
some extent confined to the preliminary levels, and a detailed treatment of a particular 
argument stream is often absent in the debate. Accordingly, an in-depth engagement with a 
particular issue on the debated concerns is somewhat absent barring a few, as we will be 
seeing in the literature review. With a view to advancing the debate further, our research 
wishes to approach the debate from the perspective of a specific issue, that is, the issue of 
justice. Hence the preliminary formulation of our research question will be: 
Is climate engineeringethically desirable from the standpoint of justice? 
Here our coinage of the term climate engineering needs some justification as 
geoengineering is the popular coinage in the literature. Geoengineering as a modern coinage 
refers to climate engineering covering a wide spectrum of applications including CDR 
(Carbon Dioxide Removal) and SRM (Solar Radiation Management). However, in the 
classical and traditional sense, geoengineering refers to the geological practices like dam-
building, construction of artificial islands, etc. In this thesis we will be discussing 
geoengineering exclusively as climate engineering and hence our preference for the term 
climate engineering over geoengineering throughout. 
In this formulation, the adoption of the issue of justice as the focus of our research 
needs some justification.Firstly, as we will see in chapter three on thereview of literature, 
justice constitutes one of the central pillars of the climate engineering controversy. There are 
a considerable number of papers mentioning the issue of justice. However, justice does not 
seem to have been given the due attention that it deserves as the reference to justice is often a 
subset of another argument stream. Secondly, though there is an undisputed agreement on the 
4 
adverse side-effects of the technology and the geo-physical and the socio-political 
implications of these side-effects11 – a full length analysis of the implications of which for 
justice is still pending. Thirdly, it may not be presumptuous to observe that justice enjoys a 
certain degree of primacy in the climate engineering ethical debate, for the perspectives 
provided by the concerns with justice provide a vantage point from which to partly refute or 
substantiate and to prioritise some of the leading arguments for and against climate 
engineering. 
Some further clarification on how the concept of justice employed in this thesis 
relates to ethics as a moral philosophy will be further helpful at this point. In moral discourse, 
Justice can be treated as an umbrella term referring to all ethical issues. Justice may also be 
treated as one moral dimension of the moral aspects in philosophy. In this thesis, the 
treatment of justice is more as a particular subset of moral philosophy especially in the first 
three chapters. This is particularly true of the chapter on review of literature as we are 
distinguishing between the various ethical issues in climate engineering where justice 
constitutes only one of the main frame arguments. However, in the normative chapters, it can 
be seen that justice is mostly treated as an overarching ethical principle. This general 
treatment of justice was necessary as we find that justice enjoys a certain degree of primacy 
in regard to many other ethical arguments in the context of climate engineering. 
We also recognise a problem in the above formulation of our research question. It is 
not theoretically possible to justifya normative judgment on the desirability of climate 
engineering exclusively from the perspective of justice. Though justice is often an important 
aspect when assessing ethical desirability, it does however not seem to be a necessary 
condition for desirability, as it might give way to otherethical principles in the assessment of 
what is ethically desirable in particularsituations. Nor does it appear to be a sufficient 
condition for desirability. Accordingly, avoiding this problem, we reformulate the research 
question as follows: 
Can climate engineering be developed in a manner compatible with justice?  
This formulation avoids the logical error of a generalised conclusion 
concerningethicaldesirability based onthe analysis of anissue that is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for desirability. Further, as climate engineering technology is still far from taking a 
                                                          
11 See Chapter 3, 3.3.2.1.1 
5 
concrete shape and form and the issue of research and development itself is strongly 
contended, a research question that directly targets the dynamics and procedures of the 
development of the technology is an imperative at this point. The above formulation is hoped 
to capture these dynamics of the assessment.  
As the issue of justice, particularly in the context of climate change, is very complex 
and wide, for want of clarity and precision, we narrow down the scope of our research to 
three dominant subsets of justice, namely, distributive justice, intergenerational justice and 
procedural justice. These three aspects of justice are found to be most important and most 
rewarding in the case of climate engineering. As a technology that is loaded with several 
foreseen and unforeseen consequences, the development and deployment of climate 
engineering will provoke immediate and direct concerns for distributional justice. Second, as 
a technology, the impact of which is stretching out far into future and the future generations 
being the victims or beneficiaries of our development or deployment of the technology, the 
issue of intergenerational justice finds its natural course onto the scene. Finally, the concerns 
with procedures are all the more overarching with regard to normative judgements over a 
pioneering and largely untested technology. As a seminal technology, visualisation of the 
methods, and techniques of climate engineeringis still far from being complete. Procedural 
justice becomes one of the self-imposing choices for the ethical analysis of climate 
engineering from the justice point of view. Accordingly, we revise our research question as 
follows: 
Can climate engineering be developed in a just manner compatible with distributive, 
intergenerational and procedural justice? 
This formulation of the research question invokes a methodological issue as to which 
model of the distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice are we coining in assessing 
the compatibility of climate engineering. Conceptual and methodological integrity demands 
precise theoretical models and principles of justice to be applied to the question under 
investigation. We are using the theoretical framework of John Rawls on distributive justice, 
intergenerational justice and procedural justice in exploring the compatibility of climate 
engineering with justice. Accordingly, the final formulation of our research question will be: 
Can the development of climate engineering be just compatible with the Rawlsian 
principles of distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice? 
6 
Our choice of John Rawls’ theory as the frame for distributive justice in climate 
engineering is not non-contentious as there are several theories of distributive justice. 
However, our preference for Rawls in the context of climate engineering may be justified for 
the following three reasons. 
 1) As we will see in Chapter 4, Rawls is one of the leading theorists of egalitarian 
justice who has acknowledged and appropriated the differentiated distribution of resources in 
the society and has suggested directions towards the alignment of the same for the greater 
benefit of all the members of the society, especially of the most disadvantaged in the society. 
There is almost a universal consensus among environmental ethicists that given the present 
inequalities in the distribution of ecological resources and the greater vulnerability of the 
poorer regions of the world to the challenges of the climate change, their fate is likely to be 
worse off by the predicted consequences of climate change.12 Since the context for the ethical 
deliberations on climate engineering is already a differentiated context, a theory that spells 
out the directions for justice amidst differences has an added advantage. 
2) Further, climate engineering is a kind of planetary technology exercised in a non-
encapsulated system with a global range of application. However, its harms and benefits 
would be distributed differentially among nations and regions. Therefore, a theory of 
distributive justice that gives due recognition to the particular context of individual nations 
becomes a sort of natural choice for discussing the ethics of climate engineering. The theory 
of justice developed by Rawls in his two books achieves this blend of the national and the 
international principles of distributive justice. While his Theory of Justice13 was applicable 
mostly to individual states, Law of Peoples14 focused on the principles of justice between 
nations. As Michael Blake and Patrick Taylor Smith (2013) have observed, Rawls’ focus is 
not on the global, but exactly on international justice.15The impacts of climate engineering, 
though global in outreach, are to be assessed at national and international levels. This also 
explains why we rely more on Rawls’ Theory of Justice over the Law of Peoples, where the 
                                                          
12 See for example, Jochen Prantl, “Debating Geoengineering Governance: How It Matters to the Asia Pacific 
Region,” NTS Alert, April (2011). Available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-
Newsletter/Alert/pdf/NTS_Alert_apr_1102.pdf. Accessed June 18, 2015. 
13 John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press: 1999, First Published in 
1971). 
14 John Rawls, Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
15Michael Blake and Patrick Taylor Smith, “International Distributive Justice,” in The Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.). Available at 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/international-justice/>. Accessed March 21, 2017. 
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latter work might have been the more intuitive suggestion for a discussion of distributive 
justice in climate engineering.16 
 3) Yet another conceptual justification for our preference to the Rawlsian 
egalitarianism is the idealised state of affairs of the original position envisaged by Rawls. 
Rawls undisputedly underscores the equality of all in accessing the primary goods of their 
society. Rawls’ views of the primary good and the hypothetical original position are 
developed in the social context. The imagery of the original position shows how parties 
would decide on the principle of equal access in the just distribution of primary goods. Now, 
if we take the analogy of the original position to the natural context of accessing the natural 
resources, the conditions and specifications of the original position would provide the just 
framework for the fair allocation of the natural resources. The primary natural resources here 
would refer to water, precipitation, cultivable land, sunlight, etc., the accessibility to which 
forms some of the central issues of distributive justice in climate engineering. From an 
ecological point of view,17 the present standards and practices of consuming the natural 
resources between nations are highly unjust and imbalanced. As we will see below, climate 
engineering is predicted to worsen this unjust scenario. The metaphors like ‘impartial 
position’ and ‘mutually disinterested rationality’ in Rawls’ imaginary original position can 
provide a real impetus for preserving the pristine perspectives of justice in such an aggravated 
scenario. As Rawls himself has hoped, “… justice as fairness will seem reasonable and 
useful, even if not fully convincing, to a wide range of thoughtful political opinions….”18 
Hence, our research endeavours to explore the pros and cons of climate 
engineeringfrom the viewpoint of distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice 
against the theoretical framework of John Rawls. The shift of focus from desirability to 
compatibility between climate engineering and justice throws open the provisions for 
endorsing climate engineering from the justice point of view if they are found compatible, or 
to denounce climate engineering from the justice point of view if they are not compatible in 
any manner or to explore and recommend the conditions necessary for making climate 
                                                          
16 The principles of justice in Theory of Justice, accordingly to Rawls, were confined mostly to particular nation 
state. Rawls developed his theory with international applicability in his Law of Peoples. However, the liberal 
institutionalists drew more from the Theory of Justice for international distributive justice. See, Blake and Smith 
2013. 
17 By ecology here we mean the sustainable way of living in tune with the organic interconnectedness of life, 
often denoted by the metaphor, web of life.  We do not take ecology in a strict environmentalist sense, rather our 
understanding of ecology is close to the perspectives of deep ecology. 
18 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. xi. 
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engineering compatible with justice. This is the research agenda running through the 
normative chapters of this thesis. 
1.3Methodology and Outline of the Study 
In answering the research question that we framed above, methodically, we will have 
to answer the following sub questions implicit in the research question: 
 What is climate engineering? 
 What are the Rawlsian principles of distributive, intergenerational and procedural 
justice? 
 Accordingly, from the Rawlsian perspective, is climate engineering more an 
opportunity or a challenge for justice? 
 What are the conditions that climate engineering has to necessarily meet in order to be 
compatible with the Rawlsian principles of justice? 
The research is structured in such a way as warranted by the research question and its 
sub questions. Following the introductory chapter, we move on to a historical and 
technological elucidation of the science of climate engineering in the second chapter. This 
chapter deals with the definition, history and the different techniques of climate engineering. 
It is a technical platform that facilitates the course of discussion in the following chapters, 
particularly the normative section in chapters four, five and six.  
Surveying and reviewing the argument streams for and against climate engineering 
coined in the existing literature provides the background from which the attempts at 
advancing the debate are to begin with. Hence an acquaintance with the existing literature on 
the ethics of climate engineeringis envisaged in the third chapter,whichreviewstheliterature 
on the ethics of climate engineering. Assessing the present status of the ethical evaluation of 
climate engineering, specifically identifying the leading arguments advocating climate 
engineering technologiesas well asthe scientific, social, and philosophical arguments19 that 
denounce or advocateclimate engineering,is the prime objective of this chapter. Alongside 
dealing with the diverse dynamics of the debate this chapter also dwells on the 
                                                          
19Arguments pertaining directly to the climate engineering technologies are treated as scientific arguments. 
Arguments related to the social consequences of the deployment of technology are considered as social 
arguments and the conceptual arguments related to a dormant worldview are considered as philosophical 
arguments. 
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interdisciplinary setting of the overall debate highlighting some of the philosophical 
perspectives that are dormant in the arguments. 
The normative section that follows spans over the next three chapters, namely, 
chapters four, five and six.Here we dwell in detail on three aspects of justice that we consider 
beingthe most challenging for the climate engineering controversy, namely, distributive 
justice, intergenerational justice and procedural justice.True to the common objective these 
chaptersfollow a similar pattern. We begin our normative analysis with a review of the 
current literature on the specific typeof justice under consideration in the chapter. The second 
part of chapters four five and sixdescribes the Rawlsian theoryon distributive, 
intergenerational and procedural justice respectively. The third part of each chapter in this 
section applies the Rawlsiantheoryto climate engineering to see if climate engineering is 
vindicated from the standpoint of the specific typeof justice under consideration. The fourth 
part is a list of recommendations consequent of the intersection between the Rawlsian 
principles of justice and climate engineeringin order to make climate engineering more 
compatible with distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice under the Rawlsian 
scheme. Although, the arguments in these chapters seem to go heavily against climate 
engineering, the suggestion from these chapters is not to reject climate engineering 
altogether, rather to propose the ways and means to surmount the factors that make justice 
and climate engineering incompatible. 
Having evaluated climate engineering from the perspective of justice using the 
Rawlsianconception of justice, the seventh and final chapter is a retrospective and 
prospective reflection on the entire study. Revisiting the research question at the end of the 
study, this chapter summarily presents the findings emerging from the analysis. Seeing how 
our claims are vindicated to some extent against certain other positions, this chapter 
highlights certain unique aspects of this research along with suggesting fresh directions for 
the advancement of the overall debate whilstrecognizing the limits of this research. The final 
chapter is summarily the general conclusion to the research as well.  
Overall we will follow an approach that will be analytically expository and 
dialogically hermeneutical. Our approach is primarily analytical and expository as it begins 
with an analysis and exposition of the issue under contention and the present state of affairs 
with the various dynamics of the debate on it. This approach is predominant particularly in 
chapter three where we make an extensive analysis of the debate scenario. The same 
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approach is also carried through in the first part of the normative chapters where we attempt 
an update on the scholarship on the related areas of justice in climate engineering. A second 
stream of the analytical approach is in coining the theoretical framework of Rawls. We make 
a considerable exposition of the perspectives of Rawls from his original works on 
distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice. The expository approach provides a 
solid platform upon which to found our dialogical tools in advancing the debate from the 
perspective of justice. The analytical approach helps us assess the strength and weakness of 
the argument frames and make fresh observations and findings on the debate. 
The dialogical section attemptsto intersect the theoretical framework of Rawls with 
the various concerns with justice in climate engineering leading to proposing newer 
directions, and foundational perspectives and norms. It is in this dialogue that we examine the 
compatibility of climate engineering and the Rawlsian views of justice. Though we encounter 
mostly areas of incompatibility between the Rawlsian justice and climate engineering, it does 
not lead us to completelyreject climate engineering, rather to hermeneutically exploring the 
ways and means of a possible compatibility between the two in the greater interest of justice. 
The potential fusion of the horizons between the theoretical frame of the Rawlsian original 
position and the likely scenario of justice in a post-geoengineered world empowers us with 
the tools for pre-eminently identifying the conditions for just climate engineering. The 
dialogical fusion highlights the areas of incompatibility and suggests the ways and means for 
addressing these incompatibilities. The recommendations made in each of the three normative 
chapters are the hermeneutical outcome of the dialogue between Rawls and climate 
engineering. The outlook section in chapter seven also carries forward the hermeneutical 
approach as the fusion of our justice perspectives with the emerging philosophical, scientific 
and epistemological perspectives is impregnated with a number of fresh conceptual directions 
for the debate. 
1.4 Conclusion 
In this introductory chapter we have been trying to situate the research in its overall 
perspective and structure. This chapter has elucidated the framing of the research question 
and the consequent methodology and approach necessary for answering the research 
question. It has been seen that the structure of the research is designed in such a way as to 
address and respond to the research question following a precise methodology. It is hoped 
11 
that this introduction provides the opening pedestal to enter in to the subsequent phases of 
this research. 
As we explained in the overall outline of the thesis givenabove, this study begins by 
dwelling quite a bit on the concept, history and techniques of climate engineering. Though 
not exhaustive, adequate acquaintance with the science of climate engineering is preliminary 
to carry on the research in its proposed direction. Following the opening chapter we will be 
moving on to the science of climate engineering in the next chapter.  
.  
 
 
Chapter 2 
Concept, Historical Development and  
Technological Approaches of Climate Engineering 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A historical perspective on the development of climate engineering and essential 
clarity on the scientific fundamentals of the climate engineering techniques could be helpful 
for any ethical analysis of climate engineering. Hence, in this chapter, we dwell on the 
definition, history and the techniques of climate engineering. However, an exhaustive 
exposition of the entire science of climate engineering is not within the scope and limit of this 
research. Our introductory recourse to the science of climate engineering will focus on the 
clarification of scientific terminologies that would facilitate the course of discussion in the 
subsequent normative chapters. Accordingly, in the first part of this chapter, we present the 
different definitions of climate engineering as coined in the literature and try to identify the 
dormant perspectivities in them. In the second part, we take a short retrospection into the 
historical development of the climate engineering proposals from its early conceptions to the 
present forms. In the third and final part, we introduce the different categories of climate 
engineering techniques. What are the approaches and perspectivities dormant in the leading 
climate engineering definitions of the day? What does the history of climate engineering 
suggest for the contemporary appropriation of climate engineering? What is the scientific 
status of the various categories of climate engineering, and how relevant are their potentials 
and limits for the ethics of climate engineering? These are some of the lead questions that we 
wish to explore in this chapter. In the overall scheme of this thesis, this chapter is envisaged 
to be more as a scientific platform upon which the subsequent discussions are to be 
developed. 
 
2.2Climate Engineering Definitions 
Climate engineering refers to a set of technologies with differing goals and 
applications. As such, it is difficult to develop a uniform definition of climate engineering. 
The literature too reflects the same diversity in the framing of the climate engineering 
technologies. Nearly two decades ago, Thomas Schelling (1996) wrote, “‘Geoengineering’ is 
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a new term, still seeking a definition. It seems to imply something global, intentional, and 
unnatural.”1 Though, the vagueness about the term geoengineering, as commented by 
Schelling, has not vanished yet, there was some considerable activity at defining it in the past 
two decades. Geoengineering originally was used in the geological sense, as the “science that 
deals with the application of geology to engineering,”2 before it was to be coined for the 
efforts at combating climate change. Nowadays, it is discussed most often in the context of 
countervailing climate change. Some authors consider climate engineering as a subset of 
terraforming.3 Given the planetary range of climate engineering as in terraforming, climate 
engineering is also called planetary engineering. 
It is not our intention in this section to formulate a commonly accepted definition of 
climate engineering. Rather than a well-qualified definition of climate engineering, we find in 
the literature a series of descriptions of climate engineering with some common elements in 
them. Our discussion on the definitions of climate engineering will focus on the common 
strands running through these definitions, the difficulties involved in defining climate 
engineering and the technological and philosophical approaches dormant in the definitions.  
The term geoengineering originates from the combination of the prefix “geo,” 
originating from the Greek ge, that means earth, and, “engineering,” with the following 
dictionary meaning: “The branch of science and technology concerned with the design, 
building, and use of engines, machines, and structures.”4 It was only in 2010 that Oxford 
dictionary warranted the inclusion of geoengineering.5 As we will see in the next section, the 
                                                          
1 Thomas Schelling, “The Economic Diplomacy of Geoengineering,” Climatic Change 33 (1996), p. 303. 
2 P. B. Gove, Ed., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 
(Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1986). 
3 James Rodger Fleming, Fixing the Sky – The Checkered History of Weather and Climate Control (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 230; David Keith, “Geoengineering the Climate: History and Prospect,” 
Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 25 (2000a), pp. 245-284. Martyn J. Fogg defined terraforming as 
the process of “enhancing the capacity of an extraterrestrial planetary environment to support life. The ultimate 
in terraforming would be to create an uncontained planetary biosphere emulating all the functions of the 
biosphere of the Earth—one that would be fully habitable for human beings.” (Martyn J. Fogg, Terraforming: 
Engineering Planetary Environments (Warrendale, Pa.: Society of Automotive Engineers, 1995), p. 9. 
4 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/engineering. Accessed on December 23, 
2014. 
5 Rob Bellamy et al., “Appraising Geoengineering,” Tyndal Centre for Climate Change Research, Working 
Paper 153(2012):1-36,p.6. Available at 
http://www.agriculturedefensecoalition.org/sites/default/files/file/new_mexico_198/198C_1_2012_Appraising_
Geoengineering_Tyndall_Center_for_Climate_Change_Research_June_2012_Report_Note_Geoengineering_D
efinitions.pdf. Accessed on Dec. 10, 2013,; Bipartisan Policy Centre Task Force on Climate Remediation 
Research, “Geoengineering: A National Strategic Plan for Research on the Potential Effectiveness, Feasibility, 
and Consequences of Climate Remediation Technologies,” (2011). Available at 
http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/task-force-climate-remediation-research, p. 5. Accessed on June 
3, 2014. 
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term has been in use long before the dictionary inclusion, and its meanings have expanded 
significantly over the past decade. 
 
Table 2.1 Climate Engineering Definitions:6This table presents the various definitions of 
climate engineering in the literature with reference to its source. It covers definitions by the 
individual scientists as well as international organisations. 
 
Year Source Definition 
1992 The US National 
Academy of Sciences 
Panel on Policy 
Implications of 
Greenhouse Warming 
“(L)arge-scale engineering of our environment in 
order to combat or counteract the effects of changes 
in atmospheric chemistry.’7 
2000 David Keith “Intentional large-scale manipulation of the 
environment...”8 
2008 Stephen Barret ‘[Geoengineering] is to counteract climate change 
by reducing the amount of solar radiation that 
strikes the Earth... [not] by changing the 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases...’9 
2009 Urban Dictionary “(T)he intentional large-scale manipulation of the 
global environment; planetary tinkering; a subset of 
terraforming or planetary engineering . . . the last 
gasp of a dying civilisation.”10 
                                                          
6 This table has been developed relying partly on the table of geoengineering definitions in Bellamy et al. 2012, 
p. 5. 
7 National Academy of Sciences Panel on Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, Policy Implications of 
Greenhouse Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base (Washington DC.: National Academy of 
Sciences Press, 1992), p. 433. 
8 Keith 2000a,p. 245. 
9 S. Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering,” Environmental and Resource Economics39 (2008), 
p. 45. Available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10640-007-9174-8?LI=true. Accessed March 
4, 2014. 
10Urban Dictionary, s.v. “geoengineering,” http://www.urbandictionary.com. Accessed June 8, 2014. 
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2009 James Lovelock Endorsed Urban Dictionary Definition (see above)11 
2009 American 
Meteorological Society 
(AMS) 
“(D)eliberately manipulating physical, chemical, or 
biological aspects of the Earth system.”12 
 
2009 Royal Society ‘...(T)he deliberate large-scale intervention in the 
Earth’s climate system, in order to moderate global 
warming...’13 
2009 UK Government House of Commons Innovation, Universities, 
Science and Skills Committee (Hoc IUSSC) 
endorsed Royal Society’s Definition (see above).14 
2010 IPCC Endorsed Royal Society’s Definition (see above) 
2010 ETC Group15 “The intentional, large-scale technological 
manipulation of the Earth’s systems, including 
systems related to climate."16 
2011 Oxford English 
Dictionary 
 “The deliberate large-scale manipulation of an 
environmental process that affects the Earth’s 
climate, in an attempt to counteract the effects of 
global warming.”17 
 
                                                          
11 Fleming 2010, p. 228. 
12 American Meteorological Society, AMS Policy Statement on Geoengineering the Climate System. Available 
at http://www.ametsoc.org/policy/2009geoengineeringclimate_amsstatement.pdf. Accessed on December18, 
2016. 
13 The Royal Society, “Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty,” 2009, p. 1. www. 
royalsociety.org. Accessed January 4, 2013. 
14 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, Engineering: Turning Ideas into 
Reality: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report. 2009. Available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdius/759/759.pdf; House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee, The Regulation of Geoengineering (London: The Stationary Office, 2010). 
Accessed April 5, 2015. 
15 ETC Group is an Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration. It works to address the 
socioeconomic and ecological issues surrounding new technologies that could have an impact on the world’s 
poorest and the most vulnerable people (See, http://www.etcgroup.org/about). 
16 Pat Mooney et al., “Darken the Sky and Whiten the Earth – The Dangers of Geoengineering, What Next?” 3 
(2012): 210-237, p. 216. 
17 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/geoengineering. Accessed June 20, 2014. 
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Some conditions for defining climate engineering in the modern sense were made by 
David Keith (2000).18 As seen above, Keith (2000) defined climate engineering as the 
“Intentional large-scale manipulation of the environment...”19 and set the components of this 
definition as the defining standards for climate engineering. According to Keith (2000), “For 
an action to be geoengineering, the environmental change must be the primary goal rather 
than a side effect and the intent and effect of the manipulation must be large in scale, e.g. 
continental to global....”20 “Three core attributes will serve as markers of geoengineering: 
scale, intent, and the degree to which the action is a countervailing measure.”21 Keith (2000) 
contrasts climate engineering with ornamental gardening and climate changes due to fossil 
fuel burning. Neither ornamental gardening, nor global warming can be treated as climate 
engineering, for, in the case of the former, the scale is small, and in the latter, the intent of 
burning fossil fuels is not climate change, but energy needs, though climate change occurs as 
a side effect.22 
The conditions of the definition set by Keith (2000) almost became the dominant 
standard in defining climate engineering as subsequent authors included those elements in 
their definitions of climate engineering.23 Pat Mooney et al. (2012), in their evaluation of the 
climate engineering definitions have identified two additional aspects, namely, technology, 
and earth system, as central to climate engineering definitions along with scale and intent. For 
Mooney et al., climate engineering is a “high-technology approach”24 with nothing much to 
do with the mitigation efforts or with changing life-styles for combating global warming. 
Mooney et al. also observes that the reference to the earth-system in climate engineering is 
potentially not limited to manipulating the carbon cycle, but it can be eventually twisted to 
manage the earth’s hydrological cycle or nitrogen cycles.25 
The definition of Keith (2000) has been foundational in developing the subsequent 
definitions by official bodies like the Royal Society (2009), IPCC (2007), and Hoc IUSSC 
(2009). The classical definition of Climate engineering as extensively used in present 
literature is provided by the Royal Society (2009), as, “...the deliberate large-scale 
intervention in the Earth’s climate system, in order to moderate global warming....”.26 This 
                                                          
18 Keith 2000a, p. 247. 
19 Keith 2000a, p. 245. 
20 Keith 2000a, p. 247. 
21 Keith 2000a, p. 247. 
22 Keith 2000a, p. 247. 
23 See, for example, Mooney et al. 2012, pp. 216-217. 
24 Mooney et al. 2012, p. 216. 
25 Mooney et al. 2012, p. 217. 
26 Royal Society 2009, p. ix. 
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definition was further corroborated by UK Government27 and the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. While meeting the conditions laid by Keith, this definition goes a step 
further with its precise climatic focus and it slightly alleviates the strong manipulative nuance 
in the other definitions by using a moderate term like intervention. The Royal Society and 
IPCC integrated the aspect of combating climate change as the professed intent of the climate 
engineering techniques. 
In our analysis of the ethics of climate engineering, we do not subscribe to any 
particular definition, but go by the conventional understanding of climate engineering. We 
are aware that this will create some ambiguity in the ethical analysis of climate engineering. 
However, that is considered a just price for treating the ethics of climate engineering in 
general particularly as there is no consensus as to the right classification of technologies. We 
are also aware that all CDR technologies listed in this chapter do not necessarily fall under 
the climate engineering schemes. However, we follow this classification after the model of 
the Royal Society and the IPCC. 
Although there is a consensus among various authors on the element of ‘scale’ in 
climate engineering definition, there is no such consensus when it comes to the element of 
‘intent.’ There are arguments that intentionality and countervailing nature are no useful 
criteria to define climate engineering. For instance, renowned historian of science, James  
Fleming (2010) holds that the stated purposes of a large scale exercise like climate 
engineering may not be constrained to such purposes in actual exercise as it will have 
unintended consequences and undesirable ends.28 It is now common knowledge that there are 
political factors influencing the definitions of modern technologies. Climate engineering is no 
exemption to it. As Mooney et al. have observed, “Defining geoengineering is a political 
act.”29 
 
2.2.1 Prevalent Ambiguities 
There are a number of problems involved in formulating a definition of climate 
engineering. Firstly, the term climate engineering is not accepted by all scientists to represent 
the various climate engineering techniques. A number of alternative terms are used in the 
literature to describe the same set of technologies. The alternative terms include, climate 
                                                          
27 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee 2009. 
28 Fleming 2010, p. 228. 
29 Mooney et al. 2012, p. 215. 
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engineering,30 planetary engineering,31 earth systems engineering,32 and climate 
modification.33 Bellamy et al. (2012) observe that in recent times there is an attempt at 
rebranding climate engineering as climate remediation as it seems to go along well with the 
popular terms of mitigation and adaptation.34 It could be seen that there are mainly linguistic 
preferences or emphases between these terms. The varying preferences and emphases do not 
make an easy formulation of a uniform definition. Secondly, there is no uniform 
understanding about the subsets of climate engineering methods. As we will see in the third 
section of this chapter, there is no commonly accepted classification of the climate 
engineering technologies, although the general division between the SRM (Solar Radiation 
Management) and CDR (Carbon Dioxide Removal) is a standard practice used in the 
literature. Of late, there are also attempts to downplay the “emotively provocative”35 tone of 
Solar Radiation Management by renaming it as “Sunlight Reflection Methods.”36 Similarly, 
CDR is rebranded as “Carbon Dioxide Remediation.”37 A third semantic difficulty in 
defining climate engineering is the synonymous coinage of climate engineering to refer solely 
to solar radiation management techniques.38 As we will see in the third chapter, which 
contains a literature review, several papers with climate engineering in the title cover only the 
Solar Radiation Management (SRM) proposals ignoring the Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) 
proposals. The very definition of climate engineering given by Barret (Table 2.1) further 
confirms this point.  
2.2.2 Remarks on the Definitions of Climate Engineering 
It is clear that the need for precise definitions will become vital as the policy makers, 
ethicists and governments will have to make their positions on climate engineering clear in 
the near future. In the context of the newly speculated technologies, Mooney et al. (2012) of 
the ETC Group, remark that, “definitions (of geoengineering) become more complex, 
                                                          
30 For example, see, D. Bodansky, “May We Engineer the Climate?” Climatic Change33 (1996): 309-321. 
31 For example, M. Hoffert et al., “Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy for a 
Greenhouse Planet,” Science298 (2002): 981-987. 
32 S. Schneider, “Earth Systems Engineering and Management,” Nature409 (2001): 417-421. 
33 R. McCormick and J. Ludwig, “Climate Modification by Atmospheric Aerosols,” Science156 (1967): 1358-
359. 
34 Bellamy et al. 2012, p. 5. 
35 Bellamy et al. 2012, p. 6. 
36 Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, Solar Radiation Management: The Governance of 
Research, 2011. Available at http://www.srmgi.org/downloads/ Accessed November 30, 2014. 
37 Climate Institute (2010), ‘Conference Statement,’ Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention, 
Pacific Grove, CA (USA) 22-26 March 2010. Available at http://www.climate.org/resources/climate-
archives/conferences/asilomar/statement.html. Accessed March 30, 2014. See also Mooney et al. 2012, p. 217. It 
is observed by Mooney et al. that the scientists who gathered at Asilomar were keen to avoid the term 
geoengineering and the final statement of meeting did not coin geoengineering.  
38 See Barrett 2008, pp. 45-54. 
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contentious and consequential.”39 The definitions articulated by those who favour climate 
engineering evidently underscore the technological manipulation of the earth systems. The 
definitions of climate engineering seem to reflect an optimistic confidence in a technological 
solution to the problem of climate change. Going by the accepted conditions of an act being 
climate engineering, the message is clear that climate engineering has the direct imprint of a 
technical fix. Keith (2000) has been articulate in this regard, as he says, “…geoengineering 
implies a countervailing measure or a ‘technical fix.’”40 The terms like intervention and 
manipulation are loaded with technical overtones. This technical determinism in the 
definitions, though necessary for the independent identity of the climate engineering 
approach, may alienate it too much from the other approaches to combat climate change. 
Thus, the definitions of climate engineering seem to already invite a better clarity on the 
status of climate engineering in the various approaches towards combating climate change. 
This confusion prevalent in the literature on the status of climate engineering will be 
discussed in detail in the literature review in the third chapter. It is true that clarity of focus 
and approach is central to every definition. However, greater caution may be helpful not to 
narrow down the overall scope of climate engineering in dealing with a planetary problem.  
Although climate engineering is contemplated in the context of the dangers of climate 
change, it is doubtful if the definite goal of fighting climate change has been given due 
importance in the definitions. The critical observation of Mooney et al. (2012) is relevant in 
this context: “Most definitions of geoengineering include a reference to intent (i.e., to combat 
climate change). But the laudable goal of combating climate change has no place in the 
definition of geoengineering, as it suggests that geoengineering technologies do, in fact, 
combat climate change.”41 The framing of the climate engineering definitions seem to be 
cautious, and perhaps even deceptive. Most definitions champion the cause of fighting 
climate change without a professed commitment to the goal and with no stated assurance of 
the results. It gives climate engineering, as Mooney et al. have commented, “a veneer of 
respectability and efficacy it has not earned.”42 
As mentioned above, the overtly scientific character of the definitions of climate 
engineering also seem to reflect a philosophical problematic hidden in the definitions. The 
present dominant definitions seem to be driven by a worldview defined by the instrumentalist 
and mechanical approach towards nature, dominant in the mechanical philosophy of nature of 
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the 16-19th century that was also responsible for the current ecological problems. This is a 
point we will be discussing in detail in our philosophical assessment of the climate 
engineering project in the final chapter of this thesis. The technological paradigm under 
which the climate engineering technologies are to be branded is not without its own inherent 
problems. As Simon Terry has observed, climate engineering does not appreciate the notion 
of human stewardship of the earth, and for geoengineers, ecosystems are mere resources for 
the optimal benefit of the humans and therefore to be ‘fixed’ rather than to be protected or 
restored.43 The highly anthropocentric definition of engineering, given by the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, as “the application of science to the optimum conversion of the resources of 
nature to the uses of humankind,”44 could be recollected in this context. As the Indian 
ecologist, Vandana Shiva, laments, “It’s an engineering paradigm that created the fossil fuel 
age that gave us climate change... Geoengineering is trying to solve the problems in the same 
old mind-set of controlling nature.”45 The environmental categories of a pre-ecological age 
like anthropocentrism, mechanism, reductionism, and, instrumentalism seem to be the hidden 
frames governing the present day attempts at defining climate engineering. Understandably, 
the terms like “intervention,” and “manipulation” are sure to invite the displeasure of the 
deep ecologists – the proponents of the organic interconnectedness of life advocating 
particularly the metaphor, the web of life - as it does not augment well the new nuances of the 
nature-human relationship restored by the environmental philosophies. 
 
2.3 History of Climate Engineering 
An historical understanding might inform a richer understanding of the ethical 
understanding. Looking at the evolving dynamics of the present status of climate engineering 
proposals will give us lessons for decisions and choices about human intervention with earth 
systems. It has been observed in the literature that there is no comprehensive history of 
climate engineering existing to date.46 Though most historical descriptions of climate 
engineering begin with the postwar attempts at weather and climate modifications, more 
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comprehensive discussions take the history back to the ancient mythological and imaginative 
dreams of controlling nature. We shall attempt a short description of the evolutionary 
development of climate engineering spanning over the mythological and scientific periods 
with a view to articulate the significance of historical perspective in the ethical deliberations 
on climate engineering.  
 
2.3.1 The Mythical and Mystical Allusions 
 Some scholarly literature sections on the history or schemes of climate engineering 
carry an allusion to the metaphor of “moving the earth,” attributed to Archimedes who is 
believed to have said in the second century BCE, “Give me a lever long enough and a place 
to stand, and I will move the world.”47 Given the ambitious aspirations of the climate 
engineering schemes, Archimedes’ claim may be considered, analogically, as the most 
ancient metaphor of climate engineering claims. For that matter, it is not without reason that 
some authors take the history of climate engineering way down by millennia.48 Analogically, 
climate engineering may be given a reference to the mythological and religious roots of 
modifying the weather and praying for a control over the climate as seen in the Greek, 
Roman and Indian traditions. In such mythological and religious traditions, natural gods 
governed the order of nature.49 Later, it was unto science to facilitate the shift from a god-
governed universe to a law-governed universe. As the case with any form of science, climate 
engineering too represents faith in a law-governed nature and the potential control over 
nature based on the knowledge of its laws. 
There are anticipations of climate engineering ambitions in the literary traditions as 
well. Homer’s Odyssey, Shakespeare’s Tempest, Milton’s Paradise Lost, and Dante’s Divine 
Comedy are some literary examples bearing imaginative imprints of human intervention with 
nature’s weather and control over nature. The megalomaniac powers of the gods and 
magicians over weather and climate depicted in myth and literature are now desired by 
engineers and futurists as reflected in the climate engineering hopes.50 The vision embodied 
in such fiction thinking will have something to suggest to climate engineering, because, as 
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Fleming (2010) comments, “myth, magic, religion, and legend are not relics of the past but 
constitute deep roots and living sparks of contemporary practices.”51 
 
2.3.2 Early Motives – Weather Control 
Fleming (2010) identifies the traces of “geoengineering” as a form of control over 
environment in the early practices like seeking shelter from the elements, using fire for 
warmth, herding animals, cultivating plants, and moving and storing fresh water.52 For 
Lovelock (2009), “we became geoengineers soon after our species started using fire for 
cooking,”53 and, for geoscientist William Ruddiman (2005), there was climate engineering 
since millennia with extensive deforestation and agriculture.54 The seventeenth century 
Baconian hubris in the powers of technology was notably applied to meteorology and 
climatology.  
 
Thomas Jefferson had thought of climate engineering at the beginnings of the 19th  
century itself. Jefferson proposed to dry marshes and clear forests to improve the American 
climate.55American meteorologist James Pollard Espy’s proposal of making rain may be 
treated as the first “scientific” proposal at “geoengineering.” In his The Philosophy of Storms, 
published in 1841,56 Espy put forward a thermal theory of storm formation. Epsy claimed a 
connection between volcanic eruptions and rains57 and proposed that great fire can produce 
rain. If a huge fireball could thrust a large amount of air to move upward in a column, it 
would produce a self-sustaining cloud that in turn would absorb more air and form more 
clouds and cause rain.58 The proposal bestowed on him the moniker “Storm King.”59 The 
American Senate turned down his proposal for its strangeness and lack of convincing 
scientific back up. It is commented on Epsy that “The public at large think of him (Epsy) as a 
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sort of madman, who fancies that he can produce artificial rain.”60 There were also some 
groups cannonading clouds to discharge rain. Epsy’s rainmaking proposals were followed up 
by a group of artillerists and “rain fakers,” who may be branded as the pluviculturalists.61 The 
charlatans would mix up chemicals and dispense them from top by collecting money from 
poor farmers. Then there were the fog removal techniques like firing the clouds with sands, 
burning large amount of gasoline, and spraying calcium chloride.62 The emerging air 
conditioning techniques of 1930s were a form of weather control.  
Traces of climate engineering, in the sense of manipulating the carbon cycle of the 
earth, could be seen in the beginnings of the 20th century itself. Ironically, the initial purpose 
of manipulating CO2 was not to cool the earth, rather, to warm it up! Swedish chemist Svante 
Arrhenius63 and meteorologist N. Ekholm64 are two early scientists who studied the relation 
between CO2 and weather changes. Arrhenius is one of the first scientists who investigated 
the link between carbon dioxide levels and global temperatures. Arrhenius feared the return 
of the ice age. According to him the earth in future might be “visited by a new ice period that 
will drive us from our temperate countries into the hotter climates of Africa.”65 The solution 
he proposed to it was a virtuous cycle in which the burning of fossil fuels could help prevent 
a rapid return to the conditions of an ice age.66He also thought that by increasing the CO2 
emissions by fossil fuel burning, agricultural productivity could be increased. 
Similarly, Ekholm also suggested the merits of increased CO2 and its positive impacts 
on plant growth. Based on the works of Arrhenius, Joseph Fourier, and John Tyndall, Ekholm 
reached at the scientific conclusion that CO2 is a crucial factor in the greenhouse effect. He 
speculated about engineering the enhancement of CO2 emission. He thought that burning coal 
for a period about one millennium might be required for the rise in the global temperature due 
to CO2 concentration. Interestingly, he went a step further to suggest that this process should 
be accelerated by burning the coal exposed in shallow seams.67The ambitious climate 
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regulation dreams are anticipated by Ekholm as he says, “It is too early to judge of how far 
Man might be capable of thus regulating the future climate. But already the view of such a 
possibility seems to me so grand that I cannot help thinking that it will afford Mankind 
hitherto unforeseen means of evolution.”68Fleming (2010) comments that Ekholm 
accomplished the reunification of the two timescales (the human historical and the 
geological) and the two agencies (anthropogenic forces and natural forces) in a new form.69 
In a period when the carbon dioxide theory did not find favour with the scientists, 
British steam engineer, Stewart Callendar, reformulated this theory with more scientific data 
and facts. Callendar’s findings established the carbon dioxide theory of climate change in 
1938.70 Compiling various weather data, Callendar showed the increase in the earth’s 
temperature by 0.50C in the early decades of the 20th century. He also estimated the 290 parts 
per million concentration of carbon dioxide in the closing decades of the 19th century, and, an 
increase of 10 parts per million in the early decades of the 20th century that was proportionate 
to the amount of fossil fuel burned. Legitimately, the modern theory of the green house effect 
due to anthropogenic causes is called the Callendar effect.71 Unfortunately, like Arrhenius, 
Callendar also viewed the rise in temperature only positively, thinking that it is helpful to 
humankind for more productive agriculture and for delaying the ice age. Parkinson comments 
that Callendar’s underestimation of the rise of CO2 was responsible for this favorable 
assessment. Callendar had only projected a rise in the mean temperature of 0.390C from the 
19th to the 21st Century. Had he anticipated the actual rise in the temperature, his assessment 
of the net impact of the rise in temperature would have been different.72 
In the first half of the 20th Century, the US and the USSR were at the forefront of 
weather control research. In the US, the focus of climate and weather modification was on 
increasing the precipitation. The USSR operations reached their peak in the 1960s. The 
communist party of the Soviet Union listed weather modification as one of the major 
scientific priorities of the USSR in its 22nd Congress in 1961. In the early half of the 20th 
century, the USSR also concentrated significantly on climate control. The USSR established 
the Leningrad’s Institute of Rainmaking in 1932. Experiments with cloud seeding using 
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calcium chloride, dry ice, and silver iodide were carried out from 1932. An experiment held 
in 1960-1961 claims to have cleared the clouds over a vast area of 20000 km.73 Unlike the US 
focus on weather modification, the USSR had a sustained focus on climate modification 
probably owing to its harsh climatic conditions.74 Construction of reservoirs, chemical 
control of evaporation, and removal of the arctic ice for increased warmth were some of the 
ambitious plans of the climate modification projects of USSR during the 1950s and 1960s. 
The climate engineering models in Russia, more in the geographical sense, was represented 
in the writings of N. Rusin and L. Flit, who wrote in 1960, that “… if we want to improve our 
planet and make it more suitable for life, we must alter its climate.”75 They also cautioned 
that changes in climate should not be used for hostile intentions.76 
 The ambitious climate engineering schemes of Russia included diverting the rivers 
from the Arctic and Mediterranean to the wheat fields and to the Asian region in USSR, and 
creation of a ‘Siberian Sea’ using the waters of Caspian Sea and Aral Sea areas. Such designs 
for climate change, “written at the height of human technological hubris in the mid-twentieth 
century, certainly is filled with, if nothing else, entertaining geoengineering schemes.”77 
However, as Schneider (2008) has observed, the contrast between the flowery rhetoric of 
climate engineering and the ecological disaster in the Aral Sea today,78 is a lesson that 
“environmental degradation is associated with much less ambitious engineering projects.”79 
 
2.3.3 Weather Warfare 
Stephan Farris’s worry that “(c)limate change has the power to unsettle boundaries 
and shake up geopolitics, usually for the worse,”80 may also have been caused by the history 
of weather control exercises. Weather has played a crucial role in defining the final fate of 
many battles. Understandably, militarisation of weather – the control of weather for military 
purpose – has been attempted in several wars from ancient days through to the Vietnam War. 
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Scientists engaged in the weather control experiments in the early decades of the 20th century 
assumed the role of the “weather warriors”81 by the middle of the 20th century.  
Meteorologists made crucial contributions to World War I as they developed 
principles of battlefield climatology82 necessary for the flight of the warplanes and artillery 
shelling. Weather control designs were dominant in the use of meteorology for military 
purposes too. Prominent mathematician at Princeton, John von Neumann’s overall approach 
is reflected in his own words: “All stable processes we shall predict. All unstable processes 
we shall control.”83 Vladimir K. Zworykin, at the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 
Laboratory in Princeton suggested in 1945 that accurate knowledge of cloud physics would 
lead to effective weather control.84 John von Neumann developed computer-modelling 
systems for numerical weather predictions.  
However, the early signs of the growing ethical anxieties about climate control could 
be seen in von Neumann himself. In 1955, he described climate control as an “abnormal 
science,” as he was much apprehensive of the potential climatic dangers and the possibility of 
international conflicts.85 Harry Wexler at US Weather Bureau sent the warnings against the 
modern day attempts at climate control including the threat to the ozone layer. Here we find 
the beginnings of social and ethical concerns taking on technology even at the dawn of the 
modern climate engineering hopes. 
In World War II, the U.S. itself is said to have trained approximately 8,000 weather 
officers, to furnish crucial information for bombing raids, naval task forces, and routine 
operations worldwide.86 The post war scenario saw aggressive research in developing 
military program in weather control. The cloud-seeding techniques developed at the General 
Electric Corporation were the major focus of research and development in the cold war 
period. The era of cloud seeding began in November 1946 when an airborne test was 
conducted by dropping dry ice pellets into clouds over Mount Greylock. General Electric 
claimed that their experiments succeeded in making snowflakes. The 1947 Annual Report of 
General Electric read, “Further experiments in weather control led to a new knowledge 
which, it is believed now, will result in inestimable benefits for mankind.”87 
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In 1950, Langmuri, the leading scientist on cloud seeding, equated weather control 
with atomic power and claimed that weather control “can be as powerful a war weapon as the 
atom bomb.”88 Langmuri’s idea was to seed the cloud with the silver iodide, water, or dry ice, 
which could kick off a sort of reaction within the cloud resulting in severe drought or 
torrential downpours and flood. These calamities, consequentially, lead to the interruptions in 
the movement of the enemy troops and their food supply. Cloud seeding has the additional 
advantage that the movement of the wind-driven clouds was unidirectional and it was easy to 
deny the responsibility for the same attributing it to natural causes. Several experiments with 
Langmuri’s cloud seeding did not produce any results and said to have highlighted only the 
need for better knowledge about the basics of cloud physics.89 The storm modification 
projects90 through seeding wrought international accusations against the US.91 
 The USSR experiments along the line further accelerated the pace of the weather 
warfare in the cold war era. In 1958, Howard T. Orville, the US Presidents’ weather adviser, 
stated: “If an unfriendly nation gets into a position to control the large-scale weather patterns 
before we can, the result could even be more disastrous than nuclear warfare.”92 In the 
subsequent decades, the cold war agenda largely governed the weather control researches too. 
The military intentions also contributed to fresh proposals and researches in the field. 
Project Popeye and Operation Motorpool carried out by US are perhaps the most 
infamous episodes in the history of the weather warfare. The US air force seeded about sixty-
eight cloud targets over Southern Laos with a view to increase the rainfall and prolong the 
monsoon, which would obstruct the movement of the Vietnamese army. St. Amand, the 
designer of the project, reported, “the first [cloud] we seeded grew like an atomic bomb 
explosion and it rained very heavily out of it and everybody was convinced with that one 
experiment that we’d done enough.”93 Operation Motorpool, was most secretly conducted 
from 1967 to 1972. The public outrage described it as the “Watergate of weather 
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warfare.”94Geoscientist Gordon J. F. MacDonald opined that one of the most crucial lessons 
from Vietnam weather warfare is “that one can conduct covert operations using a new 
technology in a democracy without the knowledge of the people.”95 
The militarisation of weather finally precipitated the formulation and enforcement of 
the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) in 1978. The ENMOD in a way 
officially marked the end of the era of militarisation of weather. Although there were several 
loopholes in the formulation of the ENMOD, it put the UN on a stand and course of action 
against weather modification for military purposes.96 Gradually, beginning with mid-1970s, 
the weather control plans were replaced with researches in CO2-induced changes in climate. 
This shift was accelerated by the growing awareness of the failure of the weather control 
techniques, growing public dissent against the US militarisation of weather, and the growing 
environmental awareness.97 
 
2.3.4 Controlling the Radiation Budget 
 In the USSR, M. Gorodsky and V. Cherenkov advanced the proposal of white 
particles injected in the space around the earth in the path of sunlight, something like the ring 
around Saturn, to generate a 12 per cent increase in solar radiation. The purpose of the Saturn 
like rings envisaged by them, unlike that of the present day SRM techniques, was to heat up 
the poles.98 Ironically, the discussions in USSR on inadvertent whether modifications, and on 
the side effects of deliberate climate changes are said to be the earliest engineering proposal 
on cooling the climate against climate warming caused by industrial operations.99 
Harry Wexler was the head of research at the US Weather Bureau. In 1958, he 
anticipated the modern ideas of tinkering with the earth’s heat budget, describing the two 
streams of radiant energy, namely, the downward stream consisting the heat absorbed by 
earth, and the upward stream of infrared radiation to space from Earth’s surface. In his 1962 
speech, “On the Possibilities of Climate Control,” he stated that “(t)he subject of weather and 
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climate control is now becoming respectable to talk about.”100 President John F. Kennedy in 
his address to the UN in 1961 had spoken of “cooperative efforts between all nations in 
weather prediction and eventually in weather control.”101 Wexler wrote: “In seeking to 
modify climate and weather on a grand scale it is tempting to speculate about ways to change 
the shape of these basic radiation curves by artificial means.”102 He proposed to do it by 
changing the reflectivity of the Earth. Wexler too did not stay away from sharing the 
“growing anxieties” on climate control, as he stated, “Man, in applying his growing energies 
and facilities against the power of the winds and storms, may do so with more enthusiasm 
than knowledge and so cause more harm than good.”103 Given the immense contributions of 
Wexler in this regard, the significant observation of Fleming carries the tone of a sort of 
historical rectification: “Remember, it was not Paul Crutzen in 2006 but Harry Wexler about 
fifty years before who first claimed that climate control was now ‘respectable to talk about,’ 
even if he considered it quite dangerous and undesirable.”104 
 
2.3.5 Recent Developments 
Italian physicist, Cesare Marchetti, coined the term ‘geoengineering’ informally in 
1970. Formally, he coined it in 1977 in Climatic Change.105 The coinage of the term referred 
to a method for ‘disposal’ of atmospheric CO2 through injection into sinking thermohaline 
oceanic currents. Russian climatologist, Mikhail Budyko (1974) also shared similar views on 
countervailing inadvertent climate changes, as he wrote, “…it becomes incumbent on us to 
develop a plan for climate modification that will maintain existing climatic conditions, in 
spite of the tendency toward a temperature increase due to man’s economic activity.”106 
NASA’s James Hansen’s announcement in 1988 that “global warming has begun”107 
is considered the beginning of the recent engagements with global warming. Following it, 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and World Meteorological Organization 
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(WMO) convened a conference and decided to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% by 2005. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in the same year with a 
view to provide periodic assessments of “the scientific, technical and socioeconomic 
information relevant for the understanding of the risk of human-induced climate change.”108 
Following the earth summit in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) set the goal of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases below the dangerous levels.  
In 1983, a report for the National Research Council carried the statement of Thomas 
Schelling, who wrote, “technologies for global cooling, perhaps by injecting the right 
particles into the stratosphere, perhaps by subtler means, [might] become economical during 
coming decades.”109 In 1984, Stanford Solomon Penner, at the University of California–San 
Diego, suggested that the global warming could be offset if commercial airlines are used to 
emit more particulates to increase the Earth’s albedo. James Early at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory revived the issue of space mirrors in 1989 when he recommended the 
construction of a solar shield “to offset the greenhouse effect.”110 In 1988, plans of ocean 
fertilization were proposed by biogeochemist John Martin. He stated: “Give me half a tanker 
of iron, and I’ll give you an ice age,” 111 In the same year companies like Climos, Planktos, 
GreenSea Ventures, and the Ocean Nourishment Corporation had the commercial plans for 
dumping iron into the ocean.  
On June 15, 1991, Mount Pinatubo in Philippines erupted and it spewed molten lava 
over 250 square miles and threw millions of tons of ash into the atmosphere. It served as an 
aerosol cloud, reflecting sunlight by roughly 10 percent for nearly two years. The Pinatubo 
effect reduced the average global temperature by about 0.9 degrees Fahrenheit. The Pinatubo 
effect was a natural analogy to a scientific experiment giving interesting clues to scientists.  
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The 1992 National Academy of Sciences report, Policy Implications of Greenhouse 
Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base, presented climate engineering as 
one of the cheapest options in mitigation. In 2003, the Pentagon report, titled, “An Abrupt 
Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security,” 
recommended the government to “explore geoengineering options that control the 
climate.”112 The symposium organized by the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research in 
Cambridge, also ventured to “identify, debate, and evaluate”113 the various engineering 
designs for containing climate change. In 2005 Hansen’s warning that the “tipping point” is 
nearing further fuelled climate concerns. Moreover, according to James Lovelock (2006) the 
earth had already crossed the tipping point.114 In 2005, in Russia, scientist Yuri Izrael, the 
head of the Global Climate and Ecology Institute, suggested to President Vladimir Putin 
designs of burning sulphur in stratosphere to fight global warming. An actual exercise in 
“climate engineering” was done on August 8, 2008 by China before the start of the Beijing 
Olympics. China fired around thousand rockets loaded with silver iodide to clear off the rain 
clouds over the Olympics stadium. In 2009, Klaus Lackner proposed the concept of artificial 
trees inhaling CO2 from the atmosphere.
115 
In 2006, Nobel laureate Crutzen’s editorial on climate engineering116 gave serious 
momentum to the climate engineering proposals. Though it shared similarities to the plans of 
Budyko, it was framed by different environmental and policy concerns.117 Crutzen did not 
consider albedo enhancement as the best option. Instead, he recommended exploring and 
debating sulphate aerosol injection.118 Several conferences on climate engineering followed, 
including those at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2007, at MIT in 2009, and 
the convention in Asilomar in California in 2010. In 2009, there were reports of a climate 
engineering field test conducted by Izrael and this team in Russia to study the passage of 
solar radiation through aerosol. The Novim Group report of 2009 on climate engineering 
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discussed the possibility of firing the ozone layer with aerosols.119 In 2009, The Royal 
Society of London dedicated a special issue of the Philosophical Transactions to discuss 
climate engineering.120In 2009, there was also the special report of the Royal Society, titled, 
Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty. 
In October 2008, on a dissenting note, Scientific American carried an editorial, titled, 
“The Hidden Dangers of Geoengineering.” It described climate engineering as a fringe 
science with serious side effects. In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama's science 
advisor, John Holdren, stated that the United States could not afford to the “luxury” of taking 
climate engineering “off the table.”121 He advocated looking at deliberate efforts to 
countervail climate change. The first attempts at a large-scale climate engineering field test 
was made by ‘Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering,’ a British academic 
consortium, in 2011. Its design was to inject reflective particles into the atmosphere with the 
help of 20-kilometer-long hose attached to a lofted hot-air balloon. This experiment did not 
take off due to political and public resistance.122 
In 2012, The National Natural Science Foundation of China included climate 
engineering as a scientific research priority. In the US, in 2013, the CIA and National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) joined hands to fund research into various climate engineering 
techniques. It was found in the same year that atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide 
surpassed 400 parts per million. IPCC, in its submission to the Fifth Assessment Report 
(AR5) of Working Group I, referred to climate engineering techniques, but “stopped short of 
endorsing them.”123On April 15, 2014, IPCC released its Working Group 3, “Mitigation of 
Climate Change,” report that is preparatory to the 5th Assessment Report to be finalized in 
Copenhagen, on 27-31 October, 2014. Climate geoengineering was included in all three 
working groups of the IPCC Assessment Report 5. 
Still today, climate engineering proposals remain at the concept level with inadequate 
field tests, limiting the purview of experiments to computer simulations. 
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Table 2.2: The following table presents the major anecdotes in the historical development of 
the climate engineering in relation to the weather control and climate change, in 
chronological order.  
 
Year Agent Description 
1841 James Pollard Epsy The “Science” of Storm and Rainmaking 
1896 Svante Arrhenius CO2 and temperature rise 
1900 Thomas Jefferson Speculation on weather control 
1901 Ekholm CO2 and temperature rise 
1932 USSR Rainmaking Institute Cloud Seeding with solid CO2 
1938 Stewart Callendar Reformulation of the CO2 Theory 
1945 John von Neumann Developments in meteorology 
1945 Vladimir K. Zworykin Developments in meteorology 
1946 General Electric Research 
Laboratory 
Cloud Seeding Researches 
1950 Langmuri Cloud seeding and ‘atom bomb’ analogy  
1956 General Electric Research 
Laboratory 
Ice-crystal formation by dry ice 
1950s Irving Langmuir Massive seeding of weather systems 
1950-60 N. Rusin and L. Flit Geological Engineering plans in USSR 
1958 Howard T. Orville Advice to US President on Military use 
1958 Harry Wexler Earth’s Heat budget control plan 
1960-1961 Leningrad’s Institute of 
Rainmaking 
Cloud seeding in USSR 
1960 M. Gorodsky and V. Cherenkov Proposal for Injection of particles into 
space 
1967-72 US Military Project Popeye and Operation Motorpool 
1970 Cesare Marchetti Informal coinage of the term 
“geoengineering” 
1978 UN ENMOD 
1980s L. Francis Warren Universal System of Weather Control 
1983 Thomas Schelling Proposal for stratosphere aerosol injection 
1984 Stanford Solomon Penner Proposal for increasing earth’s albedo 
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1988 John Martin Plans for ocean fertilization 
1988 Climos, Planktos, GreenSea 
Ventures, and the Ocean 
Nourishment Corporation 
Commercial plans for ocean fertilization 
1988 Klaus Lackner Concept of ‘artificial trees’ 
1989 James Early Solar shield concept 
1988 James Hansen’s  Warning on Global Warming 
1988 UN Establishment of IPCC 
1990 IPCC First assessment report 
1991  Mount Pinatubo eruption 
1992 National Academy of Sciences Recommendation of climate engineering 
1992 UNCED(United Nations 
Conference on Environment and 
Development)124 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 
1992 UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) 
1995 IPCC Second assessment report 
1997 UNCED Kyoto Protocol 
2001 IPCC Third assessment report 
2003 Pentagon Recommendation of climate engineering 
2003 Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research 
Various climate engineering designs 
2005 Hansen Warning on “tipping point”  
2005 UN Kyoto Protocol into force 
2005 Yuri Izrael Plans for stratosphere sulphur burning  
2006 Paul Crutzen Editorial in Climatic Change 
2007 American Academy of Arts and 
Science 
Climate engineering conference 
2007 IPCC Fourth assessment report 
2008 China Cloud firing before Olympics 
2009 MIT Climate engineering conference 
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2009 Izrael Climate engineering field test 
2009 Novim Group Report on Ozone firing 
2009 Royal Society Special issue of Philosophical 
Transactions 
2009 Royal Society Report on climate engineering 
2009 John Holdren Recommendation to US President 
2010 Margaret Leinen,  
Climate Response Fund 
Asilomar Climate engineering 
Conference 
2011 British academic consortium Proposed field test of stratospheric 
particle injection 
2012 The National Natural Science 
Foundation of China 
Climate engineering as a scientific 
research priority.  
2013 CIA & NAS Funding for climate engineering 
techniques 
2013 National Organic and 
Atmospheric Administration 
Centre (NOAA) 
CO2 concentration said to have surpassed 
400 parts per million 
2013 IPCC References to climate engineering in 
submission to the Fifth Assessment 
Report 
2014 IPCC Working Group 3 Report 
 
2.3.6 Lessons from the History of Climate Engineering 
 The history of climate engineering shows that climate engineering was not always 
value-free, as many exponents of weather and climate engineering were keen to highlight the 
dangers of side effects and possibilities of misuse, or there were social and public outcries on 
such ventures holding the scientists more responsible. It has been seen that the resistance to 
engineering and weather control has been co-existent with such moves, beginning with the 
first proposal of rain making by Epsy. The social and ethical appropriation were well 
anticipated, though nominally. Scientists Harry Wexler and Stephan Farris stand tall in the 
history in highlighting the dormant ethical issues in the scientific research. Even as Dyson 
proposed aerosol injection initially, it is observed that he envisaged it only as a design to buy 
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time for mitigation projects.125 This should provide some norms for modern day geoengineers 
in discerning the status of climate engineering as a Plan A, or Plan B.126 
Nations of the world have abandoned many weather and climate control projects as and 
when they proved themselves to be flawed. This historical precedence might help dispel the 
apprehension that research and development, including field tests, necessarily lead to 
deployment of climate engineering.127 Scientific rationality does not require the extreme 
evidence of a doom to discern the efficacy or inefficacy of a hypothesis. Humans can easily 
do away with unsuccessful projects however ambitious they may be. Climate engineering 
history has the double-edged warning against oversimplification. 
It can be seen that there were several flawed hypotheses and failed experiments in the 
history of climate control. It forces Fleming (2010) to coin the phrase, “the checkered 
history”128 to describe the history of climate engineering. Climate science has not reached the 
level of fully understanding the laws and dynamics of the complex climate 
mechanism.129Fleming (2010) seems harsh on geoengineers when he assesses their projects 
as based on “back-of-the-envelope calculations”130 or their “flawed anti-heroics” as 
“tragicomedy—or perhaps just comedy….”131 But it speaks volumes for the required 
scientific maturation of the field. 
The history further reflects the lack of environmental foresight. Historical far-sightedness 
has been missing in the history of climate engineering. Some resultsof early climate 
engineering were harmful to the global climate on a long term and at a larger scale. Early 
weather modification projects like warming the earth, removal of the Arctic ice, cultivation of 
the Saharan desert and the alleged detrimental impact of some of the early projects on present 
climate changes testify to the humbling fact that in climate sciences, the far-sightedness does 
not extend even a century ahead. It warrants double-checking the dangers of the historical 
conditioning of our present plans, and the possibility of them to be anachronistically 
redundant or counterproductive. The present inconclusive scientific knowledge on the 
processes and dynamics of the global climate may be limiting our perception of the present 
climate change, and, the limits of our present-day engineering technologies might be limiting 
our responses to the climate change. Fleming’s observation that the “… the current crop of 
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geoengineers has yet to acknowledge the checkered history of the subject”132 does not reflect 
a happy state of affairs with the present assessments of climate engineering. 
Further, the history of climate engineering also highlights concerns about dormant 
worldviews and philosophies. The invasive engagements also reflect a mindset of control and 
conquer.133 We could see that “climate engineering” projects had also shared some of the 
perennial human quest to control. The claims of several weather “engineers” over the history 
have been far-fetched from real science, tantamount to science fiction, perhaps only justified 
by the innate quest for dominance. There seems to be some overestimation of the scientific 
powers by such engineers to some extent. It is likely that even if the technology is well-
intentioned, unless it is properly framed, this may be misrepresented before the public. The 
recent trend among climate engineering scientists to avoid the use of the very term climate 
engineeringseems to be a rectification along similar line. History could serve as a helpful 
frame for a more realistic assessment of the technology. A critical reflection on the history of 
climate engineeringis helpful for evaluating the principles of our interaction with nature. 
History also shows the vulnerability of the technology to be skewed towards military 
intention. The commercial and military deviations seen in history can be a critical reference 
to the future assessment of the climate engineering proposals, especially its governance. 
History tells us that the arguments against climate engineering focused on the dangers of 
militarisation and commercialisation cannot be dismissed at the outset. 
The history of climate engineering seems to be tactfully silent about the link between the 
early weather control attempts and the present engagement with climate change. Though 
climate engineering is considered popularly as a modern engineering technology, the 
historical analysis tells us that it constitutes the latest phase in a historical continuum. 
However, this continuity is not adequately reflected in the present literature. As Keith (2000) 
observes: “Whereas there are modern intellectual histories of climate change…, and 
treatments of climate and weather modification that date from the 1970s…, there is little 
modern analysis that explores the links between weather and climate modification and current 
concerns about climate change.”134 Conversely, Keith has examined the continuity between 
early climate modification attempts or weather control and the present day climate 
engineering attempts. He makes the important distinction between the two that while the 
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early climate modifications dealt with mitigating the natural hazards or improving the natural 
states, the present day climate engineering tries to mitigate the impact of the anthropogenic 
climate hazards.135 Among the three defining conditions of climate engineering set by Keith, 
namely, scale, intent and countervailing measures, weather and climate modifications met 
only the first two.136 Keith (2000) also highlights the continuities and similarities between the 
early weather control and present climate engineering: “The case for continuity rests on the 
similarity of proposed technical methods, the continuity of citations to earlier work, a 
similarity of debate about legal and political problems, and finally, the strong resemblance of 
climate and weather modification to geoengineering …”137 
In a nutshell, an analysis of the history of climate engineering shows how a technical 
issue is associated with “socio-technical hybrid issues.”138 Further scientific and 
technological assessment of climate engineering can be done meaningfully only in its 
historical, political, ethical and philosophical contexts. 
 
2.4Climate Engineering Schemes 
There is an array of technologies branded under climate engineering, ranging from the 
down to earth planting of trees to space based giant mirrors. In addition, no territory on earth 
or even space seems to be spared from the range of operation of these technologies. Climate 
engineering technologies, collectively taken, have a literally global target area, as the range of 
deployment of climate engineering technique may cover forests, desert lands, roof tops, soil, 
polar ice, sea ice, Northern and Southern poles, equatorial regions, surface ocean, deep ocean, 
coastal sediments, underwater, clouds, atmosphere, stratosphere, and space. 
 The most popular division of climate engineering is into two broad categories, 
namely, Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar Radiation Management (SRM) 
techniques. This is the standard division made in the Royal Society report in 2009.139 
However, there are also other classifications followed by other authors. For example, 
American Meteorological Society (AMS) has a third category called “other” proposals.140 
Depending on the target area to be manipulated by particular set of technologies, there are 
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also subsets and subsets to subsets in the classification of climate engineering techniques. Yet 
another criterion employed is the common or territorial range of governance.141 
 Naively put, both SRM and CDR are on a ‘reduction’ mission. While SRM tries to 
reduce the solar radiation absorbed by the earth, CDR tries to reduce the carbon dioxide 
levels in the atmosphere. In terms of the alteration of radiative energy, SRM and CDR are 
also called short-wave climate engineering and long-wave climate engineering respectively, 
where long-wave refers to thermal radiation and short-wave to solar radiation.142 Some say, 
SRM schemes “essentially put a dimmer switch on the sun.”143 
 
Figure 1: The following figure presents the various climate engineering options. Although 
this figure presents engineered flow of carbon as a separate climate engineering technology 
option, we treat it under the CDR techniques, as it is the dominant mode of classification in 
the literature. 
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Source: T. M. Lenton and N.E. Vaughan, “The Radiative Forcing Potential of Different 
Climate geoengineering Options,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, vol. 9,:15 (2009). 
Adapted by CongressionalResearch Survey (CRS). 
 
 
2.4.1 CDR Methods 
CDR may be subdivided into land based CDR and ocean based CDR. Both land based 
CDR and ocean based CDR may be divided into three subcategories, namely, physical, 
biological and chemical, depending on the type of intervention.144 Following the scheme 
given by the Royal Society, the various CDR techniques can be organized in the following 
manner as in the Table below: 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Table of CDR Methods145 
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 Biological Physical Chemical 
Land Based 
Techniques 
Afforestation and 
land use 
Atmospheric CO2 scrubbers 
(‘air capture’) 
In-situ carbonation of 
silicates 
Basic minerals (incl. 
olivine) on soil 
Biomass/fuels with 
carbon sequestration 
In-situ carbonation of 
silicates 
 
 Basic minerals (incl. 
olivine) on soil 
 
Ocean Based 
Techniques 
Iron fertilization Changing overturning 
circulation 
Alkalinity enhancement 
(grinding, dispersing 
and dissolving 
limestone, silicates, or 
calcium 
hydroxide) 
Phosphorus/nitrogen 
Fertilisation 
 
  
Enhanced upwelling   
 
The scientific assumption behind CDR methods is that the concentration of 
anthropogenic greenhouses in the atmosphere is the main reason for global warming and by 
removing these green house gases, especially CO2, global warming can be contained. The 
removal of CDR should be to such levels as to stop global warming.146 CDR methods, in 
general, collect and store CO2 by biological, physical, or chemical means. CO2 storing is 
technically CO2 capture and sequestration. The proposed methods include afforestation, 
ocean fertilization, weathering of certain sedimentary rocks, or combining carbon capture and 
storage technology with the production of biofuels, among other approaches. We shall 
discuss below the leading proposals in CDR. 
 
2.4.1.1 Carbon Capture and Sequestration 
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CO2 is emitted both from the anthropogenic causes and naturally from earth’s carbon 
cycle. Vegetation in its process of growth absorbs large amount of atmospheric carbon and 
returns most of it when they decompose. Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) refers to 
the capturing of CO2 emitted from anthropogenic sources.
147 Biomass, bioenergy and fossil 
fuel burning are the sources of CCS technologies.148 Growth of biomass can be manipulated 
by land carbon sinks (on site burial in soil). Bioenergy Carbon Sequestration (BECS) is a 
subset of carbon sequestration. In BECS, biomass is used for creating bioenergy like 
hydrogen or electricity and the CO2 produced by it is sequestered in geological formation. 
Biomass can be sequestered as organic material, like burying trees and the waste from crops, 
or by converting it to biochar.149 Biomass could be buried also in the deep ocean. There are 
reports that oceans can store carbon for centuries and carbonate rocks can store carbon for 
thousands of years.150 
However, its effectiveness and costs are still to be estimated. The residence period of 
biochar in soil is still uncertain. The question of whether it is better to ‘bury or burn?’ biochar 
is still unsettled. Besides, the requirement of large amount of energy for transporting and 
burying biochar is a concern. Royal Society finds the most serious concern that its processes 
may adversely impact growth, nutrient cycling and the viability of the ecosystems.151 The 
decomposition of the organic material in the deep ocean and its return to surface is likely. 
Further, the absence of adequate parameters makes the cost-effectiveness assessment 
                                                          
147 See, Kelsi Bracmort and Richard K. Lattanzio, “Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy,” 
Congressional Research Service Report (2013), p. 10. There are natural mechanisms for capturing and storing 
CO2 in vegetation and Plankton, including the CO2 from anthropogenic sources. Oceans and vegetation have 
natural carbon sinks. 
148 Among these three sources, fossil fuel burning is not considered as geoengineering. If only the CCS 
technology has biomass or bioenergy as it source, it is treated as geoengineering. Bracmort and Lattanzio 
observe that it is not clear why the criterion of the of the source is used for labelling CCS as geoengineering and 
not its outcome, that is the reduction in the amount of the CO2 released in the atmosphere. One explanation is the 
fossil fuels are treated as carbon positive, while biomass and bioenergy are considered to be carbon negative. 
See, Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, pp. 10-11. We are aware that biofuels and biomass production and usage are 
not per seclimate engineering activities. However, they are listed under climate engineering as we are following 
the classification of the Royal Society. 
149 Biochar or charcoal is produced when organic matter is decomposed by heating in low oxygen environment. 
(For scientific details of biochar, see, CRS (Congressional Research Service) Report R40186, Biochar: 
Examination of an Emerging Concept to Sequester Carbon, available at 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20110111_R40186_1e80270dec3151cfd6d23ae44223e7cbbcc0b2e9.pdf. 
For more information on agricultural practices that sequester carbon, see CRS Report RL33898, Climate 
Change: The Role of the U.S. Agriculture Sector). The decomposition of biomass, the process known as 
pyrolysis, can produce biochar and biofuel like syngas and bio-oil. In charcoal carbon atoms are bound together 
more strongly than in plant matter and thus it locks in carbon against easy decomposition for long time periods. 
Raw materials for biochar include wood, straw, manure, food waste, etc. Biochar in soil is said to improve 
agricultural productivity (Royal Society 2009, pp. 11-12). 
150 Royal Society 2009, p. 11. 
151 Royal Society 2009, p. 11. 
43 
difficult. Thus, for Royal Society, “it seems unlikely that this (BECS) will be a viable 
technique at any scale that could usefully reduce atmospheric carbon.”152 
Then, there is the method of capturing CO2 from air. “Air capture is an industrial 
process that captures CO2 from ambient air producing a pure CO2 stream for use or 
disposal.”153 Three technological plans for air capture are, Absorption on solids, Absorption 
into highly alkaline solutions, and Absorption into moderately alkaline solutions with a 
catalyst.154 The technical feasibility of this method is confirmed by the present commercial 
practices.155 The lower presence of CO2 in air and the cost of energy and material are 
problems in this approach. Cost-effectiveness is a test that it has to pass. However, Royal 
Society finds it to be “useful and important”156, for, air capture plants can be located close to 
disposal sites like coal and oil fields, and it enables the industries to deal with “hard-to-
control” carbon emissions that cannot be handled by CCS.157 
 
2.4.1.2 Ocean Fertilization 
 Carbon cycle of the earth, in layman’s language, is a give and take between land, 
ocean, atmosphere, vegetation and the other living organisms. Most of the CO2 emitted to the 
atmosphere today will be transferred to the ocean after a period of 1000 years.158 The algae 
on the surface of the ocean and the bacteria at deep sea together act as a “biological pump”159 
for the transfer of CO2 into ocean and its re-return to the surface. The supply of nutrients in 
the ocean defines the process of drawing CO2 into deep sea. Some climate engineering 
schemes attempt to expedite this process of transfer of atmospheric CO2 to the ocean. Ocean 
fertilization is an ocean based approach in CDR. In this approach, nutrients like iron or 
nitrogen are added to the ocean facilitating the growth of the phytoplankton leading to the 
enhanced sequestration of CO2. Phytoplankton stores the carbon in their cells in the 
photosynthesis process and finally sequestrates it in the deep ocean, as they die, as an organic 
matter. Some studies have estimated that one ton of iron can be effective in removing 30,000 
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to 110,000 tons of atmospheric carbon.160 By far, iron is considered to be the best nutrient for 
ocean fertilization. 
 There are several uncertainties prevailing in regard to the ecological and economic 
impacts of the ocean fertilization. The rate of multiplication of phytoplankton and duration of 
sequestration at deep sea are still unsettled issues. While the proponents argue that it 
enhances fish-stock, opponents lists the potential side effects like ocean acidification, further 
production of greenhouse gases, and hostile environment for certain ocean species due to 
excess of oxygen. The need for sustained and prolonged addition of iron is a further 
concern.161 
 
2.4.1.3 Enhanced Weathering 
 One of the indigenous mechanisms of nature for removing the CO2 is the 
disintegration or dissolution of the silicate and carbonate rocks. This is known as weathering. 
The silicate minerals in the rocks consume CO2 and form carbonate. This affects the CO2 
concentration of a given region. But, this is a very slow process taking several thousand 
years, quite disproportionate to the rate of burning fossil fuels. The weather enhancement 
scheme proposes to accelerate the rate of this disintegration. Adding the silicate mineral 
olivine162 to the agricultural soil is a technique proposed for this purpose.163 This is a land 
based and ocean based CDR technique. This technique is based on the chemical reaction of 
silicate rocks with CO2 to form solid minerals. In this reaction, one silicate molecule will 
consume one CO2 molecule and carbon is stored as a solid material on land. In the ocean 
variant of this technique, instead of forming the solid material, the dissolved materials are 
released into the ocean. Compared to the land based approach, the ocean-based approach 
yields the double result, because, in the latter reaction, one silicate molecule consumes two 
CO2. The dissolved materials can be stored only in the ocean. 
The enormous mining required for the large amount of rocks, and its transportation 
and the additional requirements of water and energy are the related environmental threats. 
The scale and cost of the technique is a negative score for this proposal. Ambivalence about 
                                                          
160Hugh Powell, 2017. “Fertilizing the Ocean with Iron: Should We Add Iron to the Sea to Help Reduce 
Greenhouse Gases in the Air,” Oceanus, November 13 (2007). Available at 
http://www.whoi.edu/oceanus/feature/fertilizing-the-ocean-with-iron. Accessed June 23, 2017. Print edition 
Oceanus 46, 1 (January 2017). See, Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, pp. 12-13. 
161 See Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p. 13. 
162 Olivine is a type of silicate rock that can increase the soil quality. 
163 R. D. Schuiling & P. Krijgsman, “Enhanced Weathering: An Effective and Cheap Tool to SequesterCO2,” 
Climate Change 74 (2006): 349–354. 
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the landscape to alter and the long-term impact on the quality of air and water also 
accompany this proposal.164 
 
2.4.1.4 Oceanic Upwelling and Downwelling 
 Basing on the principles of the carbon cycle discussed above, another ocean based 
CDR proposal is the downwelling or upwelling of the ocean. Unlike the chemical 
manipulation of the carbon through the weathering method, in this proposal, the atmospheric 
carbon is transferred to the deep sea by imparting nutrients by upwelling the ocean. 
Upwelling here means manipulating the ocean currents. This is achieved by pumping water 
several hundred meters below the surface with the help of vertical pipes.165Similarly, the 
dense waters in the subpolar oceans will be downwelled.166 It is hoped that rapid increase in 
the circulation will lead to speedy sequestration. The non-local impact of the exercise is the 
concern in this technique. An upwelling on one side of the ocean may be compensated by an 
upwelling on the other side of the globe, which might distort the carbon equilibrium.167 
 
2.4.1.5 Afforestation 
Afforestation is considered as a prime method in carbon storage.168 It is estimated that 
forests can contain ten times more carbon for hundreds of years than non-forest vegetation. 
Therefore, afforestation aims at planting trees in landscapes that have been treeless for some 
time. The type of tree, climate and soil are the decisive factors in the amount of carbon 
stored. The estimate ranges from 2.2 to 9.5 metric tons of CO2 per acre per year.
169 Some 
model recommendations included converting 60 million to 65 million acres of US 
agricultural land to woodlands by 2050.170 Scientific estimation is that a minimum of 20 
years is required to reap the benefit of carbon sequestration from afforestation strategies. 
 
2.4.2 Solar Radiation Management (SRM) 
                                                          
164 See Royal Society 2009, p. 14.  
165 J. E. Lovelock & C.W. Rapley, “Ocean Pipes Could Help the Earth to Cure Itself,” Nature 449 (2007), p. 
403. 
166 S. Zhou & P. C. Flynn, “Geoengineering Downwelling Ocean Currents: A Cost Assessment,” Climatic 
Change 71 (2005): 1–2, 203–220. 
167 Royal Society 2009, p. 19. 
168 Klaus Lackner’s proposal of the artificial trees, as discussed in our historical overview, finds no serious 
mention in standard schemes of geoengineering. 
169 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation 
Potential in U.S. Forestry and Agriculture, EPA 430-R-05-006, Washington, DC, November 2005, Table 2-1. 
170 CRS Report R40562, U.S. Tree Planting for Carbon Sequestration. See, Bracmort and Lattanzio, p. 14. 
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The second major category of climate engineering is the Solar Radiation Management 
techniques. It has no recourse to mitigation or CO2 removal in combating climate change. It 
addresses global warming directly by reflecting sunlight, or in other words, by enhancing the 
albedo or reflexivity of the earth. The scientific assumptions are simple and straightforward 
that the incoming radiation from the sun and the backward radiation that is held up in the 
atmosphere are responsible for the global warming, and therefore, combating global warming 
should seek to manage the long wave and short wave radiations. This is done by enhancing 
earth’s albedo. It results in the increase in the amount of radiation reflected back to space or 
absorbed by atmosphere.  
SRM techniques may be subdivided into stratospheric and tropospheric schemes 
depending on the area of applicability. The various SRM schemes, be it surface based, cloud 
based or space based, have the unifying strategy of reflecting the sun light. The result is that 
the earth’s surface intake of the solar radiation is reduced. The range of operation of the 
various SRM schemes varies from tropospheric through stratospheric to space based 
plans.The studies show that space-based SRM methods would need to divert about 1.8% 
incoming solar radiation. For the balanced and equivalent radiative forcing effect,171 
atmosphere based or surface based methods would need to increase the albedo by about 0.31 
to about 0.32.172 
2.4.2.1 Surface Albedo Approaches 
 Surface albedo approaches propose to enable the earth to reflect more sunlight by 
increasing the brightness of the earth.173 Individual surface albedo approaches include 
brightening urban area, croplands, and deserts. Painting white on rooftops, roads and 
pavements is a method in increasing the reflectivity of the built environment. For sunny 
regions, this is said to be very successful, in addition to the saving in air-conditioning.174 
Estimates have it that the albedo for roof and pavements could be increased by 0.25 and 0.15 
                                                          
171 Radiative forcing, also called climate forcing, is the “the difference of insolation (sunlight) absorbed by the 
Earth and energy radiated back to space…. A positive forcing (more incoming energy) warms the system, while 
negative forcing (more outgoing energy) cools it.” Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiative_forcing. 
Accessed March 29, 2015. 
172 Royal Society 2009, pp. 23-24. 
173 The surface albedo is the measurement of the surface brightness of the planet. It is technically defined as the 
proportion of the solar radiation incident on the surface that is reflected. Currently, the mean surface albedo is 
about 30/198 or 0.15. Engineering a radiative forcing of -4 W/m2 in order to cool the planet, total reflection of 
the solar radiation by earth will have to be increased from ~107 to ~111 W/m2. In surface albedo approaches, 
this is proposed to be done by increasing the solar radiation reflection from 30 to 34 W/m2. It results in the 
modest increase of the surface albedo from 0.15 to about 0.17 (See, Royal Society 2009, p. 24). 
174 Royal Society 2009, p. 24. 
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respectively, leading to a net increase in the albedo of an urban area of about 0.1.175 Since 2% 
of the earth’s surface is hot deserts with high incident solar radiation potential, scientists’ 
climate engineering speculations have considered the deserts too. There are proposals to 
cover deserts with a reflective polyethylene-aluminium surface. It can increase the mean 
albedo from 0.36 to 0.8 that would provide significant radiative forcing.176 There is an 
additional proposal to increase surface albedo that genetically modified plants can augment 
albedo.177 It is observed that a decade or more will be necessary to prepare such plants on a 
commercial scale.178 
 
2.4.2.2 Cloud Albedo Enhancement 
Another proposal for increasing earth’s albedo is cloud whitening. Cloud whitening is 
the process of dispersing cloud condensation nuclei, like particles of sea salt, in clouds 
continuously.179 Aircrafts, ships, or seacrafts can do this. Satellites can monitor the cloud 
albedo. This is a method said to be stoppable at any time in case of unexpected consequences 
and the cloud properties shall be normal in a couple of days.180 One study has found the West 
coast on North America as the most suitable area for effective cloud albedo enhancement.181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The following figure is a schematic representation of cloud whitening. 
 
                                                          
175 H. Akbari et al, “Global Cooling: Increasing World-wide Urban Albedos to Offset CO2,” Climatic Change 94 
(2009): 275–286. 
176 Royal Society 2009, p. 26. 
177 Andy Ridgwell et al, “Tackling Regional Climate Change by LeafAlbedo Bio-geoengineering,” Current 
Biology 19 (January 27, 2009). The authors propose to genetically modify plant leaf or canopy structure to 
achieve greater temperature reductions. 
178 Joy S. Singarayer, Andy Ridgwell, and Peter Irvine, “Assessing the Benefits of Crop Albedo Bio-
geoengineering,” Environmental Research Letters 4 (2009): pp. 1-8. Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/34557/1/1748-9326_4_4_045110.pdf. Accessed October 21, 2014. 
179 Royal Society 2009, p. 27. 
180 John Latham et al., “Global Temperature Stabilization via Controlled Albedo Enhancement of Low-level 
Maritime Clouds,” Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society, 366 (August 29, 2008): 3969-3987. 
181 John Latham et al. 2008. 
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Source: Oren Dorell, “Can Whiter Clouds Reduce Global Warming?,” USA Today, June 11, 
2010. Adapted by Congressional Research Survey (CRS).  
 
2.4.2.3 Stratospheric Aerosol Injection 
 Aerosol injection in the stratosphere is a major proposal among SRM techniques. This 
technique envisages releasing huge amount of aerosols in the stratosphere in order to reflect 
the solar radiation. This technique has a natural example in the volcanic eruptions as in the 
case of Pinatubo.182 Volcanogenic aerosols have proven the effectiveness of aerosols in 
global cooling. Present proposals consider sulphate aerosols, among various aerosols, to be 
most reliable as evidenced by the volcanic spilling of sulphate aerosols.183 It is estimated that 
a 2% reduction in solar input can counter the rise in global temperature from a doubling of 
CO2.
184 Several studies185 using climate model stimulations have studied the impact of the 
                                                          
182 See Chapter 2; 2.3.5.  
183 Bracmort and Lattanzio think that future studies may recommend other particles. See Bracmort and Lattanzio 
2013, p. 18. 
184 B. Govindasamy & K. Caldeira K. “Geoengineering Earth’s Radiation Balance to Mitigate CO2-Induced 
Climate Change,” Geophysical Research Letters 27, 2 (2000): 141–144; B. G. Govindasamy et al, “Impact of 
Geoengineering Schemes on the Terrestrial Biosphere,”Geophysical Research Letters 29 (2002), 2061; B. 
Govindasamy et al, “Geoengineering Earth’s Radiation Balance to Mitigate Climate Change from a 
Quadrupling ofCO2,” Global Planetary Change 37 (2003):157–168; T. M. L. Wigley, “A Combined 
Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate Stabilization,” Science 314 (2006): 452–454; Crutzen 2006. 
185 K. Caldeira K & L. Wood, “Global and Arctic Climate Engineering: Numerical Model Studies,” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, A 366 (2008): 4039–4056; P. J. Rasch et al, “An Overview of 
Geoengineering of Climate Using Stratospheric Sulphate Aerosols,”Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society A 366, (2008a): 4007–4037; P. J. Rasch, et al, “Exploring the Geoengineering of Climate Using 
Stratospheric Sulphate Aerosols: The Role of Particle Size,” Geophysical Research Letters 35 (2008b), L02809; 
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sulphate aerosol injection. Royal Society opines that, “A general conclusion from these 
studies is that climate engineering with stratospheric aerosols could, in principle, be used as a 
means to counteract the first-order, global effects of increased greenhouse gas 
concentrations.”186 Aerosol injection may also prevent the melting of sea and land ice. 
Though it has several benefits, several serious side effects and risks are also predicted.187 
 
2.4.2.4 Space Based Albedo Enhancement 
 It is very much a theoretical proposal in climate engineering. It is a proposal to place 
huge reflective shields or space mirrors in the low earth orbit188 to reflect or deflect the 
incoming solar radiation. The materials proposed for this purpose are lunar glass, aluminium 
thread netting, metallic reflecting disks, and refracting disks. Design, size, maintenance, 
method of deployment, and location are the leading technical issues with regard to space 
based devices.189 Space based proposals include sunlight-deflectors in near-earth orbits,190 
55,000 mirrors - each with an area of 100 m2 in random orbits,191 and Saturn-like ring of dust 
particles with shepherding satellites.192 It is estimated that for a 2% reduction in incoming 
solar radiation, dust particles to the mass of over 2 billion tones would be the measure.193 
The logistical requirements for this project are enormous and Royal Society thinks 
that it would take decades for this technique to be developed. Royal Society’s conclusive 
judgment on space-based techniques is that owing to the great uncertainties in costs, 
effectiveness, risks and timescales, “… they are not realistic potential contributors to short-
term, temporary measures for avoiding dangerous climate change.”194 However, the society 
also thinks that in case of an emergency, “… it is quite possible that the best examples of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alan Robock, “Regional Climate Responses to Geoengineering with Tropical and Arctic SO2 Injections,” 
Journal of Geophysical Research 113 (2008a), D16101. 
186 Royal Society 2009, p. 31. 
187 Alan Robock et al., “Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Stratospheric Geoengineering,” Geophysical Research 
Letters 36 (2009). 
188 Another proposal for the location of placing the shields is the L1 point. This is the distance of 1.5 million km 
from the earth to the sun. At this point, the gravitational attraction of sun and earth are equal. L1 point has 
additional advantages over the low earth orbit. See Royal Society 2009, p. 32. 
189 Royal Society 2009, pp. 32-33. 
190 C. R. McInnes, “Minimum Mass Solar Shield for Terrestrial Climate Control,”Journal of the British 
Interplanetary Society 55 (2002): 307–311. 
191 US National Academy of Sciences, “Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, 
and the Science Base,”Panel on Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming (Washington DC.: National 
Academy Press, 1992). 
192 M. Mautner, “A Space-based Solar Screen Against Climate Warming,”Journal of the British Interplanetary 
Society 44 (1991): 135–138. 
193 Royal Society 2009, p. 32. 
194 Royal Society 2009, p. 33. 
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type may offer a cheaper and less risky approach to SRM than any of the stratospheric or 
near-Earth techniques.”195 
 SRM methods are considered fast and cost-effective compared to the CDR methods. 
Climate systems are likely to return to their pre-industrial states within a few years if SRM 
techniques are deployed.196 However, major risks, side effects and uncertainties are at stake 
in SRM methods. The likelihood of sudden termination is a major problem in SRM 
techniques. The impact on global and regional climate varies from proposal to proposal in 
SRM, like changes in precipitation pattern and ozone depletion. Undesirable changes to the 
regional weather pattern are attributed to SRM. The possibility of changing the chemical 
composition of the stratosphere, which is an important parameter of climate change along 
with radiation budget, is also predicted. By reducing the ultra violet rays reaching the 
atmosphere, SRM may extend the life-term of non-CO2 greenhouse gases that are more 
potent.197 There is also the impact on ecosystems like reduced plant respiration. By ignoring 
the CO2 concentration, SRM techniques may create unknown environmental conditions with 
negative impacts for biological systems.198 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 In the first part of this chapter, we discussed the etymology and various definitions of 
climate engineering and the dormant worldviews inherent in them. We found that there is no 
uniform definition of climate engineering accepted by scholars and there are several 
ambiguities prevalent in defining climate engineering.  The term climate engineering is not 
accepted by all scientists to represent the various climate engineering techniques. The second 
part placed climate engineering in its historical perspective. Although climate engineering is 
considered popularly as a modern engineering technology, our historical analysis showed that 
that it constituted the most recent phases in a historical continuum. The historical analysis 
prepares a better platform for appropriating the ethical issues in climate engineering.  The 
third part presented a short scientific and descriptive sketch of the various climate 
engineering schemes. The carbon dioxide removal methods and the solar radiation 
management schemes with their own sub-categories caught our attention in this section. The 
germinal phase of the technology has been true of both these technologies.  
                                                          
195 Royal Society 2009, p. 33. 
196 See, H. D. Matthews & Ken Caldeira, “Transient Climate-carbon Simulations of Planetary 
Geoengineering,”Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (2007): 9949–9954. 
197 Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p. 16. 
198Royal Society 2009, p. 34. 
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In general, this chapter prepared the historical and scientific background for our 
normative chapters on the ethics of climate engineering. As the focus of our research is on the 
ethical analysis of climate engineering from the point of view of justice, it is necessary to 
familiarize ourselves with the present debate scenario on the ethics of climate engineering. A 
general overview of the ethical debate on climate engineering is a structural prelude to the 
systematic analysis of the concerns with justice in particular. Accordingly, in sequence to the 
present chapter on the very concept of climate engineering we will be dwelling at some 
length on the present debate scenario by a literature review in the following chapter. 
.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
The Ethics of Climate Engineering: A Review of Literature 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The arguments for and against climate engineering already coined in the existing 
literature provide the primary platforms upon which the attempts at advancing the debate is to 
begin with and hence an acquaintance with the existing literature on the ethics of climate 
engineering is envisaged in this chapter. What is the present status of the ethical assessment 
of climate engineering? What are the leading arguments advocating the desirability of the 
climate engineering technologies? What are the arguments – scientific, social, philosophical – 
that consider climate engineering to be ethically undesirable? What are the ethical and 
philosophical concerns to be further appropriated for a balanced advancement of the climate 
engineering debate? These are some of the lead questions that we would address in this 
chapter. With this end in view, this chapter is reserved for a review of the literature on the 
ethics of climate engineering. The search methodology for identifying the related literature is 
explained first. The results section then organizes the various arguments for and against 
climate engineering as discussed in the literature. The various dynamics of the overall debate 
landscape like the academic, scientific and regional distribution of the debate, the 
interdisciplinary setting of the overall debate, the dormant philosophical perspectivities in the 
arguments and the arguments that are overweighed or underdeveloped are the major focus of 
the discussion section. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Two searches were done on Google Scholar on December 10 and 15, 2013. They 
covered academic literature as well as grey literature including peer-reviewed articles, 
magazine articles, news reports, conference papers, books, and book chapters. When different 
editions of the same paper were listed as journal article, online paper or conference 
presentation, priority was set for the peer-reviewed journal article in the selection process.  
First Search: In the first search, searches were held with primary and secondary 
search words. The primary search words were “geoengineering” and its synonymous usages 
in the academic literature such as, “climate engineering”, and “planetary engineering.” They 
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were used as the primary search words because they represented the focal theme of the 
research. The literature also focuses on two subunits of climate engineering, namely, “Solar 
Radiation Management” and “Carbon Dioxide Removal.” Accordingly, these expressions 
were also used as primary search words.  
 The secondary search words are combination search words used along with primary 
search words. The main combination word is “ethics” and its variations, namely, “ethical”, 
“ethically”, and “ethicists”. Terms that are semantically close to “ethics” such as “moral”, 
“morality” and “value” are also included as combination words. These secondary search 
words were used as they reflected the focus of this research. In addition, specific terms such 
as “cost-benefit,” “governance”, “justice”, “equity”, “social”, “societal”, “uncertainty”, “risk” 
and “harm” are also selected as secondary search words in combination with the primary 
search words for their specific importance in the discussion on the ethics of climate 
engineering as reflected in the literature.  
In the first search, distinct searches were made along all combinations as listed in 
Table 1. The searches produced 160 hits altogether. Out of these 160 results, 40 citations and 
33 overlapping entries were excluded. Due to the variety of secondary search words, which 
are semantically close, understandably, there was the overlap of papers for various 
combinations of search.  Overlapping papers were excluded from selection. Some 
combinations did not produce any result. Care was taken to include only those papers dealing 
with the ethical aspects of climate engineering. This was done by skimming through the 
abstract of the papers from the first set of general selection based on the search words 
checking if the document focused on the ethics of climate engineering. The abstract of each 
of the remaining 87 papers was skimmed through to ensure that the documents really focused 
on the ethics of climate engineering. This resulted in the elimination of three more references. 
As a norm, books on the ethics of climate engineering were selected in the first and second 
searches if only both the primary search words and their variations figured in the title of the 
book. This was to ensure that the focus of the book is directly on the ethics of climate 
engineering. Thus four books that did not meet this criterion were excluded. Thus, out of the 
160 results 80 references were selected in the first search.  
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Table 1: First search 
 
Primary Search Words 
 
Secondary Search Words 
 
 Geoengineering 
 Climate Engineering 
 Planetary Engineering 
 Solar Radiation 
Management 
 Carbon Dioxide Removal 
 
 
 Ethics 
 Ethical 
 Ethically 
 Moral 
 Morality 
 Value 
 Uncertainty 
 Justice 
 Equity 
 Cost-benefit 
 Governance 
 Social  
 Society 
 Societal 
 Harm 
 
 
Table 2: Results from the first search 
 
 
Primary 
Search 
Word 
 
Secondary Search Words 
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s 
Eth
ical 
Ethi
cally 
M
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l 
Mor
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lue 
Uncer
tainty 
Eq
uit
y 
Jus
tice 
Cos
t- 
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Go
ver 
Na
So
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l 
So
cie 
Ta
Ha
rm 
55 
nefi
t 
nc
e 
l 
Geoengi
neering 
14 6 2 2 0 0 5 1 1 1 20 3 1 3 
Climate 
Enginee
ring 
2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 1 1 0 
Solar 
Radiatio
n 
Manage
ment 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 
Carbon 
Dioxide 
Remova
l 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Planetar
y 
Enginee
ring 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Second search: In the first search, all the primary search words were combined with all the 
secondary search words in so far as they all occurred in the title. However, climate 
engineering being an emerging field and the focus of the research, ethics of climate 
engineering, being a very special area, this first search did not produce an adequate number 
of results for a comprehensive review. This prompted for a second search on the same 
database, Google Scholar.  
While the first search concentrated exclusively on the title of the articles, the second 
search focused on the title, abstract, and keywords of the article, manually looking for the 
primary search word in the title of the article and the secondary search words in the abstract 
and keywords of the article. In the second search, the concept of abstract, where the 
secondary search words figure in, was understood in a broad sense. It included the abstracts 
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of peer-reviewed papers, the introduction to grey articles, which have no specific abstract, or 
the opening paragraph of the magazine papers, book-reviews, news reports, and conference 
papers. 
 In the second search, the primary search word was restricted exclusively to 
‘geoengineering.’ The synonymous usages of the primary search word, namely, Climate 
Engineering, Solar Radiation Management, Carbon Dioxide Removal, and Planetary 
Engineering, were skipped in the second search. This exclusion was forced by the vast 
number of results (870) produced by the second search with geoengineering as the primary 
search word. As the range of the second search included the keywords and abstract too, to 
keep the research focused precisely to the ethics of climate engineering, it deemed necessary 
to limit the number of combination words too in the second search. The restriction imposed 
on the primary search words is paralleled by a similar restriction on the combination words 
too. To keep the review precisely to the ethics of climate engineering, the combination words 
were restricted to “ethics” and its directly synonymous usages. Therefore, the secondary 
search words used for the second search are “ethics”, “ethically”, “ethical”, “moral”, 
“morality” and “value”. In other words, the terms pertaining to the sub-sets of ethics used in 
the first search, such as equity, justice, cost-benefit, social, societal, society, harm, 
uncertainty, and governance were excluded from the second search. However, the inclusion 
of these sub-sets of ethics as combination words in the first search could be justified, as it 
constituted the major focus or one of the major strands of discussion in the concerned articles, 
as suggested by their appearance in the title itself.  
Accordingly, Google Scholar was searched for all the papers carrying geoengineering 
in the title. Each entry in the list of 870 results produced by the search was manually checked 
for the combination words such as ethics, ethically, ethicists, moral, morality, and value in 
the abstract or keywords of the article. As in the first search, care was taken in the second 
search too, to include only those papers treating the combination words in their ethical sense. 
This was done by skimming through the abstract of the papers from the first set of general 
selection based on the search words checking if the document focused on the ethics of 
climate engineering. All the papers overlapping with the first search were discounted in the 
second search.  
The second search had ‘geoengineering’ as the only primary search word, with 
restricted combinations as justified in the methodology. The search with geoengineering in 
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the title produced 870 results. 51 of these hits were found to be overlapping with the 
selections in the first search and they were skipped. The remaining 819 hits were individually 
skimmed through and each hit was checked for any of the combination words of ‘ethics’, 
‘ethical’, ‘ethically’, ‘moral’ and value in the abstract, or keywords. According to the search, 
10 papers were found with ethics in the abstract or keyword and 9 and 1 respectively for 
ethical and ethically. According to the search, three papers included ‘moral’ in the abstract or 
keyword while ‘morality’ found no inclusion. The combination word ‘value’ also figured in 
the abstract or keyword of two of the results. A total of 25 references met the inclusion 
criteria in the second search. 
Table 3: Second search 
(Primary Search Word in the Title and Secondary search words in the Abstract or Keywords) 
 
 
Primary Search word 
 
Combination Words 
 
Geoengineering 
 
Ethics 
Ethical 
Ethically 
Moral 
Morality 
Value 
 
Table 4: Results from second search 
Primary 
Search Word 
 
Combinations 
 Ethics Ethical Ethically Moral Morality Value 
Geoengineering 10 9 1 3 0 2 
 
Snowballing: A careful examination of the set of documents yielded from the first and second 
searches showed that it still did not include some of the important papers, which are 
significantly used in the discussion on the ethics of climate engineering. Therefore, a further 
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search strategy relied on the snowballing method to add a number of necessary references to 
the results of the first and second searches. In this method, the bibliography of the documents 
resulting from the two searches was checked through. The papers extensively used by those 
authors including the reports of various formal bodies on climate engineering, which are of a 
canonical nature, were also added to the select entries. Thus further papers, discussing the 
ethics of climate engineering but excluded from the first and second searches, were included 
by employing the snowballing method. Employing the snowballing method, as justified in the 
methodology, an additional 33 references were selected. It took the total tally to 138.In 
summary, the searches resulted in 80 documents from the first search, 25 additional sources 
from the second search and 33 further references by snowballing, amounting to a total of 138 
references. 
3.3 Results 
The debate on the ethical desirability of climate engineering is complex with cross-cutting 
sets of dialectics, along with many prevalent uncertainties and ambiguities. This is evidenced 
by the intriguing fabric of the plethora of arguments and the multiple perspectives they are 
interpretatively drawn into. The results of the literature review present these argument 
positions in a sketchy manner.Table 5 presents the distribution of the select literature 
according to their type, with the journal articles topping the list.1 
Table 5: Type of References 
1 Journal Articles 62 
2 Online Papers 28 
3 Magazine Articles 14 
7 Books 12 
4 Book Chapters 10 
5 Reports 5 
6 Conference Papers 5 
8 Encyclopaedic Entries 2 
 Total 138 
                                                          
1The Journal articles here refer to the papers published in peer-reviewed journals with some focus on a specific 
academic area. Online Papers mean the research papers and draft of the papers to be published and other 
materials that are available in online journals or as online material. Magazine Articles refer to the papers 
published in periodicals, print or online, with a more popular appeal and vast variety of scientific, social and 
cultural focus. Renowned periodicals like Nature and Science are treated under the Magazines in this 
classification.  
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Long before the science of climate engineering was to gain momentum, in 1996, 
Jamieson and Schneider had addressed the question of whether to engage in extensive 
research into the feasibility of the various potential climate engineering strategies and had 
responded in the affirmative. The following decade saw just 3 more papers published on the 
ethics of climate engineering. The relatively large number of publications in the recent three 
years shows that the attention towards climate engineering is on the rise. Table 6 presents the 
chronological development of the debate from 1996 to 2013. The table shows the nominal 
beginnings of climate engineering in the second half of the 1990s, the declining attention in 
the first half of the first decade of 2000 and the sudden uprise of interest in the latter half. 
Table 6: Chronological Range of Publications 
1996 1 
1997 0 
1998 2 
1999 0 
2000 1 
2001 0 
2002 0 
2003 0 
2004 0 
2005 0 
2006 6 
2007 4 
2008 6 
2009 14 
2010 29 
2011 17 
2012 35 
20132 23 
Total 138 
                                                          
2 This review covers only the papers available on Google Scholar till December 15, 2013. A quick update on the 
preliminary search until 2017 was tried in August 2017. The search with geoengineering and ethics and climate 
engineering and ethics as the search words has produced 7 more papers between 2014 and 2017. Solar Radiation 
Management and Ethics produced one more result. Carbon Dioxide Removal and Ethics did not produce any 
results.As this review is based on the Google Scholar, it includes only those papers published in English. It 
implies that some of the observations made on the literature review in regard to the academic lopsidedness, and 
the North-South and West-East allusions are only provisional as the review does not include the papers 
published in other languages. 
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There is an increasing rise in the attention on climate engineering as testified by the 
steady rise in the number of publications in the field. Nerlich and Jaspal (2012) had argued 
that the debate shows the likelihood of a closing down.3 Their argument has been more 
speculative than statistical. Our statistics shows that over the past decade, 2012 and 2013 
have the largest number of publications and it shows that the debate has been gaining 
momentum and slowly building up along the social and moral lines too. Scholte et al. (2013) 
who apprised the framing of the debate in the newspapers also would agree with us on this 
observation: “We wish to confront the notion that the debate on geoengineering may be 
closing down over time: indeed in scientific literature one can see more publications about 
the sociopolitical implications, as well as ethical dimensions, which were lacking before… 
These developments suggest that over time the debate may be opening up to more voices.”4 
The present ethical responses to such a crucial and global problem seem to be unevenly 
balanced. 95% of the authors are from the British, American and European setting.5 The 
voice of Asia, Africa and South America are not adequately represented on the scene. This 
calls for more extensive engagement with justice concerns, overlooking of side effects, 
governance issues and risk assessment. A contextually bound appraisal of a technology with a 
trans-boundary impact might be tantamount to a procedural impropriety. 
The papers published in the initial phase of the debate are found to be more inclined 
to favour climate engineering. However, there is a gradual shift towards more cautionary and 
conditional endorsement. As the debate gets diversified over time and more and more 
information is poured in, there seems to be a concurrent dynamics of maturation for the 
ethical deliberations too. 
Issue-specific discussion treating the sub-points and issues of a major argument under 
contention is not adequately found in the literature. Barring a few articles dealing with a 
specific ethical issue to advanced levels, many papers are a hotchpotch of ethical, cultural, 
                                                          
3 B. Nerlich and R. Jaspal, “Metaphors We Die by? Geoengineering, Metaphors and the Argument from 
Catastrophe,” Metaphor and Symbol 27 (2012): 131–147. See also, Scholte et al. 2013, “Opening up the Societal 
Debate on Climate Engineering: How Newspaper Frames are Changing,” Journal of Integrative Environmental 
Sciences 10 (2013), p. 5. 
4 Scholte et al. 2013, p. 5. 
5 See, Bidisha Banerjee, “The Limitations of Geoengineering: Governance in a World of Uncertainty,” Stanford 
Journal of Law, Science and Policy, May (2011), p. 23. “[T]he proponents of geoengineering governance, at 
present, hail from the U.S., Canada, Europe, the U.K., and Australia. Additionally, a handful of elite developing 
country scientists from the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World are involved in an SRM governance 
initiative with the Royal Society…. The technologies of humility rubric, which emphasizes both vulnerability 
and distribution, would suggest that there is a need to create processes that can fruitfully involve developing-
world citizens in deliberative dialogue with policy-makers and scientists early in the process of designing 
region-scale geoengineering interventions.” It is not overlooked that Indian scientists are involved in US Project 
(See, Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p. 3. Footnote no. 10). 
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political and governance issues in general engaging themselves in no serious analysis. Most 
articles do not dwell at any significant length on a specific, scientific, social, political or 
ethical problem. This lack of focus in debate is possibly due to the early phase of the debate. 
A random reading of the various papers generates the immediate impression that 
climate engineering debate cannot be confined to the domains of climate sciences, but it has 
explicit interdisciplinary ramifications covering the social, political, and philosophical 
domains as well. Given the complexity of the debate with such disciplinary interdependence, 
a systematic organisation of the various arguments is not likely to be that straightforward, but 
open to arbitrary schemes to a significant extent. However, in our scheme, we take a rather 
straightforward approach by primarily separating the seemingly for and against arguments.6 
The various arguments for climate engineering are organized under six main frames with a 
number of sub-frames. Accordingly, the cluster of arguments opposing climate engineering is 
classified under nine main-frames with their sub-frames. 
.3.1 Arguments for Climate Engineering 
Firstly, we shall present the arguments supporting climate engineering. “Support” 
here is to be understood in an interpretative sense. If an aspect of the debate seems to imply a 
justification of the climate engineering project, directly or indirectly, it is being qualified 
forclimate engineering. Here we refer to climate engineering in general and do not distinguish 
between the different categories of it, nor do we distinguish between researching into climate 
engineering and the actual deployment of climate engineering. The following are the leading 
ethical contenders forclimate engineering.  
 
Table 7: Main Frame Arguments 
                                                          
6The provisional nature of the classification of the for and against arguments, and of the number of papers listed 
for the argument frames and the organisation of the sub-frames is not ruled out. Possible multiple-perspectivities 
of arguments that are interpretative are ignored in their classification. A paper is qualified for listing if only a 
particular argument is developed and advanced by it, engaging it at some length. The listing of the paper under 
the for and against positions does not imply a definitive position of the author for or against. Our concern 
precisely is with individual arguments, and not with the overall position of the paper or the individual views of 
the authors. Accordingly, the same paper may find mention both under the for and the against division, relative 
to the argument, as the case of the argument may be. Betz and Casean (2012), in their study too had encountered 
the same complexity of the argument reconstructions.  According to them, “…argument reconstructions are 
always interpretations. This being definitely true for coarse-grained analysis, it is also fact that, when compiling 
a detailed argument reconstruction, there is always room for interpretation that one can fill in one way or 
another. Hence, there is no such thing as the one and only correct reconstruction of a controversy.” Gregor Betz 
and Sebastian Casean, Ethical Aspects of Climate Engineering (Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing, 2012), p. 
13. Downloadable at http://digibib.ubka.dni-karlsruhe.de/volltexte/1000028245, 2012. Downloaded on 
December 5, 2013. 
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 Argument Frames Number of 
Papers 
1 Climate Emergency Arguments 51 
2 Feasibility Arguments 32 
3 Arguments in Favour of Climate Engineering Research 25 
4 Lesser Evil Arguments 17 
5 Public Good Arguments 6 
6 Ecological Arguments 4 
Table 8: Main Frame Arguments with Sub-frames 
(In the literature, a number of ethical perspectives and principles may be identified as 
supporting a particular main frame argument. In this table, a set of such arguments supporting 
a main frame argument is organised as the sub-frames to the main frames.) 
 Arguments Framing Number of 
Papers  
1 Climate Emergency Arguments (51 Papers)  
 The 350 ppm target of CO2 concentration in atmosphere 11 
 No Alternative Methods 10 
 Preparation for Climate Emergency  8 
 Buys more time for mitigation 4 
 Negligible Side effects 4 
 Global Temperature be maintained below 20C 3 
 Climate Sensitivity to be kept below 4k 3 
 The Sick Patient Metaphor 3 
 Species extinction to be averted 2 
 Climate engineering facilitates mitigation 2 
 Contextual Justification of the most vulnerable (Desperate Argument) 1 
2 Feasibility Arguments (32 Papers)  
 Cost-effective/Cost-benefit 18 
 Do-it-alone  5 
 Life-style Argument  5 
 Creates Job 1 
 Short-Term Deployment  1 
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 Equity 2 
3 Argument in Favour of Climate Engineering Research (24 Papers)  
 Bottom-up approach (Public Engagement) 14 
 
 
Feasible Informed consent 3 
Responsibility to future generations 3 
False Exclusiveness 2 
Research as Innovation  1 
Knowledge enhancement argument 1 
4. Lesser evil Argument (17 Papers)  
 
 
Variations of the Precautionary Principle 8 
Survival Challenge 4 
Arm the Future Argument 3 
Maximin Rule 2 
5 Global Public Good (6 Papers)  
 Application of Oxford Principles7 5 
 Concern for Public good 1 
6 Ecological Arguments (5 Papers) 
 An otherwise anthropogenic climate emergency Argument 2 
 Artful Solution 3 
 
3.3.1.1 Climate Emergency Arguments 
The whole debate seems to be stemming from a consensus between the proponents and 
opponents of climate engineering in regard to the dangerous climatic changesthat the earth 
has already crossed several climate “tipping points” and a dangerous phase transition, or 
crossing a “climate threshold” is almost inevitable given the low returns from mitigation 
policies. The variants of the climate emergency arguments are the need for containing the 
carbon level below 350 ppm, maintaining global temperature below 20C from preindustrial 
levels, keeping climate sensitivity below 4K, averting the disintegration of the continental 
ice-sheets, preparation for climate emergency, desperate argument, absence of other 
alternatives to counter the failure of mitigation, buy-time argument for mitigation, facilitating 
mitigation, and averting species-extinction.  
                                                          
7 For a detailed explanation of the Oxford Principles, please see 6.2.1.4. 
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As we would see below,8 there are some borderline environmentalists who hold 
different opinions on the various climate change assessment. Such dissenting opinions do not 
seem to be taken seriously by the various parties involved in the climate engineering debate. 
Also, the desperation with the present mitigation strategies is almost an unquestionable 
proposition among the proponents and opponents of climate engineering. Naturally, the 
concern about averting dangerous climate change is the leading argument for climate 
engineering with 51 papers9 dealing with this issue. “Climate change catastrophe,” 
                                                          
8See 3.4.2.4. 
9 Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p.8; Kjetil Gramstad and Sigve Tjøtta, “Climate Engineering: Cost Benefit and 
Beyond,” Working Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Norway, 23. 
September 2010, available at at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27302/ MPRA Paper No. 27302, p. 4, accessed 
on March 9, 2014; Clive Hamilton, “Ethical Anxieties About Geoengineering: Moral Hazard, Slippery Slope 
and Playing God,” Paper presented to a conference of the Australian Academy of Science Canberra, 27 
September 2011,available athttp://www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/shs/Climatechange/Geo-
politics/ethical_anxieties_about_geoengineering.pdf, p.2, accessed on March 9, 2014; Jay Michaelson, 
“Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project,” Stanford Environmental Law Journal 17 (January 
1998):1-53, p. 30; David B.Resnik and Daniel A. Vallero, “Geoengineering: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? 
Journal of Earth Science and Climate Change (December 2011), p. 4, available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3596048/, accessed on March 9, 2014; Scholte et al. 2013, pp. 
3-5, Betz and Casean 2012, pp.115-8; Sebastian Harnish and Stephanie Uther, “The Global Governance of 
Climate Engineering – Draft of a Research Agenda,” available at   http://www.climate-engineering.uni-
hd.de/md/climate-engineering/projects/people/harnisch-uther_2010_-_isa_paper.pdf, p. 2, accessed on March 9, 
2014; Hannes Fernow, “Complex Risks and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,” in Dorothee Amelung, 
Wolfgang Dietz, Hannes Fernow, Daniel Heyen, David Reichwein, and Thilo Wiertz, Beyond calculation - 
Climate Engineering Risks from a Social Sciences Perspective,”  Forum Marsilius-Kolleg, 02 (2012), p. 12, 
available at http://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/forum-mk/article/viewFile/9408/Amelung_et_al, 
accessed on March 9, 2014; Wolfgang Dietz, “Cooperation behind the Veil of Ambiguity,” in Dorothee 
Amelung, Wolfgang Dietz, Hannes Fernow, Daniel Heyen, David Reichwein, and Thilo Wiertz, Beyond 
calculation - Climate Engineering risks from a social sciences perspective, p. 20; Royal Society 2009; Banerjee 
2011, p. 19.; Banerjee 2011, p.22; James Hansen  et al., Dangerous Human-Made Interference with Climate: A 
GISS Model Study, 7 Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics (2007): 2287-2312, available at 
http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2007/2007_Hansen_etal_1.pdf, accessed on December 9, 2013; C. Greene, B. 
Monger, and M. Huntley, “Geoengineering: The Inescapable Truth of Getting to 350,” Solutions 1 (2010), pp. 
57–66; William C. G. Burns, “Climate Geoengineering: Solar Radiation Management and its Implications for 
Intergenerational Equity,” Stanford Journal of Law, Science and Policy (May 2011), p.38, available at 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjlsp/cgi-bin/orange_web/users_images/pdfs/61_Burns%20Final.pdf, accessed on 
September 4, 2014;  William C. G. Burns, “Geoengineering the Climate: An Overview of Solar Radiation 
Management Options,” Tulsa Law Review 46:282(2012), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041131, p.285, 
accessed on September 4, 2014; Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p.7; Burns 2011, p. 51; Clive Hamilton, “The 
Ethical Foundations of Climate Engineering,” 2011a, available at 
http://www.schrogl.com/03ClimateGeo/DOKUMENTE/205_HAMILTON_ETHICAL_FOUNDATION_CLIM
ATE_ENGINEERING_2011.pdf, p. 19, accessed on March 27, 2014; Gabriel Hinding, “The Ethics of Solar 
Radiation Management: Absolutely Necessary or Too Dangerous?,” University of Pittsburgh, Swanson School 
of Engineering Submission (2013):1-4, p. 2; Sean Low et al., “Geoengineering Policy and Governance Issues,” 
Blackstock Encyclopaedia of Sustainability Science and Technology (New York: Springer, 2012): 4104-4119; 
Banerjee 2011; Clive Hamilton, “Ethical Anxieties About Geoengineering: Moral Hazard, Slippery Slope and 
Playing God, 2011b, Paper presented to a conference of the Australian Academy of Science Canberra, 27 
September 2011, available at http://www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/shs/Climatechange/Geo-politics/ethical-
anxieties_about_geoengineering.pdf, . pp. 1-18; accessed on July 3, 201;David Keith., Parson E., Morgan M., 
“Research on Global Sunblock Needed Now,” Nature 463 (2010): 426–427; Banerjee 2011, p.16; Hamilton 
2011b, p. 19; Resnik and Vallero 2011, p.3; Banerjee 2011, 20; Hamilton 2011b, p. 19; Seth D. Baum et al., 
“Double Catastrophe: Intermittent Stratospheric Geoengineering Induced By Societal Collapse,” Environment, 
Systems and Decisions 33:1 (2013):168-180, available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10669-012-
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“dangerous climate change,” “climate emergency,” etc., are the various jargons coined to 
represent the situation.  
The sequence of scientific positions on the emerging climate change problem may be 
lined up as follows: Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission leads to CO2 concentration 
above 350 ppm which would shoot the climate sensitivity of the earth above 4 K and the 
resultant imbalance in the radiation budget of the earth causes the global warming above 20C, 
leading to continental ice sheet melting and rise in sea level. The final corollary of this 
sequence of events is the mass extinction of the species including human beings. Balancing 
of the radiation budget of the earth is necessary to keep climate sensitivity below 4 K failing 
which global warming would exceed 20C from the preindustrial phase.  
  The dangerous climate change anxiety is based on the scientific data that the present 
CO2 concentration is about 380 ppm and it is likely to go up. There will be severe 
consequences if CO2 levels are not brought down to 350 ppm within decades. 11 papers are 
alarming the dangers of the high levels of CO2 concentration.
10 The implicit argument is that 
the carbon cycle needs to be addressed effectively by technical intervention and technical 
removal of the carbon invokes the various climate engineering technologies of carbon dioxide 
removal. The melting of the continental ice sheets, resultant rise in the sea level, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9429-y, accessed on January 21, 2014;  Dane Scott, “Geoengineering and Environmental Ethics,” Nature 
Education Knowledge 3:10 (2012a):10; Daniel Heyen, “An Economic Perspective on Risks of Climate Change 
and SRM – Limitations of Methodology, New Concepts and the Precautionary Principle,” in Dorothee 
Amelung, Wolfgang Dietz, Hannes Fernow, Daniel Heyen, David Reichwein, and Thilo Wiertz, pp. 34-40; 
Keith 2010a; Hamilton 2011b, p. 19; Stephen M. Gardiner, “Is ‘Arming the Future’ with Geoengineering Really 
the Lesser Evil? Some Doubts About the Ethics of Intentionally Manipulating the Climate System (February 19, 
2009), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford, 2010b), available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1357162 2013b, p. 28; Stephen M. Gardiner, “The Desperation Argument for 
Geoengineering,” January 2013c, Symposium, pp. 28-33, available at 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/desperation-argument-for-
geoengineering/23D9326AEA5756D07C05DA7B24140A86, accessed on January 23, 2014; Dorothee 
Amelung, “Psychological and Social Risk Evaluation Criteria,” in Dorothee Amelung, Wolfgang Dietz, Hannes 
Fernow, Daniel Heyen, David Reichwein, and Thilo Wiertz, Beyond calculation - Climate Engineering Risks 
from a Social Sciences Perspective,” 2012b, p.41; Barrett 2008; J. Goodell, “How to Cool the Planet: 
Geoengineering and the Audacious Quest to Fix Earth's Climate (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2010); Royal 
Society 2009; Crutzen 2006; B. Hale, “You Say ‘Solution’” I Say ‘Pollution,’ 2009, available at 
http://scienceprogress.org/2009/08/ocean-fertilization-ethics/ 2009, accessed on December 3, 2013; Dale 
Jamieson, “Ethics and Intentional Climate Change,” Climatic Change, 33: 323-336 (1996); Michaelson 1998, 
10-15; Michaelson 1998, p. 17; Edward A. Parson and David W. Keith, “End the Deadlock on Governance of 
Geoengineering Research,” Science 339 (2013); Banerjee 2011, p. 19, Hamilton 2011, p. 2. 
10 Bracmort and Lattanzio, p.8; Gramstad and Tjøtta 2010, p. 4; Hamilton 2011, p.2; Michaelson 1998, p.30; 
Resnik and Vallero 2011, p.4; Gardiner 2006; Scholte et al. 2013, pp.3,4,5; Betz and Casean 2012, 2012, 
pp.115-8; Harnisch and Uther 2010, p. 2; Fernow 2012, p. 12; Dietz 2012, p.20.; Royal Society 2009; Banerjee 
2011, p. 19.; Banerjee 2011, p.22. Hansen 2006; Green 2010; Burns 2012, p. 285; Burns, 2011, p.38; Bracmort 
and Lattanzio, p.7; Burns 2011, p. 51. Hamilton 2011b, p. 19; Hinding 2013, p. 2; Low 2013. 
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destruction of coastal cities warrant the urgency of the climate problem.11 The climate history 
shows that slightly higher global temperatures can cause the disintegration of the continental 
ice sheets.12Climate engineering is a “band-aid against abrupt climate change.”13 The fear of 
climate sensitivity exceeding 4 K is looming up.14 A balancing of the “radiation budget of the 
earth”15 is necessary to avoid the rise of the global warming above 20C from the preindustrial 
period. The tragic consequences of global warming are a tangible danger.16 Worst of it all, the 
extinction of diverse species and even of the human species cannot be ruled out in a 
dangerous climate scenario.17 Some estimates have it that by 2050, 15-37% of the species 
might be extinct.18 
The absence of effective alternative methods to counter such a drastic climate tragedy 
is yet another factor justifying climate engineering. The insufficiency of the Kyoto protocol 
and the climate change as an absent problem can be effectively addressed only with climate 
engineering.19Michaelson (1998) holds that climate change is not a vivid, but an “absent 
problem.”20By absent problem, Michaelson (1998) means that the adverse effects of global 
climate changeand the real problems associated with such climate change have yet to 
manifest themselves. Climate change as an absent problem can be addressed by climate 
engineering.21 The failure of the mitigation policies to meet their targets is a matter 
aggravating the call for technically addressing the problem.22 Paradoxically, as opposed to the 
moral hazard fears that climate engineering would play down the mitigation agenda, 
Michaelson and Parson represent the position that climate engineering might even facilitate 
mitigation by triggering greater awareness in regard to climate change. Parson (2013) 
presents four scenarios linking climate engineering and mitigation suggesting how climate 
                                                          
11 Banerjee 2011; Hamilton 2011b, p. 19; Keith et al. 2010. 
12 See Betz and Casean 2012, p.117. 
13 Banerjee 2011, p. 21. 
14 Heyen 2012, pp. 35-40; Keith 2010a; Hamilton 2011b, p. 19; Betz and Casean 2012, pp.117-118. 
15 Betz and Casean 2012, p.118. 
16 Resnik and Vallero 2011, pp.2-3; Banerjee 2011, p.16; Hamilton 2011b, p. 19. 
17 Baum et al. 2013, p.7; Scott 2012a, p. 9. 
18 See Scott 2012a, p. 9. 
19 Amelung 2012b, p.41; Barret 2008; Goodell 2010; Royal Society 2009; Crutzen 2006; Hale 2009; Royal 
Society 2009; Jamieson 1996; Michaelson 1998, pp. 10-15. 
20 Michaelson 1998, p. 7. 
21 Michaelson 1998, p. 17. 
22 Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p.7; Burns 2011, p.38; Resnik and Vallero 2011, p. 4. 
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engineering might enhance mitigation incentives.23 Mitigation as a strategy against global 
warming also implies the “cruel irony”24 of the prisoner’s dilemma.25 
In the context of the climate emergency, Gardiner identifies a “desperate argument” in 
the justification of climate engineering. This is the argument that the initiatives of coastal or 
island nations and peoples who are most vulnerable to the climate changes, out of their 
desperate attempts at saving themselves, might provide a contextual justification for climate 
engineering.26 It provides a sort of self-defence argument for unilateral deployment of climate 
engineering. 
Therefore, from the perspective of the climate emergency, climate engineering should 
be seen as an intelligent way of being prepared for such a situation in advance. For Bracmort 
and Laatazio (2013), it is a “Contingency Plan” to be ready “on the shelf.”27 Thus, there is the 
frequent coinage of metaphors like, ‘Plan B’ “Insurance Policy,” etc., referring to climate 
engineering. For Gramstad and Tjotta (2010),28 this should be an “emergency tool” against 
the “Damocles’ sword of massive biotic disruption.”29 In addition, there is the additional 
merit of “buying-time.” Climate engineering would allow more time for mitigation to take 
effect by holding up the sudden impacts of unabated climate changes.30 
The proponents of climate engineering do not engage substantively with the 
allegations on the side-effects of the technology. They have a presumed consequentialist 
justification in various respects such as, the pros would outweigh the cons,31 mitigation too 
has side-effects,32 no perfect foresight of all consequences is possible,33 side-effects can be 
                                                          
23 Parson 2013; Michaelson 1998, p. 17. 
24 Resnik and Vallero 2011, p. 4. 
25 Prisoner’s Dilemma is an analogy to the moral problem of achieving individual and collective benefits by 
cooperating or not cooperating. Individual interest may hinder societal benefit and only collaboration would 
result in collective benefit. Non-cooperative behaviour may make one better off temporarily, but in the end, 
everybody ends up worse off. See, S. Gardiner, “A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational 
Ethics, and the Problem of Moral Corruption,” Environmental Values 15 (2006): 397–413; Resnik and Vallero 
2011, p. 4. 
26 Gardiner 2013b, pp. 28-29. 
27 Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p. 8. 
28 Gramstad and Tjøtta 2010, p. 4. 
29 Michaelson 1998, p. 30. 
30 Banerjee 2011, p. 19; Royal Society 2009, p. 47; Hamilton 2011, p. 2. 
31 Hinding 2013, p. 2. 
32 Resnik and Vallero 2011, pp. 3-5. 
33 Goodell 2010, p. 135. 
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minimized through research,34 etc. Therefore, the side effects of climate engineering are 
negligible.35 
The literature also draws the sick-patient analogy in defence of developing climate 
engineering.36 The ethical argument of the lesser evil is implicit in this argument. The 
argument uses the analogy of a sick patient. The metaphor of the sick patient is applied to the 
earth, whereby by 2050, the earth is supposed to be akin to a terminally sick patient. In the 
case of a terminally sick, in medical practice, the exercise of risky and high dose medicines 
evading the normal standards is warranted. So too, in case of a climate emergency, regular 
and normal ethical standards will have to be kept aside and extra-ordinary measures may 
have to be adapted to save the fate of the earth. Climate engineering would be morally 
justified in such a climate emergency. 
3.3.1.2 The Lesser Evil Argument 
Many authors consider the lesser evil argument as “the major argument in favour of 
research into climate engineering.”37A random look at the spectrum of debate would 
somewhat endorse this point. The forced-choice context of a climate catastrophe, the arm-the-
future argument, the variations of the precautionary principle, the maximin rule, the survival 
argument and the sick-patient argument are the varying subsets of the lesser evil argument 
mostly debated in the context of a moral justification for climate engineering.  
There are 15 papers dealing with the lesser-evil issue.38 Accordingly, this may be treated 
as one of the leading arguments for climate engineering. The argument from lesser evil was 
                                                          
34 Betz and Casean 2012, p. 33. 
35 Betz and Casean 2012, p. 18. 
36 Betz and Casean 2012, pp. 34-35. 
37 Gregor Betz, “The Case for Climate Engineering Research: An Analysis of the ‘Arm the Future’ Argument,’” 
Climatic Change 111 (2012), p. 473. 
38 These 15 papers are selected on the basis of the reference to the concept of lesser evil in the moral sense. The 
reference to lesser evil in these papers could be in favour of geoengineering or against it, or to some extent 
supporting both positions. In this section, we are only assessing those lesser-evil arguments that seem to endorse 
the geoengineering causes. The papers dealing with lesser-evil arguments are: Betz and Casean 2012;Betz 2012; 
Adam Corner and Nick Pidgeon, “Geoengineering the Climate: The Social and Ethical Implications,” 
Environment 52 (2010): 24-37; Gareth Davies, “Framing the Social, Political, and Environmental Risks and 
Benefits of Geoengineering: Balancing the Hard-to-imagine against the Hard-to-measure,” Tulsa Law Review 46 
(2011): 101-122; Stephen M. Gardiner, “Is ‘Arming the Future’ with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil? 
Some Doubts about the Ethics of Intentionally Manipulating the Climate System,” in Stephen M. Gardiner et al, 
eds. Climate Ethics (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010a):284-313;Stephen M. Gardiner, “Some 
Early Ethics of Geoengineering the Climate: A Commentary on the Values of the Royal Society Report,” 
Environmental Values 20 (2011): 163–188; Gardiner 2013b, pp. 28-33; Clive Hamilton, “The Ethical 
Foundations of Geoengineering,” in Wil C. G. Burns and Andrew L. Strauss, eds., Climate Change 
Geoengineering: Philosophical Perspectives, Legal Issues, and Governance Frameworks (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013): 39-58; Christopher J. Preston, “Re-Thinking the Unthinkable: 
Environmental Ethics and the Presumptive Argument Against Geoengineering,” Environmental Values 20 
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part of the debate from its early conceptions. Jamieson and Schneider (1996) who have in a 
way pioneered the ethical debate on the issue had recourse to this point. “(R)esearch should 
continue on whether ICC (intentional climate change) can be carried out in a way that is 
consistent with the conditions that I have outlined. My reason for this is straightforward: we 
may reach a point at which ICC is the lesser of two evils.”39 “I do (somewhat reluctantly) 
agree that study of geoengineering potential is probably needed […], given our growing 
inadvertent impact on the planet and the possibility that other alternatives are worse.”40 
Crutzen’s (2006) prediction of a “worst case scenario” implicitly carries the same idea.41 This 
argument finds further credibility in the present day climatic apprehensions that how hard we 
may try, the target 20C may not be reached. 
The lesser evil argument has the presumed assumption that mitigation and adaptation are 
the preferred options for tackling climate problems; and climate engineering has inherent 
ethical problems and is to be considered as an evil though of a lesser degree and this would 
be justified in the context of a do or die situation. Gardiner observes that “appeals to the 
lesser evil are attractive to a wide audience, including those who are otherwise strongly 
against technological intervention.”42 Gardiner (2010b) calls it “the arm the future argument,” 
in short, the AFA.43 The arm the future argument holds that if the present plans with 
mitigation are not successful, in future, the humanity will be forced to make a choice between 
doing climate engineering or allowing the catastrophic disaster to take place. Given these 
choices, humanity will certainly have to make the choice for doing climate engineering. 
Therefore, it is important at present to prepare for that future choice by engaging in climate 
engineering research. It is a way of enabling or arming the future generations to make a 
choice for climate engineering to save the earth and hence it is called the arm the future 
argument.44 The arm the future argument is a variation of the lesser evil argument with 
greater focus on the future scenario. Arm the future argument also focuses on the concrete 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2011): 457–479; Christopher J. Preston, “Ethics and Geoengineering: Reviewing the Moral Issues Raised by 
Solar Radiation Management and Carbon Dioxide Removal,” WIREs Climate Change 4 (2013): 23–37. Shane J. 
Ralston, “Geoengineering as a Matter of Environmental Instrumentalism,” available at 
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39 Jamieson 1996, pp. 332f. 
40 Schneider 1996, pp. 300f. 
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justification of the research and development into climate engineering. The AF argument thus 
implies consequential “conditional predictions,” for a future scenario and “normative 
assumptions” and “general normative principles” for evaluating specific options in that 
scenario.45 
The AF argument is further supported by the precautionary principle and the maximin 
rule. Precaution may be understood in general as the caution that is exercised in an uncertain 
context. When there are scientifically ambiguous consequences in terms of harm and benefits, 
precautionary principle prefers adapting the ethical stand of first avoiding harm. One of the 
basic forms of the precautionary principle in the context of environment was advocated by 
the article 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. It stated: “In order to 
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation.”46  Several authors take recourse to the many variants 
of the precautionary principle in the context of the climate engineering.47Reichwein opines 
that“precautionary Principle is currently the most promising approach to SRM, although 
clarification on the specific applicability and the legal impacts of the principle is 
necessary.”48 Similarly, Daniel Heyen (2012) in his economic analysis of the risk for climate 
engineering advocates the usage of precautionary principle.49 Ralston assumes that the 
precautionary principle as well as the Rio Declaration50 warrant overlooking the uncertainties 
“where there are threats of irreversible harm to the environment and by implication the 
quality of life for future generations.”51 A moderate coinage of the precautionary principle in 
the context of the large-scale uncertainties involved in climate engineering is invoked by 
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2012, p. 29. 
47Reichwein 2012;Heyen 2012; Betz and Casean 2012; Davies 2011, pp. 101-122; Benjamin Hale & Lisa 
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49 Heyen 2012. 
50 See, Gardiner 2009, p. 22. 
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Resnik and Vallero (2011).52 In this view, “research on geoengineering should continue, but 
specific proposals should not be implemented unless we have good evidence concerning their 
safety, efficacy, and feasibility. Small-scale, low-risk climate engineering projects, such as 
reforestation or the use of physical or chemical processes to remove CO2, should be 
attempted prior to implementing large, risky projects, such as SO2 spraying or fertilizing the 
oceans.”53 Against the arguments of the detractors of climate engineering who invoke the 
precautionary principle to dissuade research, Resnik and Vallero (2011) cautions that, “An 
overly precautionary approach toward something so time-sensitive and potentially 
irreversible as climate change could result in missed opportunities.”54 The appeal to the 
ethical norm of maximin principle55 is spontaneously drawn in the context of precautionary 
principle in relation to lesser evil. The maximin principle or maximin criterion is a principle 
advocated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971). Gregor Betz (2012) formulates the 
maximin principle as follows: “Of a set of alternative choices, the one with the highest 
minimal possible payoff is rationally to be preferred.”56 Like the precautionary principle, this 
is also a principle for making a decision under uncertainty. It holds that an action should be 
favoured where the worst loss from that action will be better than the minimum loss from all 
other actions possible in the given context. The enthusiasts for research and development in 
climate engineering suggest that the application of maximin rule would endorse their cause. 
The forecast of a possible climate emergency in the future and the normative 
assumption that the worst consequences of not doing climate engineering will be worse than 
the worst consequence of doing climate engineering seem to support the case of lesser evil 
argument. What are the possible worst consequences of not doing climate engineering? The 
scenario envisaged is formulated in extreme categories by most authors. “Nightmare 
scenario,” “climate emergency,” “climate catastrophe” are some of the terms coined in the 
literature in this regard.57 
Some of the literature highlights the worst scenario of the extinction of the human 
species itself. Survival of the human species might itself be dependent on our ability to 
geoengineer now.58 This is termed as survival argument by Gardiner (2010).59 Applying the 
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concern for survival to a wider context, climate engineering is considered by some authors as 
a conservation of the global ecosystem and it may be treated as the only remaining 
possibility.60 
 
3.3.1.3 Arguments in Favour Climate Engineering Research 
 Another major line of the debate identifiable in the literature, which is closely related 
to the climate emergency arguments, pertains to the research and development of climate 
engineering. As climate engineering is a seminal science, still to take off the launch pad, the 
preliminary question is, is research and development of climate engineering desirable at all? 
Knowledge enhancement argument, innovation argument, responsibility to future generation, 
easiness to obtain informed consent, and false exclusiveness,61 are the major subsets of the 
arguments pertaining to research ethics in climate engineering. As an alternative or 
complement to mitigation, research and development into climate engineering makes it ready 
for deployment in case of an emergency. The innovation argument holds that research can 
“trigger spin-offs and create jobs.”62 Research does enhance our knowledge of the science of 
climate engineering.63 The possibility of obtaining informed consent through representative 
bodies makes the feasibility of research relatively easy despite the complex nature of the 
informed consent in such a global concern.64 
Another compelling motivation for research and development is our responsibility to 
future generations whereby our present planning and design matter quite a lot for the well 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
59 Its formulation goes: “If very substantial progress on emissions reduction is not made soon, then the world 
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being of future generations in a fast changing climate scenario.65 Fernow (2012) thinks that 
“research into SRM techniques can alternatively be considered as our moral duty, since 
arming the future might present us with an opportunity to pay off our CO2-‘debt’.”66 Refusal 
to research now would “lead to a shifting of the ‘problem’, i.e. some of the risks, to some 
future generation.”67 
Ruling out the misconception that mitigation and climate engineering exclude each 
other would provide another justification for research and development. According to Keith 
(2000), mitigation and climate engineering do not exclude each other.68Forming public 
opinion and ensuring public engagement from the outset are serious points extensively 
discussed in the literature. There are at least 15 papers dealing with public engagement in 
climate engineering and that too on an optimistic note exploring various models of engaging 
the public.69 Upstream public engagement,70 supermajority rule,71 and Participatory 
Democratic Governance of bottom up model,72 are some of the models proposed in the 
literature towards forming and appraising the public view on research into climate 
engineering.  
 
3.3.1.4 Feasibility Arguments 
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The feasibility arguments constitute a bulk of the defensive positions on climate 
engineering. The general assumption in the feasibility arguments is that climate engineering 
compared to mitigation has several practical advantages in that it is cheap and cost-effective, 
easily deployed, avoids unnecessary compromise with the present life-style, etc. Since a 
nation can single-handedly or a small group of nations jointly can develop and deploy climate 
engineering, it does not invite the hurdles of collective decision-making and international 
consensus. Betz and Casean (2012) call it the do-it-alone argument.73 Further, a small group 
of nations will be able to execute the project.74 Many other authors also have treated this 
easiness as assuring the success of climate engineering.75Michaelson (1998) also sees that it 
minimises the institutional roles making it administratively simpler.76 
Cost-effectiveness and efficiency are the most projected elements highlighted under 
the feasibility position with a number of at least 18 papers developing this part of the 
debate.77 Bracmort thinks that compared to mitigation, future technology might still bring 
down costs.78 The scientific analysis of Emmerling (2013) has shown that SRM is very likely 
to be effective.79 Gramstad (2010) claims that climate engineering passes the cost-benefit 
test.80 Hinding is very articulate that the pros of climate engineering outweigh the 
cons.81Michaelson (1998) goes one step further to argue that mitigation is more expensive 
than climate engineering82 and it has the secondary economic benefit of being an eco-friendly 
technology and it is cheaper in political economic terms.83 Preston (2013) considers climate 
engineering to be effective as SRM will be fast, cheap, efficient, and naturally observed in the 
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Pinatubo effect.84 Svoboda (2012) shows SAG (Sulphate Aerosol Geoengineering) has less 
net harm than mitigation and other forms of climate engineering.85 Lane and Bickel’s 
research claimed that “the benefit- to-cost ratio of research and development of SRM 
technologies is ‘on the order of 1000 to 1.”86 Leal-Arcas (2012) too considers it to be least 
expensive and quick.87 
The life-style argument could also be placed alongside the advantages of climate 
engineering. While mitigation poses serious challenges to the style of living, habits and 
economics ways of the present civilization, climate engineering avoids the challenges of 
having to address the root causes of the climate problems.88 Accordingly it is also described 
as the “easiness argument”89 for climate engineering. There is the single claim by Wigley 
(2000) that short-term deployment of certain variants of climate engineering is possible, 
adding to the effectiveness of climate engineering.90Although there are only somenominal 
arguments in defence of climate engineering from the perspective of justice, the two 
observations related to equity could be treated broadly under the effectiveness of the climate 
engineering. Michaelson (1998) observes that climate engineering, broadly treated, is fairer 
than mitigation provided we agree that the ideal world never exists.91 He also claims that 
climate engineering avoids the tragedy of commons.92 
 
3.3.1.5 Public Good Arguments 
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Given the large scale and long-term impact of climate engineering some authors 
suggest treating climate engineering as a global public good.93 The consideration of climate 
engineering as a public good was developed in the Oxford principles for climate engineering. 
The Oxford principles for climate engineering were developed and submitted to UK House of 
Commons in 2009. Oxford Principles recommended that climate engineering should be 
treated and regulated as a public good. Reyner et al (2011) consider the climate engineering 
projects, including research and deployment, within the framework of the Oxford 
principles.94 Preston comments that “Oxford principles are notable for stipulating that climate 
engineering should not be driven by profit-raising questions…”95 The Royal Society (2009) 
has also underscored the role of the public participation along similar lines. 
 
3.3.1.6 Ecological Arguments 
A final category of arguments promoting the cause of climate engineering may be termed 
as ecological arguments. They are branded as ecological arguments because they presuppose 
a vision of nature and human’s relationship to nature. The ecological arguments have a 
revised understanding of the earth-system, opposed to the radical environmentalists, which 
permits desirable intervention with nature. Not surprisingly, only five papers96 have been 
identified to be dealing at some length with these arguments. Preston (2011) counters the 
“ecofascism” of the deep environmentalists.97 Refusal to do climate engineering can be 
tantamount to ecofascism because in case of an emergency it would mean letting the humans 
to die to keep the earth system unperturbed and that might lead to the extinction of the human 
species.98 He envisages a hypothetical situation where climate engineering would be more a 
responsible obligation to the earth system. It is an imaginary situation if climate engineering 
was warranted by sudden climate changes caused by other than anthropogenic factors. He 
wonders if climate engineering would have been desirable in such a circumstance.99 In this 
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case, Preston (2011) raises the philosophical issues concerning the fundamental relationship 
between humans and the earth. The earth’s large-scale biogeochemical processes should not 
be understood in isolation from the human well being. He says, “The values embodied in 
earth’s basic biogeochemical systems are not so high that they trump human interests…”100 
Based on John Dewey’s concept of artful inquiry, Ralston (2009) considers climate 
engineering as an artful solution to climate emergency.101 According to Ralston (2009), 
“Research on climate engineering ought to continue, as should research on mitigation and 
adaptation. In varying degrees, all of these are artful and ethical ways to preserve the 
atmosphere for future generations, and, at the same time, ways for us to behave as responsible 
members of the greater geocommunity.”102Climate engineering also has the potential for 
increased plant productivity and more colourful sunsets,103 which also are tantamount to the 
ecological benefits.  
 
3.3.2 Arguments against Climate Engineering 
The opponents of climate engineering field an array of arguments which not only 
counters the arguments for climate engineering, but also opens up new battlefields from 
several frontiers spanning through climate science, philosophy, social sciences, and political 
concerns, to geo-ecological consequences and risk ethics.  
The arguments against climate engineering shall be shortly outlined here along the 
scheme presented in Table 9.  
Table 9: Main Frame Arguments: 
 Arguments Frame Number 
of 
Papers 
1 Scientific Objections 68 
2 Feasibility Objections 61 
3 Issues of Risk 56 
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4 Governance Concerns 45 
5 Concerns with Technical Fix 41 
6 Arguments from Justice 37 
7 Deep Ecology Arguments 35 
8 Moral Hazard 32 
9 Arguments Opposing Climate Engineering Research  30 
Table 10: Main Frame Arguments with Sub-frames 
(The various arguments and principles that are found to be complementing a main frame 
argument are organised as a sub-frame under the main frame. This table presents the list of 
the main frame and sub-frame arguments ranked in the order of the number of papers.) 
1. Scientific Arguments Sub-frames (68 Papers)  
 Unseen Side-effects 24 
 Irreducible Uncertainties 20 
 Earth System Complexity 8 
 There are Scientific Alternatives for Averting Climate Changes 6 
 Only Partial Offset by Climate engineering 6 
 Climate engineering might Worsen Catastrophic Changes 3 
 Worst Scenario compared to the failure with mitigation 1 
2. Feasibility Sub-frames (61 Papers)  
 Large scale field tests are problematic 27 
 Sudden Termination Problem 17 
 False claims of Cost-effectiveness 7 
 Questionable Effectiveness  3 
 Factor of Possible Human Error  3 
 Non-reliable Forecast 2 
 Irreversible Intervention 2 
3 Risk Ethics Sub-frames (56 Papers)  
 Unestimated risks 20 
 Unilateral Deployment 14 
 Commercialisation of Technology 12 
 Militarisation of Technology and Possible climate Wars 9 
Dual Use of Technology 1 
79 
4 Governance Issues Sub-frames (45 Papers) 
 Complexity of Governance 34 
Inadequacy of Existing International Laws 7 
Uncertain International Cooperation 2 
Impossible Long-term control 2 
5 Concerns with Technical Fix (41 Papers)  
 Technical Fix 15 
 Treating Symptom over cause 8 
Techno-escalation (Slippery slope) 7 
Hubris Argument 5 
Futuristic Argument 3 
Intentional Intervention (Principle of double effect) 3 
6 Justice Concerns Sub-frames (37 Papers)  
 Intergenerational equity 17 
 Unequal Distribution of Cost and Benefits 9 
 Compensation Issues 4 
 The Predator evasion paradox 3 
 Survival of the Fittest 1 
Difference Principle 1 
 Egalitarianism  1 
 Human Rights 1 
7 Deep-ecology Arguments Sub-frames (35 Papers)  
 Rights of Non-human species 7 
 Playing God  6 
 Domination of Nature  5 
 Aesthetic concerns 4 
 Unwarranted deviation in the anthroposcene 4 
 Respect Argument 3 
 Anthropological Argument 3 
 Holistic Argument 2 
 
8 
9 
Non-interference Argument (Non-anthropocentric Argument) 1 
Moral Hazard (33 Papers)  
Arguments Opposing Climate Engineering ResearchSub-frames 
(30 Papers) 
 
Concern with Moratorium on Research and Field Tests 12 
80 
Research leads to Deployment 9 
Problems with Informed Consent 5 
Passing the Buck to future generations 3 
 Future Dilemma Scenario 1 
 
 
3.3.2.1 Scientific Objections 
The various arguments closely linked to the findings of the climatic sciences are 
clustered together as the scientific arguments. In our scheme of classification of arguments, 
the scientific arguments have the most number of hits with 68 references. Unseen side-effects 
of climate engineering, irreducible uncertainties, earth-system complexity, possibility of 
alternative means, partial offset of anthropogenic climate change, etc., are the sub-sets of the 
scientific arguments against climate engineering. 
 
3.3.2.1.1 Side-effects of Climate Engineering 
 With very little research and field tests having been done and with no precedence of 
the technological exercise to such a global magnitude, geoengineering scientists, theorists, 
and ethicists are highly apprehensive about the potential side-effects of geoengineering. 
Almost every paper expresses a genuine concern over the consequences and 24 of our 
selected sources develop the debate in terms of the side-effects of geoengineering.104 Climate 
scientists have identified a series of side-effects for the various constituencies of 
geoengineering. The fear of the projected side-effects prevents the technology from taking 
off. The major side-effects of geoengineering related to climate and environment extensively 
discussed in the literature are the following: prolonged ocean acidification, aggravating ozone 
depletion, sunlight reduction resulting in reduced solar power production, implementation 
impacts like noise, pollution, debris, etc., increased whitening of the skies, challenges to the 
terrestrial optical astronomy and satellite remote sensing, reduction in global precipitation, 
irregular monsoons, increased acid deposition, extinction of the Amazon forests, greater 
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formation of tropospheric cirrus clouds,105 food and water scarcity in regions of Saharan 
Africa and Asia due to interference with the with Asian and African monsoon patterns,106 
possible drought in Southeast Asia, slowest flow of Ganges and Amazon, potential health 
hazards from increased ozone depletion like increased skin cancer, and cataract leading to 
one million death, adverse challenges to marine ecosystem, reduction in agricultural 
production, biogeochemical cycles and forest productivity,107 potential threats to the 
ecosystems and livelihoods in polar regions due to high concentrations of “wash-out” 
sulphate particles,108 reduction in the net primary productivity of North America by 50-
100%,109  challenges with the space-based systems like the sunshades sailing out of the orbit, 
tracking problems, imposing logistical problems like unprecedented scale of production of 
mirrors and long time-span required for production, impossibility of replacing trillions of 
flyers, failure of rockets and their possible collisions, as well as the formation of orbital 
debris clouds.110More specifically, ocean fertilization may result in “Changes in marine 
primary production, biodiversity and food webs; increased ocean interior anoxia and 
acidification; also increased N2O and CH4 release.”111 Direct carbon capture may also 
damage the deep-sea ecosystems and increased acidification of ocean.112 Ocean fertilization 
can also cause oxygen depletion leading to methane release and changed mix of ocean 
biota.113 Preston’s (2013) description of the incidental impacts also shares the same 
anxieties.114 The speculative nature of the predictions, trans-boundary impacts of the 
technology, and, unequal distribution of the side-effects further worsen the case.115 A study 
on deploying sulphate aerosols held for the US Department of Defence showed that it “could 
explicitly constitute hostile weather modification.”116 
3.3.2.1.2 Irreducible Uncertainties117 
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 An introductory reading of the literature on the ethics of climate engineering gives the 
impression that the whole debate is operating against the backdrop of huge uncertainties. 
Uncertainty becomes an imposing limit on almost every aspect of the entire debate. From 21 
papers, this review identifies a few of the leading technical uncertainties that are ethically 
relevant.118 In regard to SRM and the CDR method of the air capture of CO2, there are many 
uncertainties prevalent in regard to their benefits and harms. As for the afforestation 
technique, there is uncertainty about “calculating baselines and the permanence of carbon 
sequestration.”119 For ocean based techniques, there is uncertainty about the fate of carbon in 
ocean and the P:N utilization ratio120 of eco-systems. The rate of carbon accumulation under 
changing climates is a challenge to carbon capture techniques. Costs, life-time, feasibility, 
and aerosol transport and its effect on cloud optical properties are uncertain matters for 
SRM.121 Resnik and Vallero (2011) find that uncertainties are very high with regard to the 
radiant gases, their cooling forcing as well as albedo. In climatic engineering techniques, a 
small change in initial conditions can lead to results totally different from the expected. A 
minor mistake can therefore cause unintended and unknown results.122 Tanaka calls for 
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scientific data, research gaps and the still speculative aspects in the proposed technologies as opposed to the 
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uncertainty analysis to avoid overshoot.123Williamson (2012),124 relying on various studies 
conducted by others, warns about the uncertainties in regard to the measure of mid-and deep-
water production of nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4), from the decomposition of 
additional sinking biomass. It is suggested that Nitrous oxide and Methane are 320 times and 
20 times greater potential than CO2 in causing global warming. Therefore, any increase in 
their production and their reach in the atmosphere would have serious consequences that 
would offset the desired results of CO2 Sequestration.
125 
3.3.2.1.3 Earth-system Complexity 
This argument holds that the earth system may be more complex than what science 
has presently understood and any tampering with it or intentional manipulation of it would 
result in dangerous climatic changes. The assumption here is that any technical attempt to 
cool the earth would affect the earth as a whole. As the Royal Society has summarized, one 
of the perspectives on the potential role of geoengineering is that “it represents a dangerous 
manipulation of Earth systems and may be intrinsically unethical.”126 Fernow (2012) holds 
that “… it is crucial for the comprehensive regulation of complex and sensitive processes to 
bear in mind thatpossible adverse, irreversible consequences of planetary-scale manipulations 
could emerge exactly from the unforeseeable and non-linear dynamics of ecological and 
social systems.”127 The complexity of the earth-system does not allow understanding or 
controlling the climate system in a reasonable manner.128 Preston (2011) identifies a prima 
facie reason, a presumptive argument emerging in the opposition against climate engineering. 
“The presumptive argument is bolstered by recognition of the extraordinary complexity of 
earth’s ecological system and often a deep scepticism about scientists’ ability to manage 
it.”129 Gardiner’s (2010a) coining of the “unthinkable action”130 carries the very thought of 
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climate engineering as morally undesirable and something very counter-intuitive. The 
perspective of the earth as a self-regulating system for habitation also needs to be correlated 
with this idea.131 
 
3.3.2.1.4 Worsens Dangerous Climate Change 
As opposed to climate engineering as an insurance policy, it is argued by the opponents 
that climate engineering might worsen the dangerous climate change.132 Baum et al. (2013), 
for example, envisages a double catastrophe scenario where a natural calamity halts the 
sulphate aerosol injection leading to sudden rise in temperature, which results in the 
extinction of the human species itself.133 In the long run, the worst case without 
geoengineering might be better than the worst case with mitigation.134 
3.3.2.1.5 Potential Scientific Alternatives 
Apart from mitigation and adaptation, the opponents argue, that the scientific 
community must rigorously look into alternative ways of countering the anthropogenic 
climate changes. Biochar, air capture methods, zero emission vehicles or alternative energy 
sources, adequate mass education, population control, etc., might provide viable alternatives 
to climate engineering.135 If these alternative approaches are seriously implemented, climate 
change would be less alarming and there would be no need for a technological fix. Besides, 
the alternative approaches will not in any way play down the mitigation efforts as they share 
the same concerns driving the mitigation strategies.  
3.3.2.1.6 Only Partial Offset136 
Climate engineering can address only a small portion of the diverse consequences of 
anthropogenic climate changes. It is not anything effective in addressing such changes 
comprehensively with a complete control over the thermostat.137 There are several vital areas 
that are not addressed by it. For instance, the albedo enhancement does not remove the 
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concentration of the CO2 in the atmosphere, but only allows it to continue, and ocean 
acidification and its challenges to marine life would still remain untouched. Therefore, 
geoengineering solutions, though it may be successful in some respects, cannot be considered 
to be an integral response to climate change. It is not worth investing in a strategy that will 
not bring in a sustainable solution. 
3.3.2.2 Arguments Opposing Climate Engineering Research 
 There are many arguments opposing research and development of climate 
engineering. The ethical debate here is also informed by epistemic, cultural and democratic 
factors. Issues related to informed consent, intergenerational ethics including the rights of 
future generations, the precautionary principle, and research value, are the leading sub-sets of 
arguments in this section. 30 papers are raising these issues in a manner worth mentioning. 
 9 out of these 30 papers are directly confronting the very idea of research. Arguments 
in them consider research to be intrinsically unjustifiable.138 A major concern about any 
research in this context is that research inevitably leads to deployment.139 “If the development 
of climate engineering technologies will automatically lead to their deployment, the situation 
we end up in by doing research and development is not a situation where we have two 
alternative options. The decision to engage in research now predetermines the deployment. 
Research and development does therefore not increase the number of options we have in the 
long run.”140 According to Jamieson (1996), “there is a serious risk that ICC projects will be 
implemented even if they are unwarranted…. in many cases research leads unreflectively to 
development.”141 As Jamieson (1996) has noted, here there is a cultural imperative not to 
oppose progress. For many opponents, research is no goal in itself.142 
 Preston (2013) fears that climate engineering researches are prone to the problems of 
“path-dependency” or “lock-in.”143 Technological lock-in would mean that the “the pressure 
to implement climate engineering from vested institutions could potentially overwhelm the 
caution the technology demands.”144 It invites the slippery slope of formation of interest 
groups involved in research and those groups acting as pressure groups. Resnik and Vallero’s 
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(2011) concern with an epistemic problem of science becoming tainted with private funding 
opposes the cause of research.145 
 There is yet another stream of argument along the line which may be termed as the 
“anachronistic” argument. According to this argument, the present understanding of climate 
engineering technology may not be compatible with the nature of climate engineering 
technology 50 years from now. As technological advancements are occurring at 
unprecedented levels, future generations may be able to develop better technologies for 
averting climate changes. The present generation cannot anticipate a state-of-the-art 
technology of the future now. Therefore developing a technology, using the present technical 
know-how, which may take several decades to be ready for deployment is undesirable.146 
Then there is the issue of intergenerational ethics. The very planning of research 
implies that the future generations are already made parties to the problem and we transfer 
the risks of CE to them. Betz and Casean (2012)call it the “risk-transfer argument.”147 Instead 
of addressing the problem of mitigation here and now, the present generation comfortably 
“passes the buck” to future generations.148 The risk-transfer scenario throws the future 
generations into a situation in which their choices and rights are conditioned in an ethically 
unacceptable manner.149 
Promoting research into climate engineering at this juncture will have serious other 
ramifications. Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013) observe that “Government endorsement 
prematurely stamps geoengineering activities as acceptable; and given the nascent state of 
understanding in the science, a rush toward implementation may result in potentially 
dangerous proposals being mistakenly promoted and potentially useful techniques mistakenly 
ignored.”150 Besides, in a society where various research projects are striving for funding, a 
huge sum spent on climate engineering research will be a setback to several other researches 
which may be of immediate benefit to the society. Prioritization of climate engineering will 
displace other knowledge enhancing projects.151 Besides, there is the likelihood of climate 
engineering research turning out to be trivial.152 
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 Obtaining informed consent for climate engineering research is very problematic. The 
principle of informed consent holds that a person who will be subjected to a research or a 
party who will be affected by the research should be told about the implications and risks of 
the research and his/her consent must be obtained for carrying out the research. In the case of 
climate engineering, the conventional understanding of informed consent faces many 
limitations. It is difficult to clearly identify the parties who will be affected by climate 
engineering. Even if they are identified, that will be a huge number of masses of populations 
for such a globally impactful technology. It is difficult to get a unanimous consent from a 
huge population. In that case, it may be argued that the representative consent of populations 
may be sufficient. However, the representative consent also involves several concerns like 
who is to represent and what is the norm for forming the opinion to be represented. The 
desperate or self-defence scenarios as highlighted by Gardiner also invoke the issue of 
informed consent. Assuming informed consent in a desperate scenario does not absorb the 
complexity of the problem.153 
 There are 8 papers dealing with a moratorium on climate engineering tests.154 
Different variants of the precautionary principles are invoked by different authors even for a 
ban or moratorium on climate engineering.155 The weak version of the precautionary 
principle states that the precaution of avoiding harm should be given preference in case of a 
choice under uncertainty. There are several elements of uncertainty and potentials risks in 
climate engineering. This is adequate reason for a ban on climate engineering as a precaution 
against the adverse impacts on the ecosystem. Besides, the worries about moral hazard, the 
possible commercial misuse of technology are arguments listed for a ban or moratorium. 
3.3.2.3 Feasibility Objections 
The opponents of climate engineering squarely confront the claims of the proponents 
that it is a feasible and efficient technique compared to mitigation and adaptation. The 
feasibility objections are classified under the sub-units of large-scale field tests, termination 
problem, irreversible interventions, possible human errors, cost-effective deficiencies, etc. In 
aggregate, there are 61 papers developing the debate from the perspective of feasibility. The 
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large-scale impact of climate engineering poses serious ethical issues. The feasibility and 
permissibility of such a large-scale technique is questionable for non-encapsulated system.156 
 As of 2013 there were about 8 field tests at a small-scale which were either executed 
or planned and these tests do not seem to have produced anything significant towards climate 
engineering research, apart from spanning controversies.157 The climate engineering studies 
are still relying on computer simulations, which are far from actual tests, and there are serious 
inconsistencies with these simulations.158 There are several papers questioning the reliability 
of small-scale tests, the very possibility of tests, the propriety of “trial and error” method at 
such a larger scale, the application of do-no-harm principle and minimization principle.159 
The problem of sudden termination or the exit problem is lavishly raised in the 
literature questioning the feasibility of climate engineering. There are 17 papers dealing with 
this problem.160 The shared anxiety is that a sudden termination of the aerosol injection or 
any such methods would result in a sudden rise in temperature, which would aggravate the 
dangerous climate change scenario. The long-term deployment makes it an irreversible 
intervention and non-stoppable development.161 The feasibility is further challenged by the 
possibility of human error.162 The reliability of the forecasts is still questionable.163 Although 
climate engineering is presented by the proponents as very cost-effective, there are several 
arguments challenging the cost-benefit and cost-effective claims. It is shown that most 
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analyses fall short of being reliable, ignore the indirect costs, irrelevant due to uncertainty, or 
even fails in cost benefit test.164 
3.3.2.4 Governance Concerns 
Absence of an adequate governance mechanism poses a serious challenge to climate 
engineering. It constitutes a hot and heavy debate in the literature with 45 papers developing 
on this area.165 The questions of moral authority, instability of political institutions and 
political strategies, deliberate democratic engagement, political obliviousness, respect for 
sovereignty are amongst the concerns in governance of climate engineering, which render it 
an ethically challenging undertaking.International cooperation might turn out to be a big 
hurdle along the way to governance.166 The impracticality of long-term control167 and the 
inadequacy of the present international laws and treaties further complicate governance.168 
3.3.2.5 Arguments from Justice 
 Just as the case with any debate in environmental ethics, justice constitutes one of the 
central pillars of the climate engineering controversy. The concerns with justice in climate 
engineering are discussed in detail in the following chapters of this study. Thedue attention 
paid tojustice in the debate is testified by the intense activity in this field as 37 papers 
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represent this issue.  Intergenerational equity,169 risk-transfer to future generations,170 
beneficence and Belmont principle,171 participation of the vulnerable sections,172 distributive 
and procedural justice173 and indigenous people and their involvement,174 are the major issues 
pertaining to justice in the context of climate engineering. 
 The unequal distribution of cost and benefits and benefits and harms is vociferously 
raised by the advocates of climatic justice.175 The difference principle, egalitarianism and 
human rights questions are also introduced in the debate in the context of 
justice.176Rawlsdeveloped the principle of difference in his Justice as Fairness.177 Difference 
principle is a principle of justice to regulate the distribution of wealth and income amidst 
social and economic inequalities. It requires that social institutions be arranged in such a way 
that inequalities in wealth and income must be oriented to the benefit of those who would be 
worst off. The economic inequalities should be to everyone’s advantage, and chiefly to the 
greatest advantage of the least advantaged. As we would discuss eventually, in the context of 
climate engineering, the contrary is likely to be the case. The egalitarian fear is that climate 
engineering might widen the socio-economic inequalities already prevalent in the world. 
Conversely, it would weaken the just realisation of the human rights. There is also a stream of 
argument under the justice concerns that those who caused the problem of climate change 
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should also solve it.178Betz and Casean (2012)call it the polluter-pays principle.179 Abdicating 
our responsibility is a kind of injustice to the future generations. Benajmin Hale (2012) calls 
it the Responsibility abdication objection. In this argument, climate engineering acquits us of 
our responsibility for our actions. We can get away with our offences without being held 
responsible for.180Climate engineering provides a “get-out-of-jail-free card.”181 The issue of 
paying compensation to the deprived and the losers is a major problem to be addressed.182 
3.3.2.6 Moral Hazard Argument 
 A prominent argument against climate engineering is the moral hazard argument. The 
notion of moral hazard originates from the insurance context referring to the natural tendency 
of the insured to be more care-free and experimental than the non-insured. Applied to climate 
engineering, it is feared that climate engineering possibility will weaken the case of 
alternative strategies like mitigation and adaptation. The literature on the ethics of climate 
engineering has an elaborate discussion on the moral hazards associated with climate 
engineering. We have 32 papers advancing the moral hazard debate.183The significant moral 
hazard arguments opposing climate engineering are mainly the variants of moral hazard like 
technical dependence hazard, governance hazard, snowball hazard,184 and Gardiner’s deeper 
ethical hazard. The image of climate engineering as a possible insurance policy against 
climate change185 and the likelihood of consolidating present life-style and practices are also 
considered moral hazards caused by climate engineering. Climate engineering research would 
invoke the problem of moral corruption.186 Moral corruption, according to Gardiner is “the 
subversion of our moral discourse to our own ends.”187 It is because the present generation 
may underestimate their responsibilities and find rational ways to justify their 
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overconsumption, especially given the hypothetical possibilities opened up by the research. 
This argument is a variation of the moral hazard argument. 
3.3.2.7 Considerations Concerning Risk 
 As an emerging set of technology with trans-boundary outreach, climate engineering 
is loaded with many risks that should be taken into account for ethical responses and policy 
formulations. Apart from the scientific and technical issues like unseen side-effects and 
uncertainties188 which are already discussed, climate engineering further invites many 
potential risks which are to be engaged from the social, political, legal and environmental 
perspectives. The literature has an exhaustive overview of these risks from multi-
perspectives.189 The danger of unilateral deployment, commercial interests of private 
stakeholders, potential move towards climate wars, and the danger of dual use are the major 
non-technical risks.  
 There are apprehensions about the feasibility of climate engineering to be developed 
by one or a small group of nations. There can be unprecedented consequences for the 
deployment of the technology in a non-encapsulated earth system even if it is by a single 
nation. The results show that the fear of unilateral deployment is a leading contender for the 
risk ethics with 13 references.190 The large-scale and long-term impact of climate engineering 
with its trans-temporal and trans-spatial outreach, coupled with the military motives of some 
of the stakeholders, makes it an extremely risky practice with the tangible potential for 
unmitigated conflict of interests which might end up in geopolitical and climate wars.191 The 
potential danger of the dual use of technology for military empowerment with the production 
of weapons of mass destruction is also to be taken into account.192 
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The possible commercialisation of technology may invite additional risks for climate 
engineering technologies. The formation of interest groups with the involvement of private 
stakeholders with profit motives might divert the technology to commercial ends. 
Commercialisation of the technology may compromise the genuine motivations of 
technology and profit motives may expose the technology to the risks of unwarranted or 
prolonged deployment. It also implies the risk of spoiling the image of science as an objective 
and trust-worthy practice.193 
 
3.3.2.8 Concerns with Technical Fix 
 The critique of climate engineering in this category is based on foundational 
conceptual and theoretical assumptions. The problems of technical fix, treating symptom over 
cause, techno-escalation and hubris arguments194 are the subsets of arguments for the 
technological critique. Climate engineering is criticized as a big technical fix of the earth. As 
such it is an artificial solution envisaging a designer climate. 16 papers are voicing a concern 
about it.195 Along the same line, it is argued that climate engineering is fundamentally flawed, 
as it does not have recourse to the fundamental problematic underneath, rather, prefers to 
treat the symptom over the cause. It is nothing more than a “band-aid” solution.196 
 The hubris argument is a corollary of the technical fix criticism. The hubris argument 
refers to the unwarranted faith in the megalomaniac powers of technology which facilitates 
large scale manipulations in an unbridled manner.197 In the words of Betz and Casean (2012), 
it is an “arrogance and a form of self-deceit that will heavily backfire.”198 There is a slippery 
slope involved in it that it leads to a sort of techno-escalation whereby humanity gets an 
unacceptable hope in technology preferring designer climate against the natural and the 
irreversible means over the reversible.199 
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3.3.2.9 Deep-ecological Arguments 
 Deep-ecology, an offshoot of the ecological thinking since 1980s, is understood here 
as a philosophical perspective which views the earth, human and the diverse infrahuman 
species as an integral part of the web of life. It challenges the anthropocentric view of life, 
admonishes the instrumental approach towards the infrahuman, and attributes an intrinsic 
value to every species. Relationality is the key element in deep-ecology. The relational matrix 
of the web of life emphasised by the advocates of deep ecology provide a conceptual 
framework for categorising some of the critique against artificial solutions in climate 
engineering. Accordingly, climate engineering is viewed as a totally different phase in the 
anthroposcene200 where the new metaphors of human interaction with nature are “messing 
with nature”201 “tampering with nature”202 “domination of nature”203 and “playing God.”204 
 Climate engineering will also have some negative impact on the aesthetic appeal of 
nature and environment such as the difference in the sunsets, loss of the blue sky, wilderness 
and naturality. This may be termed as the aesthetic argument against climate 
engineering.205Betz and Casean (2012) call it the “loss of intangible.”206 Holism arguments207 
and non-interference argument208 are also coined against intentional climate change, which 
may be branded under the ecological objections. The point about holism argument is that the 
decision to geoengineer would imply our failure to adapt to nature. In our rapid expanding 
processes in terms of technological powers and population growth, we have failed in our 
ability to live in harmony with the rest of the creation, though humans are one of the recent 
arrivals in the evolutionary history.209 Non-interference argument, as Paul Taylor has 
articulated, is that “we must not try to manipulate, control, modify, or ‘manage’ natural 
systems or otherwise intervene in their normal functioning.’210The respect argument holds 
that climate engineering indirectly points to the disrespect to nature because climate 
engineering was warranted by climate changes resulting from pollution which is a sign of our 
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disrespect for nature.211 The respect argument extended to the non-human species212 invokes 
animal liberationist perspectives and bio-centric perspectives in relation to climate 
engineering. As deep ecology is concerned with the relationship of humans to nature and the 
role of humans in the web of life, climate engineering concerns cannot stay away from 
sharing some platforms with it. 
3.4 Discussion 
In this section, we shall engage with the argument streams at a greater degree 
highlighting the various ambiguities of the argument clusters. After observing some of the 
general characteristics operative in the debate landscape, we shall move on to wider 
conceptual and thematic issues of the debate. Accordingly, this section is divided into two 
parts: logistical observations, and thematic engagement. By logistical observation we mean 
the general characteristics and commendable elements in the overall progress of the debate. 
In the section on thematic engagement, we shall dwell in detail on some argument frames, 
which deserve further attention and development. 
3.4.1 Logistical Observations  
3.4.1.1 The Complex Dynamics of the Debate Landscape 
A review of the literature on the ethics of climate engineering at this stage of the debate is 
posed to encounter a series of difficulties. The plethora of ethical arguments with an 
interwoven and interdisciplinary nature pose the initial problem. The gestational phase of the 
empirical research and the lack of scientific clarity on the whole make the ethical assessment 
difficult. The degree of empirical uncertainty and the range of hypothetical openness to even 
contradictory positions present in most arguments make the assessments ambiguous. The 
expository and descriptive nature of most papers with qualified positions and selective 
endorsement of the arguments for or against, and conversely, the absence of a tangible and 
definitive endorsement or negation of concrete positions make the overall debate less 
articulate.  
There seems to be little consensus in the literature on the demarcation between the purely 
scientific, social, political and ethical problems inherent in the controversy. Accordingly, 
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most scientific authors identify only a few ethical problems213 in the climate engineering 
controversy, while the ethicists and philosophers are inclined to raise an ethical point on 
almost every aspect of the controversy. The scientific ambiguity and uncertainty opens up an 
unchartered territory to the ethicist to voyage into far-fetched analyses and apprehensions. 
 
3.4.1.2 Semantic Diversity and Ethical Ambiguity 
The ethical deliberation of climate engineering becomes complex on account of the 
differing focuses and applications of the very technology. The usage of the term climate 
engineering in the literature as referring to varying technologies poses a crucial challenge in 
the ethical appropriation of climate engineering.214 Bellamy et al (2012) made a critical 
review of the various climate engineering proposals and they found that the substantial 
variability in the outputs of different proposals originated from the “hidden framing effects 
relating to contextual and methodological choices.”215 They claim that climate engineering 
has largely been appraised in contextual isolation, “ignoring the wider portfolio of options for 
tackling climate change – spanning mitigation and adaptation – and creating an artificial 
choice between geoengineering proposals.”216 
An example of the interplay between semantic ambiguity and ethics is present in the 
arm-the-future argument. Betz (2012), in his analysis of the arm the future argument in 
defence of sulphate aerosol climate engineering, found it to be objectionable and “far from 
invincible.”217 However, he concluded that the same argument “would face significantly less 
objections, if it were understood as an argument for developing carbon management 
technologies (such as, e.g., air capture or biomass to coal) rather than technologies for global 
albedo enhancement.”218 It shows the need for developing specific ethical discussions around 
technology-specific climate engineering. Betz (2012) rightly concludes: “the argument for 
climate engineering research is case sensitive; focusing on specific technologies might help to 
alleviate some of the objections such a research program faces.”219 According to Preston 
(2013), “the ethical concerns intensify or weaken depending on the technology under 
consideration. The wide range of climate engineering technologies currently being discussed 
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makes it prudent that each technique should be evaluated individually for its ethical 
merit.”220It shows the technical complexity and the ethical diversity inbuilt in climate 
engineering debates.  As Sheila Jasanoff (2003) states, “… it is a truism among policy 
scholars that the solution to a problem will only be as good as the framing of that 
problem.”221 
 
3.4.1.3 The Academic Lopsidedness of the Debate 
Presently, the debate is somewhat confined to the academic circles, or, is in general 
“expert-analytic.”222 Though there is a good number of a grey literature sources (76 papers) 
apart from the peer-reviewed articles, popular publications on the topic seems insufficient. 
Need for more number of popular publications is important given the call for public 
engagement as underscored by several of the papers. It is noticed that even the grey literature 
is published in top class journals. The public in Asia and Africa seems to be poorly informed. 
There should be deliberate efforts by ethicists and policy makers to make the debate inclusive 
with representation from the different regions of the world who can do the moral 
philosophising from their own concrete context.  
There seems to be regional prejudices with regard to climate problems. For instance, in 
India, there is the general impression generated by the media that climate change is mostly a 
problem generated by the affluent life style of the developed West, and therefore, to be 
resolved by them. However, the cataclysmic nature of the problem is such that no nation can 
take such a self-abdicating approach. “As an issue potentially affecting citizens of countries 
around the globe—both rich and poor—dialogue about the prospect of engineering the earth’s 
climate should not be confined to technical or political elites, nor for that matter solely to the 
citizens of industrialized Western nations.”223Bellamy et al. (2012) call for a balancing of 
appraisal methods, that, only with a “participatory-deliberative appraisals of 
geoengineering…. can we begin to fully account for the great systems uncertainties and high 
stakes that characterize the post-normal state in which the upstream science of 
geoengineering resides.”224 Bellamy et al. (2012) comment that “Most existing methods of 
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appraisal do not adequately respond to the post-normal scientific context in which climate 
engineering resides and show a strong emphasis on closed and exclusive ‘expert-analytic’ 
techniques.”225 
 
3.4.1.4 Inadequate Interdisciplinary Engagement 
As of now there are more professional philosophers and ethicists on the debate scene. It 
seems more involvement of the scientists will give greater credibility to the debate. Keith, 
Schneider, Robock, etc., are the leading scientists involved also in the ethical debate. The 
multifaceted nature of the problem spanning over the scientific, social, ethical, political, and 
economic terrains deserve greater attention in the debate. The debate seems to be lopsided, to 
some extent, towards the ethical and philosophical terrain with inadequate scientific 
information and participation.226 
As we have seen already, though the debate was given a major kick off by Crutzen in 
2006, the number of environmental scientists participating in the debate is far from sufficient. 
However, there is a progressive interdisciplinary attention seen in the field. As Banerjee 
(2011) observes, “Asilomar II was an improvement on Asilomar I because the second 
Asilomar attempted to bring together social and natural scientists, and to engage citizens in 
deliberation about geoengineering governance.”227 “A sound characterization of the 
underlying probabilities and risks requires a well-integrated analysis spanning fields such as 
Earth sciences, statistics, and economics…”228 In climate engineering, “the ethical and 
economic analyses hinge critically on a (hopefully) solid foundation provided by the natural 
and social sciences.”229 Tuana’s suggestion for developing an ELSI (Ethical, Legal and Social 
Issues) analysis is relevant in this context. Scott argues, “SRM is not merely an engineering 
puzzle. Responsible decision-making over SRM research and possible deployment will 
require cooperative and interdisciplinary discussions…. This presents a challenge for 
synthesizing the essential insights from various disciplines that must be involved in 
responsible decision-making on SRM.”230 Harnisch has shown the need for interdisciplinarity 
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in risk calculation.231 The how of interdisciplinary engagement in climate engineering 
constitutes a significant stream for the future advancement of the debate. 
 
3.4.1.5 Missing Contextual Setting 
Though there is a considerable awareness of the need for technique-specific appropriation 
of climate engineering ethics, the literature does not reflect the awareness of a context-
specific and region-based analysis of the relevance of climate engineering. Though ethics is a 
contextually embedded discipline, there is no engagement at the contextual application of a 
particular technique and deliberations over its consequent contextually defined opportunities 
and challenges. As of now the literature seems to be handling mostly the merits or demerits 
of the global impact of climate engineering.  
There is a general presupposition in the literature that nations more vulnerable to climate 
changes will support climate engineering. The strength or weakness of the ethical concerns is 
likely to be fluctuating relative to the context. For instance, the desperation argument 
critiqued by Gardiner has specificity. Desperation argument refers to a situation of climatic 
catastrophe where climate engineering may be rhetorically desired. It assumes that in a 
desperate context, if countries like Maldives initiate climate engineering or request the 
competent countries to save them through climate engineering, the dire urgency and 
desperate plea of the affected would provide a justification for climate engineering. It 
assumes that the pleas of the desperate would justify climate engineering. In other words, the 
danger of the catastrophe coupled with the fate of the vulnerable population would set aside 
the various apprehensions about climate engineering. Desperation thus becomes the 
justification for the policy making.232 It is thus a variant of the lesser evil argument.  
While we find the existing literature to be general and non-specific, we do not mean that 
the quality of the existing research is anything low. Our arguments subsequently in the 
normative chapters will be more along the same level of general statements as we are short of 
any exhaustive technology-specific analysis. We highlight the absence of specific ethical 
analysis of technology with a view to suggest the future directions for the debate to advance. 
 
 
3.4.1.6 Ethics Precedes Technology 
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Preston (2012) describes the ethics of climate engineering as something 
extraordinary.233 The extraordinary aspects of the ethics of climate engineering may be 
identified in many respects. This is perhaps the first time in the history of the interface 
between technology and ethics that a potential technology that has not fielded any 
commendable field test yet, let alone developed a proper research protocol, has been 
subjected to such rigorous ethical scrutiny. Although there were instances of ethics preceding 
technology in several cases as in the proposals for human cloning, genetically modified food, 
and genetically modified organisms, advancements in research had made the technology a 
tangible scientific possibility in those cases.234 Environmental scientist Gregg Marland’s 
(1996) admission that “It is hard to focus on the ‘could we’ parts of the discussion without 
raising the ‘should we’”235 seems to place the question of the ethical desirability of the 
technology before the technical feasibility of the same. 
 
It could also be noted that most papers dealing with the ethics of climate engineering have 
an open approach without a definitive negation or endorsement of climate engineering. Out of 
the 138 papers reviewed, arbitrarily judged, there seem to be only 10 papers, outright 
supporting climate engineering deployment and only five papers outright ruling out climate 
engineering.236 Though the nod for research and development into climate engineering is 
dormant in several papers, the number of papers advocating research and development is 
limited to 15. Most authors wish to take cautionary and qualified positions. This qualified 
stand taken by most authors is likely due to the high degree of uncertainty hovering over the 
debate. This observation corroborates the need for alleviating the element of uncertainty in 
climate engineering debate. 
 
 
3.4. 2 Thematic Engagement 
3.4.2.1 Lesser Evil or Greater Evil? 
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The lesser evil argument seems to be one of the moderately developed argument streams 
in the debate with a cluster of arguments supporting and opposing it. Two general 
impressions emerge from an overview of the lesser evil debate scenario. Firstly, the claim of 
lesser evil as a straightforward argument for climate engineering is deceptive and superficial 
as the proponents do not seem to have satisfactorily answered to the objections to lesser evil. 
Secondly, the recourse to lesser evil in the present phase of the debate seems to be relying 
heavily on philosophical premises than on scientifically legitimate propositions.  
The lesser evil argument has the presumed assumption that mitigation and adaptation are 
the preferred options for tackling climate problems. It also assumes that climate engineering 
has inherent ethical problems and therefore to be considered as an evil though of a lesser 
degree, and this would be justified only in a do or die context. Gardiner (2010b) observes that 
“appeals to the lesser evil are attractive to a wide audience, including those who are otherwise 
strongly against technological intervention.”237 The major boost to climate engineering given 
by Crutzen dwelt on the lesser evil argument for the desirability of research into climate 
engineering. 
The vulnerability of the arguments to be countered by the opposing position is perhaps 
best evidenced in the case of the lesser evil argument, whereby some of the opponents would 
treat it as a greater evil than a lesser one. There are intrinsic problems which are unsettled in 
treating climate engineering as a lesser evil. Although the proponents of climate engineering 
present lesser evil as one of the major arguments for justifying their position, there are several 
objections to this argument to which they have not responded convincingly. Is it ethically 
justifiable to develop a technology, with such a massive magnitude, which is considered an 
evil in itself? How reliable are the predictions of a nightmare scenario? This concern is 
probably the dormant motive behind the Royal Society’s discontent with the last resort 
arguments.238 Gardiner (2007) thinks that there are several questions that are not satisfactorily 
answered in treating climate engineering as lesser evil: “how likely is the emergency situation 
(where one has actually to decide between these two options) to arise? Is it true that these are 
the only alternatives? Is the lesser evil really lesser, all-things-considered? Now, as it 
happens, the answers to these questions seem very much in doubt in the geoengineering 
case.”239 
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Unlike other emergencies, climate emergency is an anticipated emergency and the normal 
way to respond in such a situation is to take the measures to avoid the occurrence of the 
emergency.240 There is the “important difference between preparing for an emergency and 
preparing for an emergency that is to be brought on by one's own moral failure”241 which is 
typically the case with climate engineering. Preparation for emergency does not necessarily 
imply doing climate engineering. Rather, it can be a way of enhancing our mitigation 
strategies like developing alternative energy sources.242 
Crutzen’s proposal cannot be neutral as it would encourage “political inertia”243 on 
mitigation and adaptation. The question of researching into climate engineering cannot be 
discussed in isolation from the issues of deployment.244The problem of “intergenerational 
moral corruption”245 is necessarily inbuilt in opting for climate engineering as an insurance 
policy or Plan B, because if a future climate emergency, consequent of our political inertia, is 
a real possibility, we owe more to the future generations than climate engineering, like 
compensation.  
Some arguments diametrically oppose the central assumptions of the lesser evil argument. 
Climate engineering is no lesser evil; rather, it might lead to an evil scenario worse than the 
emergency scenario resulting from political inertia with mitigation and adaptation.246 The fear 
of this scenario cannot be underestimated given the mounting of the CO2 concentration in the 
atmosphere, the sidelining of mitigation efforts, and the long-term side effects of climate 
engineering. The historical examples of the destruction of the societies like Mayan, Khmer 
and Old Kingdom of Egypt are indicators to the dangers of rapid climate changes.247 A 
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dangerous climate scenario brought on by intentional climate change is morally still worse.248 
Similarly, the analogy of the sick-patient having to apply severe dosage of medicine is found 
incompatible in the climate engineering scenario, because there is no absolute bottom line in 
this case, whereas a sick patient would be dying eventually.249 
Although the proponents of the technology have recourse to the maxmin principle, Betz’s 
(2012) analysis shows the conditions of applying the maximin principle are not met in the 
case of climate engineering.250 The application of the maximin principle in the lesser evil 
argument is contentious. Betz (2012) opines that the maximin principle can be applied 
equally for and against employing climate engineering research and development. A similar 
problem is faced by invoking the precautionary principle in defence of the lesser evil 
argument. The precautionary principle would be justified in the context of climate 
engineering if only the selective and interpretative variants of the principle are invoked. 
Contrary to the claims of the proponents in terms of the precautionary principle, Banerjee 
(2011) argues that “A strongly precautionary approach to geoengineering would ban all 
research, or impose a moratorium.”251 Research on climate engineering defended by lesser 
evil argument itself is unjustified, “since there is no ‘practice planet’ on which these 
technologies can be tested”252 
The arm-the-future argument, a subset of the lesser evil argument, has its own moral 
problems and limitations. According to Gardiner (2010b), “… the argument obscures much 
of what is at stake in the ethics of geoengineering, including what it means to call something 
an ‘evil’, and whether doing evil has further moral implications.”253 Betz (2012), having 
recapitulated the pluralistic aspects of the arm-the-future argument and the objections against 
it, concludes that “the case for climate engineering research can be recast, by making 
provisions or concessions, so as to take the criticism into account and to ease the opposition 
between the conflicting positions.”254 Betz (2012) continues, “proponents and opponents of 
the AF-argument differ with respect to the assessment of our future ability to reliably predict 
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the earth system. While proponents are optimistic about pushing the current limits of social 
and natural sciences, opponents point out that we might not gain the detailed understanding 
necessary for accurate climate engineering predictions.”255 On a detailed analysis of the 
assumptions upon which the lesser evil argument is founded, Gardiner (2010b) has identified 
a number of areas that may run against the justification offered by lesser evil argument for 
climate engineering.256 Gardiner (2010b) concludes that its narrow focus would be 
tantamount to moral corruption.257 
On the whole the treatment of the lesser evil argument in the literature shows a high 
degree of philosophical maturation. However, the argument relies heavily on the speculative 
methods with inadequate scientific backing for the philosophical positions.  
 
3.4.2.2 The Strategic Positioning of Climate Engineering 
In the present phase of the debate, the literature in general is vague about the strategic 
level at which climate engineering is debated upon. Some methodological refinement might 
alleviate, to some extent, some of the complexity and ambiguity prevailing over the overall 
debate. A systematization of the complex argument frames in terms of the position attributed 
to climate engineering among the various strategies to combat climate change might provide 
a straightforward framework for policy makers in their assessment. Clarifying the status of 
climate engineering is of foundational importance for subsequent development of the debate. 
By strategic positioning, we mean the ranking of the climate engineering technology among 
the various strategies to address the climate change. In most papers, there is some hidden 
framing of the status of climate engineering, treating this technology either as “the best 
option” - Plan A - , or, as a Plan B - a supplementary tool facilitating the efforts of mitigation 
and adaptation - as a possible insurance policy, or as a last resort option. Understanding the 
ranking order of climate engineering among the various means to combat climate change 
would help formulate precise and right questions of varying ethical intensity. For instance, 
there is a significant difference between the questions, is climate engineering desirable and is 
climate engineering desirable as the best option?, or, is climate engineering justifiable as a 
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Plan B, or, is climate engineering justifiable as a last resort? These questions vary 
significantly in their moral value. Therefore, the proper placement of the climate engineering 
approaches in the graded hierarchy of the measures to combat climate change is necessary. 
Depending on the ranking of climate engineering in the hierarchy of the climate change 
combating measures, the strength or weakness of the arguments for and against climate 
engineering will be significantly varying. For instance, the tangibility of the moral hazard 
objection will be weakened if climate engineering is presented as a supplementary tool to 
mitigation and adaptation, and conversely, any hubristic hype about it as the best option 
might reasonably aggravate the case of moral hazard. 
It is not overlooked that there are a couple of hard-core champions of climate engineering 
who treat it as the first option and so too some others on the other side of the aisle ruling out 
climate engineering, whatever status it may be given. With some interpretative discernment, 
at least 7 works may be classified as having a strong orientation to climate engineering as a 
preferred option.258 In addition, a minimum of dozen authors would strongly advocate 
research and development at this stage.259 In addition, there are many other proponents and 
stakeholders of climate engineering among scientists, environmentalists and economists, like 
Novim Group, Copenhagen Consensus Centre, American Enterprise Institute, Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers, Stewart Brand, James Lovelock, Mike MacCracken; private entities 
like Climos, Planktos, Bill Gates, David Victor, Scott Barret, Alvin Lin; and Royal Society 
scientists like John Shepherd, David Keith, Peter Cox, Ken Caldeira, etc., who are cautious 
but vehement champions of climate engineering.260 The Arctic Methane Group also calls for 
the actual deployment of the technology.261 
                                                          
258 The following authors consider geoengineering as a preferential choice. Michaelson 1998; David W. Keith, 
“Engineering the Planet,” in Schneider et al. eds., Climate Change Science and Policy (Washington: Island 
Press,2000b): 494-502; William Nordhaus, A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming 
Policies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); William D. Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Warming the 
World: Economic Models of Global warming XII (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 200); See also its 
review,J. Fost, Review: Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming by W. D. Nordhaus and J. 
Boyer, Journal of Economics 77:1 (2002): 94-98; Deepak Lal, “Eco-Fundamentalism,” International Affairs 
71:3 (1995): 515-528; Edward Teller et al., Active Climate Stabilization: Practical Physics-Based Approaches 
to Prevention of Climate Change, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Apr. 18, 2002, at 1, 4, available at 
http://www.osti.gov/accomplishments/documents/fullText/ACC0233.pdf.] (See also Davies 2011, p.102, 
Footnote No. 4). 
259 Goodell 2010; C. Greene et al. 2010; Parkinson 2010; Rayner 2011; Royal Society 2009; Virgoe 2009; 
Cicerone 2006; Crutzen 2006.; Hinding 2013, p.3. Robert B. Jacson, “Pursuing Geoengineering for 
Atmospheric Restoration,” Issues in Science and Technology Summer (2010):67-76; MacCracken 2006, p. 241; 
Schneider, 2008; Davies 2011. 
260 See Banerjee 2011, p. 19. 
261 See Gardiner 2013b, p. 28. 
106 
Understandably, there is a pragmatic preoccupation with the outspoken proponents of 
climate engineering. A sort of pragmatic reductionism with the ethical concerns is evident in 
the best option argument. They seem to be approaching the controversy from a practical point 
of view overriding the wider philosophical and ethical nuances of the debate. In fact, as for 
Keith, the objections to climate engineering are only pragmatic problems. Hamilton (2011a) 
criticizes such an approach: “One implication of the best-option argument is that it implies 
that the ethics of climate engineering can be reduced to a disagreement over scientific and 
economic facts. An important philosophical aspect of this utilitarian position is that it rejects 
the view that motives count when making ethical judgments. Those who adopt this approach 
see themselves as pragmatic—what matters, practically and ethically, is what works.”262 The 
pragmatists in the debate need to fill up the ethical gaps - ignoring the wider nuances of the 
problem - in their assessment by engaging with the hardcore opponents of it. As of now, the 
status of climate engineering as “the best option” seems an overstated and frivolous claim.  
Many papers assume a complementary status for climate engineering. In this approach, 
climate engineering forms synergies with mitigation and adaptation in tackling climate 
change.263 More research and study is to go to assessing the pros and cons of climate 
engineering exercised in combination with mitigation. Some selective studies in this field 
have highlighted some of its merits. Gramstad’s estimation of the combined cost-benefit 
analysis of climate engineering with mitigation pin points the new directions opened by up 
such synergies: “Combining climate engineering and emission control increases the net 
benefit even further to 4.3 – 18.0 trillion US dollars…”264 Yet another fruit of such a synergy 
which might dispel several ethical anxieties is seen in the optimism of Lenton and Vaughan 
(2009): “[s]trong mitigation, combined with global-scale air capture and storage, 
afforestation, and bio-char production, i.e. enhanced CO2 sinks, might be able to bring CO2 
back to its pre-industrial level by 2100, thus removing the need for other geoengineering.”265 
A third position differentiated from the other approaches is the outright negation of the 
climate engineering proposals.266 For Burns (2012), even contemplating about such 
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technological employment is “… paradoxical, and perhaps even a bit tragic …”267 Some 
authors and groups will be inclined to think along with Rapp (1989) that “it is easier and safer 
to stop before getting started.”268 They question the very desirability of research programs, 
asking, “should we even begin serious, sustained research programs?”269 For them climate 
engineering is no option at all.  
A fourth perspective on the status of climate engineering often coined in the literature is 
to treat it as a last resort option. This perspective has been predominant in the lesser evil 
argument for climate engineering and is already mentioned in the preceding results and 
discussion. A study on the media attention on climate engineering covering 93 world 
newspapers from 1990 to 2010 identified “catastrophic” as the most common narrative frame. 
This is presented as a way to “save” the earth.270 Nerlich and Jaspal (2012) did a metaphor 
analysis covering 91 newspaper articles. They concluded that “metaphors, analogies and 
arguments were mainly used to frame geoengineering as a last resort technology that has to 
be adopted in a context of impending catastrophe.”271 As discussed above, Royal Society has 
deliberately tried to downplay the last resort tone of climate engineering. 
A final approach that may be called the neutral approach, considers it premature and 
immaterial to support or oppose climate engineering at this point. This approach is well 
captured in Gardiner’s response, “unhelpful distraction”272 to questions on support or 
rejection of climate engineering. This approach seems to be dominant among the leading 
ethicists in the field like Gardiner, Preston, Svoboda, and many others. 
 A random assessment of the various approaches to climate engineering in regard to its 
strategic positioning gives the impression that given the huge amount of uncertainties and 
ambiguities prevailing over the debate, the extreme perspectives of outright negation as well 
as the best option claim cannot be easily accepted as they are short of objective and verifiable 
evidences, especially since most climate engineering speculations are still confined to 
computer simulations. Clarifying the normative status of climate engineering as the best 
option (Plan A), or as a complementary tool (Plan B), or as the last resort option (lesser evil) 
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and aligning the debate along this ranking would bring greater clarity to the overall debate. 
Inasmuch as the technology-specific ethical deliberation is helpful for the debate, the 
position-specific debate also would be as much helpful for alleviating the complexity and 
ambiguity prevailing in the debate. 
3.4.2.3 Asymmetric Focus on SRM over CDR 
Ethical deliberations have focused more on SRM than on CDR technologies. This is 
evident from the results from the first round search as described in the methodology. While 
the first round of search with SRM in the title combined with a set of combination words 
produced 6 results, the similar search with CDR in the title produced no results. In the final 
search results, 16 papers273 are identified with an exclusive focus on the ethics of SRM; 
whereas there was not a single paper with the exclusive discussion of the ethics of CDR, 
barring three papers274 with some selective focus on ocean fertilization. An international 
workshop held at the University of Montana in October 2010 had the specific theme, “The 
Ethics of Geoengineering: Investigating the Moral Challenges of Solar Radiation 
Management.” The emphasis on SRM also explains why the exit problem – the problem of 
terminating the aerosol injection abruptly - became excessively predominant in the arguments 
against literature with 17 papers sharing this concern. In the literature, the ethics of CDR 
technologies is discussed mostly in combination with the climate engineering technologies in 
general.  
The emphasis on the ethics of SRM and the discard of the CDR ethics seem 
premature, and perhaps, an unhelpful deviation too. As of now, there is no imposing scientific 
support for SRM technologies to be treated as the state of the art form of climate engineering. 
As Keith et al. has acknowledged, “To date, no geoengineering proposal has been researched 
to the point of becoming a policy option.”275Rather, there are differing scientific voices of the 
Royal Society and IPCC with a preferred choice for the CDR techniques over SRM for 
climate engineering researches to take off. IPCC has recommendation for biomass technique, 
a subset of CDR techniques. In a study engaging the public in a series of discussion groups 
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held in 2010, titled ‘Experiment Earth?’276serious concerns over the safety of SRM methods 
were raised and a strong preference for more mitigation exercises was expressed.277 The same 
study also showed the inclination among the people to support CDR techniques over SRM 
techniques.278 Possibly, the emphasis on the SRM is caused by the trend-setting paper by 
Crutzen in 2006 recommending sulphate aerosol injection which accelerated the ethical 
discussion on climate engineering.279 
It is widely acknowledged that there are significant differences between SRM and 
CDR in terms of side-effects, cost, and varying feasibilities at the scientific, political and 
social levels. For example, CDR techniques are said to be very expensive whereas SRM is 
considered to be "cheap, fast and imperfect."280 Therefore, any general ethical assessment of 
climate engineering cannot be assumed to subsume the full ethical implications of the CDR 
technologies. As we have seen in chapter two, the different CDR techniques have totally 
different range of applications and their impacts and side-effects are significantly different. 
Much of the assessments of their consequences are still at the speculative level providing 
only inadequate scientific data and inconclusive results for ethical judgements.281It looks the 
climate engineering ethicists need to do more CDR-specific exercises for striking a balance in 
the debate, which is dominated by SRM-specific discussions. 
 
Now, it is clear that the predominant question here is, how to proceed? Do we wait for 
reliable data or go for a moratorium on research and development? We feel that this question 
is to be left open at this phase of the debate. Although the precautionary principle can be 
invoked here as a tool to make a decision under uncertainty, it does not seem to resolve 
anything and the proponents as well as the opponents are using it to advocate their case. As 
decisions are often made in a context, we will have to speculate over and compare the various 
cases emerging from the intervening and non-intervening scenarios to make a more reliable 
way out. Such decisions under uncertainty do not seem to be adequately solved in applied 
ethics. As there are no clean solutions at the moment, this topic itself might be a subject of 
more rigorous research. 
 
3.4.2.4 Climate Emergency – Consensus and Ambivalence 
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The primary argument for climate engineering with the maximum support of papers 
as evident from the results is the climate emergency argument with 51 papers backing it. The 
overall landscape of the debate related to the various aspects of the climate change seems to 
warrant further scientific refinement. In the debate, unlike the other argument streams, there 
seems to be no serious objections to the scientific assumptions of climate emergency. The 
debate seems to be sharing a broad consensus on the dangers of climate change. The debate 
seems to pay no serious attention to some of the still grey areas in the science of climate 
change, though they are borderline voices. The proponents of climate engineering need to 
provide greater clarity on the elements of uncertainty and the lack of scientific consensus on 
some of the climate change estimations in order to make their arguments rock solid.  
The proponents of climate engineering want climate engineering in order to save the 
earth against an imminent climate emergency. As for some, “a point of no return … may be 
as soon as 2015.”282 According to the majority of the scientists and policymakers, a 
temperature rise by 2ºC from pre-industrial period will have a serious impact on human 
institutions and ecosystems.283 For Michaelson (1998), the catastrophic strategy is inevitable: 
“Not even the most austere post-Kyoto regulatory regime can avert a probable temperature 
rise of 2 to 3 degrees Fahrenheit during the next century….”284 Gardiner (2013c) comments 
that “…the mesmerizing force of the emergency rhetoric”285 is used as a coverage for the 
political and ethical issues in climate engineering. 
 However, there are areas which need greater scientific clarity in this regard. Firstly, 
there is the problem of defining what a climate emergency is. As Prantl (2011) has observed, 
“How would we define ‘climate emergency’ for the purpose of triggering the deployment of 
geoengineering technology?”286 The various scientific opinions on climate change weaken 
the credibility of the predictive potentials of such projected emergencies. A consensus on 
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tipping points, climate thresholds, etc., may be far from near. Secondly, though the dangers of 
climate change is pretty clear and there is a broad scientific consensus on this point as 
reflected in the IPCC’s reports, there are some borderline environmental groups that hold that 
climate change is a pseudo problem. Thirdly, the anthropogenic reasons for the climate 
change are also contented by some others. The “sceptical environmentalists” or “deniers”287 
downplay the challenges posed by climate change.288 The sceptics challenge the reality of 
global warming, negate its anthropogenic grounds, and question the predictions about its 
impacts.289 Fourthly, there is the marring of the debate on climate change by political and 
economic interests.290 In the present day climate science, the element of subjectivity is no 
pseudo-issue. For instance, as Nordhaus (2009) puts it, “… the perception of risk under 
present (climate) circumstances is highly subjective.”291 
Probably, it is because there is almost a universal scientific consent on the climate 
emergency that the doomsday prophets of climate engineering do not seem to engage 
seriously with the borderline objections to climate changes, nor with the subtle nuances of the 
climate emergency claims. The comparatively high average of papers dealing with the 
elements of uncertainty, especially uncertainties in regard to climate changes and climatic 
impacts, are further a case against overlooking the loopholes in the claims of climate 
emergency. The debate scenario seems to remain inconclusive for a watertight, evidence-
based justification of the climate emergency calling for climate engineering. Climate 
emergency arguments need further sophistication in its various nuances.  
 
3.4.2.5 Conflict of Interest 
A dynamic of the debate that might prove to be crucial in the future, but underdeveloped 
in the present setting of the debate pertains to the hidden epistemological quandaries. Possible 
conflict of interests, potentials for moral corruption, and the unhindered progress motive are a 
few such factors randomly mentioned in the debate. Although these concerns find some off-
the-cuff mention in some authors, they are not dwelt upon to their deserving proportions.  
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Many leading climate engineering scientists who are influential figures in policy-making 
are involved in more than one research project including those initiated by private companies, 
or funded by private agencies. This might lead to a conflict of interests with the neutral 
scientists. According to Egede-Nissen (2010), this would press for the question, “Are 
scientists merely impartial providers and interpreters of vital information that we need in 
order to evaluate the advantages and drawbacks of geoengineering, or are they using their 
specialized knowledge and privileged positions to promote conclusions and solutions based 
on personal values and beliefs?”292 Hamilton (2011a) warns, “A lobby group of scientists and 
investors is beginning to form and it is likely to become more influential as geoengineering 
becomes normalised in the public debate….”293 In addition to the possible commercialization 
of the technology, an argument raised against climate engineering by several papers, the 
commercialization of knowledge itself might be at stake in the absence of a governance 
mechanism at the moment and in the context of the lead given by several private companies 
in the research. The loss of trust in science by the public has been on the rise in recent 
decades for several reasons294 and this might be aggravated by the climate engineering 
controversy. Gardiner’s (2010a) warning on moral corruption295 whereby moral discourse is 
subverted by personal motives shares the same fear. The fear of technology being used for 
military purpose and the likelihood of the commercialization of technology, as expressed by a 
significant number of papers, may also be correlated with it. 
 The couple of slippery slopes at stake in the debate also share some borderlines with 
these concerns with conflict of interests. The slippery slope that research might lead to 
deployment, as discussed in the results section, may be facilitated by the collective social 
mind-set not to oppose development, posing another uncritical epistemic barrier to an 
objective assessment of the controversy. The formation of interest groups is another concern. 
As Morrow et al. (2009) put it: “Perhaps the most worrying issue at this early stage is that the 
initiation of serious SWCE (short wave climate engineering) research would create interest 
groups that have strong incentives to continue SWCE research and even implementation. … 
(T)hese groups would resist efforts to abandon SWCE research, and they might push for 
SWCE implementation even if it proves to be unwise.”296 Therefore, climate engineering 
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ethicists will have to pay greater attention to the likely deviations in the debate trajectory in 
future by the conflicting interests. 
 
3.4.2.6 Public Engagement 
The concern with the procedural propriety, characteristic of any ethical debate, is already 
raised in the climate engineering context as well. There is a strong call for the procedural 
propriety of policy-making by ensuring the pubic engagement with a bottom-up approach. 
However, the concrete instances of having engaged the public in the actual debate so far are 
only very nominal with a very few reports. The need for involving the sections of the society 
who are most vulnerable to the dangers of the technology is not emphasized. Although the 
Oxford principles have a strong blend along this line, it is strange that the Oxford principles 
have not captured a serious attention in the debate except for a few off the cuff mention by 
some authors. Besides, there is the challenge of undoing the catastrophe-mesmerism already 
created by the framings of the media. The issue of informed consent, central to research 
ethics, meets with unprecedented challenges in this case. Bodansky (1996) has commented 
that meeting the parameters of informed consent in climate engineering may be more difficult 
than working out a green house gases reduction treaty.297 However, the proponents for 
tackling this problem have proposed no tangible framework or working hypothesis. These 
concerns are to be duly developed for the maturation of the debate to decisive levels. 
The public engagement exercises already conducted in some countries have revealed 
that the public’s knowledge of climate engineering is very poor298 and the awareness of the 
danger of climate change creates a favourable attitude towards climate engineering.299 The 
Ipsos-MORI study in 2010, has shown the inclination among the people to support CDR 
techniques over SRM techniques.300 The positive correlation between the more individualistic 
worldviews of the subjects and the support for climate engineering, as shown by a number of 
studies,301 itself constitutes a lot food for reflection from a critical epistemic point of view. 
While on the one hand, the public is open to researching climate engineering, they have 
reservations against its deployment. This is shown by the quantitative and qualitative data 
provided by the studies.302 In the Experiment Earth study mentioned-above,303 serious 
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concerns about the safety of SRM methods were raised and a strong preference for more 
mitigation exercises was expressed.304 
Though a lion’s portion of the controversy is reserved for the debate on researching 
climate engineering, some of the important principles of research ethics like respect and non-
maleficence have found only a passing mention in the debate. A rapprochement between the 
climate engineering ethics and the traditional principles of research ethics is almost absent in 
the literature. The question of justice is given due importance. However, other principles like 
respect, benevolence and non-maleficence have not found deserving inroads onto the 
mainstay. The scope of such principles in climate engineering is described by Morrow: “The 
Principle of Respect requires that the scientific community secure the global public's consent, 
which would need to be voiced through their representatives and given for any studies within 
specified parameters, rather than on a case-by-case basis. The Principle of Beneficence and 
Justice requires that researchers strive for a favourable risk–benefit ratio and a fair 
distribution of risks and anticipated benefits, all while protecting the basic rights of the 
individuals affected. Finally, the Principle of Minimization requires that no study last longer, 
cover a greater geographical extent, or exert a greater influence on the climate than is 
necessary to test the specific hypotheses in question.”305 
Corner et al. (2013), exploring the “naturalness” of climate engineering techniques as 
perceived by the public, showed that there are hidden framings operative in considering 
something as natural. The hidden parameters can unintentionally condition the argument 
frames. As Corner et al. (2013) comment, the perception of some technologies as natural by 
the participants may be due to the simplistic framing of the facilitators. The analogies like 
artificial trees for capturing CO2 and volcanic eruption to the release of sulphur particles into 
the stratosphere can do the tricks with framing.306 Corner et al. (2013) comment that, “While 
these characterizations might be technically accurate, they also provide a powerful framing: 
that the way to think about these technologies is by analogy to existing ‘natural’ 
processes.”307 
Climate engineering debate needs to develop proper methodologies and tools or engaging 
the public in an objective manner, upholding the principles of research ethics, in an 
environment not conditioned by hidden framings. 
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3.4.2.7 Governance and Ethics 
 In the literature, there is an extensive discussion on governance in its multifaceted 
aspects. This was evident in the results shown up by the search methodology itself. In the first 
search, the combination of “governance” with the primary search words produced the most 
number of results, i.e., 30 hits. This is a considerable hike from the other results. It could be 
noticed that the combination of “ethics” with the primary search words, had only 17 results, 
the second highest. For the Royal Society (2009), the central problem in climate engineering 
pertains to governance. “The greatest challenges to the successful deployment of climate 
engineering may be the social, ethical, legal and political issues associated with governance, 
rather than scientific and technical issues.”308 
The strong emphasis on governance from the early days of debate shows that the think 
tanks and policy makers have fully captured the complexity of the governance. Despite the 
emphasis on governance, the debate is yet to produce any concrete and tangible form of 
governance, let alone a new international law, and the deliberations in the literature are still 
confined to the levels of suggestions, recommendations and models. The overemphasis on 
governance at this early phase and the identification of governance as the most serious issue 
seem to betray the same pragmatic approach to climate engineering coined by the hard core 
proponents, making it more a political and legal concern, over its ethical and social 
complexities. Even in papers on governance, the focus is mostly on the international, 
managerial and political aspects of it and in many papers it is not directly clear why 
governance becomes an ethically relevant question. Though there are ethically strong issues 
like the questions of moral authority, respect for sovereignty, etc., discussed by a number of 
papers, no paper has substantively engaged with them forming the primary focus. Hence, 
there seems to be a paradoxical situation that despite the heavy emphasis on the governance 
issues, the ethical aspects of governance remain underdeveloped.  
Need for diverse governance models, scientific apprehensions against excessive 
governance, and recommendations of technique-specific governance are some of the leading 
streams forming the governance debate. True to the trans-boundary range of the climate 
engineering techniques, there is a broad consensus in the debate on the international nature of 
the governance mechanisms. There are arguments that different methods of governance are 
                                                          
308 Royal Society 2009, p. xi. 
116 
required.309 There are also apprehensions against too much governance.310 “Scientists 
engaged in geoengineering research have argued vigorously against any early regulation of 
their activities, insisting that society should take a hands-off approach until there is a risk of 
significant harm from tests and experiments.”311 The existing international governance 
structures are found inadequate and recommendations for structural adaptations in 
international governance to address the problem of climate change are also made. Treaty 
Approaches (UNFCCC, London Convention), Voluntary code based approach (Asilomar 
2010), Environmental Assurance bonds model, Technologies of Humility,312ad hoc 
principles,313 or via formal rules314 governance at the multilateral level315 or as a subset of 
countries316 with current levels of technological capability, etc., are some of the models 
proposed.317 Parthasarathy et al. (2010) highlight the flaws in a top-down approach and 
advocates a bottom-up approach.318 Parthasarathy et al. (2010) consider the KPM (Keith, 
Parson, Morgan) approach which advocates loosely coordinated international program for 
Arctic Geoengineering to be “one of the most thoughtful approaches to date.”319 International 
governance models could include CLRTRAP(Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution), Montreal Protocol, ENMOD, IMO(International Maritime Organisation), UNEP 
(United Nations Environment Programme), UNFCCC, CBD (Conservation of Biodiversity), 
etc.320 
The semantic ambiguity in regard to climate engineering is also to be considered in 
the governance question. The sort of governance is relative to the mode of technology used. 
For instance, “… air capture does not have the same accompanying governance concerns that 
SRM does.”321 The Royal Society has commented that scientific metrics alone are 
insufficient for governance.322 
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The climate engineering governance mechanisms must reflect the complex ethical 
nature of the controversy. Climate engineering ethicists should further develop the specific 
ethical concerns in governance issues. Further, the limited focus on the ethics in the 
discussions on governance needs to be rectified. For instance, as Gardiner has noted, the 
Royal Society has less than a page for ethics in its formal report on the science and 
governance of climate engineering. As of now, the review shows that the governance issue is 
debated by climate engineering scientists. No paper on governance seems to suggest the 
representation of the ethicists on the governance body. Therefore, the picture of the present 
review implies that that future course of developments in the debate needs to bridge the 
chasm between the huge ethical challenges of the controversy on the one hand and the 
absence of due ethical awareness in the governance concerns.  
3.4.2.8 The Ethical Primacy of Side-effects 
Yet another underdeveloped aspect of the debate, which has equal ethical and 
scientific overtones, is the issue of the side-effects. The future course of the debate needs to 
focus more on assessing and weighing the ethics of side-effects in a scientifically informed 
manner. While the proponents consider the side-effects to be negligible, it evokes some of the 
most furious hue and cry against climate engineering from the opponents. Many of the 
arguments centred on the side-effects still seem to be occurring in the abstract with less 
concrete assessment. Perhaps, the issue of side-effects was to top the list of the arguments 
with most number of cross-cutting subsets and clusters of arguments and counter arguments. 
The present state of engagement with the ethics of side-effects does not reflect a particular 
effect-specific assessment in its scientific, climatic, social and political aspects. In this regard, 
we agree with Betz and Casean (2012): “Weighing side effects represents common issues that 
occur throughout the CE (climate engineering) controversy. The proponents of the 
controversy do not explicitly address (e.g. tackle through further arguments) the question as 
to how a series of side-effects, which are partly certain, partly probable, and partly possible, 
are to be evaluated and weighted against each other.”323 The observation of Prantl (2011), 
that, “Current discussions of climate engineering still tend to be relatively abstract…”324 
seems to be better justified in the context side-effects. Although science could quantify the 
anticipated side-effects, there are still the unestimated, unanticipated side-effects. As Davies 
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(2011) says, “…the heart of the resistance to geoengineering . . . is fear of the unknown.”325 
Boyd (2008) calls it the “unknown unknowns.”326 
Incompatibility of the actual deployment scenario with the natural examples and field 
tests pose a serious challenge in the reliable assessment of the side-effects. Although volcanic 
eruptions provide an analogy for aerosol injection, such a natural example of the release of a 
single pulse of aerosol for a short duration is argued to be different from the artificial, long-
term and irreversible exercises as in climate engineering.327 “(N)either current climate models 
nor spatiotemporally confined tests can reliably foresee all side-effects of CE (climate 
engineering) employment.”328 
The issue of side-effects presents a confusing and paradoxical scenario as well. For 
instance, as MacCracken finds it, some of the adverse impact of climate engineering on 
Ozone and monsoon could be avoided if aerosol injection is directed to the Arctic. But in this 
case, countries that would benefit from an ice-free Arctic would be the losers.329 Apart from 
the huge differences in side-effects between SRM and CDR, there is also the issue of the 
contextual and regional embeddedness of the side-effects. The assessment of the side-effects 
significantly varies depending on where it is deployed. For instance, “Surface albedo changes 
in urban settlements, … would pose far fewer risks to ecosystems than iron fertilisation of the 
oceans.”330 The clarity on side-effects is important for meaningfully invoking the other 
ethical principles of maximin rule, precautionary principle, justice, equity, and non-
malfeasance in the climate engineering context.  
The discussion on the side-effects spontaneously forces us into issues on the 
feasibility of climate engineering too. Feasibility considerations such as cost-benefit analysis, 
compensation, etc., require reliable forecast of the side-effects. The scepticism prevailing in 
the literature on the cost-benefit claims of the proponents is justified by the uncertainties over 
the side-effects. No cost-benefit and cost-effective analyses can be complete without 
incorporating the indirect costs like compensation, etc., in estimating which the unknown 
unknowns are serious hurdles. For Banerjee (2011), “A risk-based approach to 
geoengineering that internalizes any potential social costs might rule out geoengineering 
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altogether.”331 The serious flaws in cost-benefit analysis of the proponents as well as the 
opponents are a concern repeatedly figuring in the literature. “The incredible economics of 
geoengineering”332 on the one hand does not seem to account for the “cost of dealing with 
unintended consequences or compensating injured parties”333 on the other. It is such evasive 
approaches to the side-effects that create the hype that the “benefit-to-cost ratio of research 
and development of SRM technologies is “on the order of 1000 to 1.”334 These concerns 
about the side-effects in the present state of the debate need a serious revisitation by the 
climate engineering ethicists. 
 
3.4.2.9 The Ambivalence about Moral Hazard 
 Moral Hazard is a prominent argument against climate engineering. As the results of 
this review shows, there are at least 32 papers dealing with this argument position. Unlike the 
case with side-effects, the proponents have confronted this argument on several counts and 
the moral hazard argument scenario is rich with arguments and counter arguments. Despite 
the pro and contra arguments on moral hazard, our review suggests that the weight of the 
moral hazard argument is still to be ascertained.  
 ‘Moral hazard’ is a term drawn from insurance industry. In the insurance context, it is 
a fear that some kind of insurance may change the behaviour of the insured individuals 
increasing their exposure to risk. In the climate engineering context, it is the fear that the 
projected hope that there is a solution to climate change, may underestimate the attempts at 
mitigation by diverting the energy and resources meant to be used for it. Thus climate 
engineering may weaken the conventional efforts at combating climate change.335 The Royal 
Society (2009) also set the tone of interdisciplinary research in this regard by advocating 
verification by social science studies about the existence of moral hazard.336 Thilo Wiertz 
(2012)has found a philosophical point about moral hazard that it implies “an uncertainty 
about social reactions to the technologies and a (moral) value at stake.”337 A few empirical 
studies have given feedbacks contrary to the popular beliefs. The study by the German 
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Federal Ministry of Education and Research concluded that “there is no empirical material 
within the climate engineering context to support the moral hazard thesis.”338 The tentative 
finding of a study on risk perceptions conducted by the Natural Environment Research 
Council in Great Britain was “contrary to the ‘moral hazard’ argument that climate 
engineering would undermine popular support for mitigation or adaptation.”339 
 Amelung thinks that people’s fear of climate engineering technology, “might even 
strengthen people’s motivation to help reduce carbon emissions.”340 As such moral hazard 
cannot claim the psychological support for its arguments. Wiertz thinks that the moral hazard 
argument needs to be relocated within the contemporary climate sciences. He shows the 
limitations of pure empiricist perspective on moral hazard in climate engineering and 
advocates an approach with greater sensitivity to the political dimension, focusing on power 
relations in contemporary environmental discourses.341 According to Hale (2012), moral 
hazard arguments “do not present an overriding moral reason for prohibiting climate 
engineering. …. moral hazard arguments are beset with problems of ambiguity and 
vagueness. As a consequence of this, … the moral hazard argument against geoengineering is 
underdetermined.”342 
 Contrary to it, Lin (2012), also drawing on empirical studies, finds it “likely that 
geoengineering efforts will undermine mainstream strategies to combat climate change.”343 
Resnik and Vallero (2011) think that moral hazard is a “speculative argument with little basis 
in fact,” for researching and developing mitigation also are no zero-sum games.344Michaelson 
(1998) thinks that the moral hazard fears can be averted if climate engineering is pursued 
parallel to mitigation and if the “Proponents of geoengineering …take responsibility for 
ensuring that the policy does not degenerate into simple procrastination.”345 
In conclusion, it could be said, that though there is a serious concern with moral 
hazard in the literature as one of the leading argument against climate engineering, a 
comprehensive understanding of the debate at the moment does not present an imposing 
picture of moral hazard as a solid argument against climate engineering. Nor are the major 
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assumptions of the moral hazard argument convincingly ruled out by the proponents of 
climate engineering. It seems the issue of moral hazard stands in need of greater empirical 
verification and more informed analysis. The concern with moral hazard is likely to weaken 
or strengthen depending on the positioning of climate engineering, as discussed above, as 
Plan A or Plan B for combating climate change. In nutshell, as with most other arguments on 
climate engineering, the strength of moral hazard argument also is still to be ascertained. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The debate about the ethics of climate engineering may be unprecedented in several 
respects, not only for its complexity, but for many other features as well. Despite its 
similarities with the GMO debate and the ethical debate that preceded the techniques of gene 
therapy, in some respects, it may be the first time in the history of the discipline of ethics that 
a technology that is in the offing, sparks off so much controversy and the very desirability of 
researching itself is subjected to such a critical scrutiny. Even before a major patent has been 
issued on research, the very mention of it sparks controversy in several circles. Besides, the 
review suggests extreme polarities in debate even at such an early stage from the hard-core 
‘Plan A proponents’ through the ‘neutral umpires’ who prefers to wait and see to the deadly 
opponents who calls for a moratorium or ban on any type of research. “Geoengineering 
therefore stands out among emerging technologies for the way the ethical issues belong in a 
finite spectrum of temporal spaces stretching from the mere mention of it as a possible future 
technology through to the question of how to bring geoengineering activities to a close.”346 
Irrespective of such polarities, there are also a number of streams of consensus among 
the vast majority in the debate. The concerns over the dangers of climate change, the primacy 
of mitigation strategies over technical interventions, the growing discontent with the efficacy 
of the mitigation strategies, the point of extreme caution in employing the technology, the 
recourse to technology as a last resort, and the elements of unresolved uncertainty and risk 
are instances of such consensus in varying degrees.  
This review of literature started with employing a standard methodology for 
identifying the relevant literature on the ethics of climate engineering. The methodology 
consisted of two rounds of searches termed as primary and secondary with the primary search 
words of climate engineering and its equivalent coinages along with the combination words 
of ethics and its derivates. The prominent arguments for and against climate engineering 
                                                          
346 Preston 2013, p. 24. 
122 
picked up from the literature were aligned in a plain manner in the results section. The results 
section showed the enormous complexity of the debate. Six main frame arguments were 
identified with a number of subsets to each as defending the cause of climate engineering. 
Nine main frame arguments were identified with a number of subsets to each as opposing 
climate engineering ethically. It was also observed that the clashes between the arguments for 
and against climate engineering take place against the background of a number of significant 
uncertainties.  
Further, in the discussion section, some observations were made on the general 
features of the debate landscape. The logistical observations highlighted the factors such as 
the complexity of the debate landscape, the semantic diversity and ethical ambiguity, the 
academic lopsidedness of the debate, missing contextual setting, etc. The thematic comments 
discussed and evaluated the claims of the lesser evil argument, the moral positioning of 
climate engineering, public engagement, governance concerns, the ambivalence about moral 
hazard, etc.  Thus those argument structures outlined in the results, which were found to be 
underdeveloped in the debate and required further attention, were dwelt upon in the 
discussion section.  
In the overall setting of this research, this chapter has provided us with the required 
platform for invoking our research question: Can the development of climate engineering be 
just compatible with the Rawlsian principles of distributive, intergenerational and procedural 
justice? Accordingly in the following three chapters we will be taking up this normative 
question. Many of the argument streams that we introduced in this chapter will be revisited in 
the following three normative chapters. Based on this background knowledge and our various 
assessment of it, in the next chapter we will look at the issue of distributive justice in climate 
engineering. 
.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
Distributive Justice in Climate Engineering 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As we have already seen in the review of the literature in the previous chapter, justice 
constitutes one of the central pillars of the climate engineering controversy. The importance 
of justice in the debate is testified by the intense activity in this field as 37 papers represent 
this issue.1 We have seen that ethical concerns pertaining to intergenerational equity, risk-
transfer to future generations, beneficence and Belmont principle, participation of the 
vulnerable sections of the society, distributive and procedural justice and indigenous people 
and their involvement are the major issues related to justice in climate engineering. 
Advocates of climatic justice have vociferously raised concerns about the unequal 
distribution of cost and/or harms on the one hand and benefits on the other.2 The difference 
principle, egalitarianism and human rights questions are also introduced in the debate in the 
context of justice.3The egalitarian fear is that climate engineering might widen the socio-
economic inequalities already prevalent in the world.  
The concerns with justice constitute the following three normative chapters of this 
study. Developing on the current debate on climate engineering and justice, we shall dwell in 
detail on three aspects of justice that we consider to be most challenging for the climate 
engineering controversy, namely, distributive justice, intergenerational justice and procedural 
justice. The issues of distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice are discussed 
respectively in the following three chapters. Although, the arguments in these chapters seem 
to go heavily against climate engineering, the approach of these normative chapters would 
not be to reject climate engineering altogether. Rather, it will be a call to the proponents of 
climate engineering to meet the conditions of justice before researching, developing and 
deploying climate engineering. 
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In the present chapter, we shall focus exclusively on the challenges of distributive 
justice from climate engineering. Distributive justice, in general terms, deals with the 
distribution of goods in society and the norms on how harms and benefits ought to be shared 
among persons. Analysing the side effects of climate engineering in the light of distributive 
justice, we will see if climate engineering has the danger to increase benefits for some and 
harms for others. Is climate engineeringcompatible with distributive justice? What are the 
conditions of just research and application of climate engineering technologies from the 
perspective of the Rawlsian view of distributive justice? These are the lead questions that we 
will be tackling in this chapter. 
In the first part of this chapter, we shall give a short sketch of the present status of the 
treatment of distributive justice in the literature. In the second part, we shall present the 
theories and principles of distributive justice developed by John Rawls. In the third part, we 
will focus on the question of under which conditions the research and application of climate 
engineering technologies would be just as seen from the perspective of the Rawlsian view of 
distributive justice. Accordingly, we shall make some practical recommendations in this 
regard in the final part of this chapter.  
4.2 Current Research on Distributive Justice and Climate Engineering 
It is difficult to do away with the temptation not to begin this discussion on a slightly 
negative note. In the entire spectrum of debate on the ethics of climate engineering, though 
there are several papers referring to the issues of justice along with other concerns, we could 
identify only a single paper4 dealing exclusively with the issue of justice in climate 
engineering, let alone the issue of distributive justice. Svoboda et al. (2011) have discussed at 
length specifically on the justice concerns in SRM technologies.5 Though justice is voiced as 
a major concern for ethics in climate engineering, no paper has tried to appropriate in detail 
the challenges related to distributive justice in climate engineering.  
There are ten papers6 highlighting one or other aspect of the distributive justice in 
climate engineering, though their precise concern is not with justice. We find them worth 
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Jamieson 1996; Martin Bunzl, “Geoengineering Harms and Compensation,” Stanford Journal of Law, Science 
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mentioning as they help advance the debate on distributive justice along some unique 
directions. The findings and recommendations of these papers are helpful for our study in 
examining the conditions that would enable the just research and deployment of climate 
engineering technologies as seen from the perspective of the Rawlsian view of distributive 
justice.  
The unequal distribution of harms and benefits, compensation to the vulnerable 
populations, scientific uncertainties in the proper assessment of harms and benefits, and need 
for solidarity are the leading concerns from the point of view of distributive justice discussed 
in the current literature.  
4.2.1 Harm-Benefit Asymmetry 
A major concern in justice that is almost unanimously shared by various authors, and 
forcefully expressed by Preston (2013), is that “… the interests of the most powerful would 
be protected, while those less powerful will get secondary consideration (if they are 
considered at all).”7Preston’s paper in 2013, titled, “Ethics and Geoengineering: Reviewing 
the Moral Issues Raised by Solar Radiation Management and Carbon Dioxide Removal,” is 
one of the most articulate voices on the concerns with distributive justice in climate 
engineering. Preston (2013) holds that “Principles of beneficence and justice demand … the 
fair distribution of any benefits or harms that do occur.”8 Similarly, Aaron Ray (2012) and 
Schneider (2008) believe that the asymmetrical impact of climate engineering is causing 
serious challenges to distributive justice. Relying on Bunzl’s prediction of the 10% of the 
World’s population going worst off,9 Ray (2012) raises one of the central questions in climate 
engineering as to who should bear the cost and benefits of climate engineering.10Schneider’s 
(2011b) observation bears a lot of nuances in this context: “People in poor countries . . . 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Policy, Published online July 2011. Accessed online at 
https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxtYnVuemx8Z3g6N
DczZjdmYWE2N2YwNmEzOQ on December 2, 2014, accessed on June 3, 2016; S. Gardiner, “Why 
Geoengineering is not a ‘Global Public Good,’ and Why it is Ethically Misleading to Frame it as One,” Climatic 
Change 121 (2013b): 513–525; Marion Hourdequin, “Geoengineering Solidarity and Moral Risk,” Christopher 
Preston, ed., Engineering the Climate – The Ethics of Solar Radiation Management (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2014). 
7 Preston 2013, p. 30. 
8Preston 2013, p. 28. 
9 Bunzl, “Geoengineering and Equity,” Bunzl’s Blog, comment posted May 12, 2008. Available at 
http://ccspp.blogspot.com/2008/05/geoengineering-and-equity.html, comment posted May 12, 2008. Accessed 
November 5, 2014.  
10 Ray 2010, p. 40. 
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have . . . (not) reaped much benefit from the activities that may be resulting in climate 
change.”11 
While Svoboda et al. (2011)12 and Morrow et al. (2009)13 relying on philosophical 
framework and scientific models respectively, have underscored the unequal distribution of 
harms and benefits as a big threat to distributive justice in climate engineering. Svoboda et al. 
(2011) rely mostly on the egalitarian theories of distributive justice advocated by John Rawls, 
Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen, and Richard Arneson along with the desert-based approach 
as the theoretical frame for assessing the desirability of sulphate aerosol injection. In the final 
analysis, despite the significant differences in the various models coined, it is found that 
“SAG is ethically problematic on all five of the major theories of distributive 
justice….”14Examining the problems associated with sulphate aerosol geoengineering (SAG), 
they conclude that it does not meet the requirements of distributive justice as it implies an 
uneven distribution of harm on persons and communities. The paper by Svoboda et al. (2011) 
seems to be the first systematic attempt to investigate the issues of justice in solar radiation 
management. Similarly, Morrow et al. (2009), analysing the impacts of SRM from the 
available simulation studies, have exposed a crucial irony in the potential benefits of SRM 
that even in our own generation, the beneficiaries of SRM will not be those who would bear 
the risks.15The assumption that the beneficiaries and the risk-bearers in SRM will be different 
is more or less confirmed by simulation studies. Most simulation studies cited elsewhere in 
this thesis show that the impact of SRM will be unevenly distributed.Conversely, those who 
would bear the risks will have very little benefit. Besides, the involvement of the private 
parties in climate engineering worsens the danger of the benefits being skewed away from 
those who would need it most.16 
The concerns over the distribution of harm and benefit will have a significant role in 
forming the public opinion on climate engineering. Wylie Carr et al. (2014)17 have observed 
that there is a strong intuitive concern expressed by the respondents of a study on the public 
opinion in climate engineering. The participants are curious to know how their respective 
regions would be affected. The effects of SRM as to who would benefit and who would stand 
                                                          
11 Schneider 2011b, p. 329. 
12 Svoboda et al. 2011. 
13Morrow et al. 2009. 
14 Svoboda et al., 2011, p. 18. 
15 Morrow et al. 2009, p.5. 
16 Preston 2013, p.30. 
17 Carr et al. 2014, p. 180. 
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to lose are serious concerns for the public.18 Understandably, their approval of the scheme 
would be much subject to the harm or benefit to the region relative to them. It shows that 
concerns of distributive justice in climate engineering are intuitively inbuilt in the popular 
folk and would warrant the serious attention of the ethicists. Wylie et al. (2014) comment that 
though the issue is not adequately addressed by the formal bodies, the public is very saliently 
concerned about it. They also make the crucial observation based on public opinion, that, 
unlike the harmful effects of the climate change that are unintentional, harms caused by 
climate engineering would be ethically more aggressive as they are intentional in nature 
resulting from a invasive technique.19 
 
4.2.2 Looming Scientific Ambiguities 
Some papers highlight scientific and methodological concerns that pose challenges to 
clear discussions on distributive justice. There is ambiguity about the reliability of the climate 
engineering studies and predictions. Lack of definitive scientific data poses problems to 
defining the conditions for distributive justice. For instance, Tuana et al. (2012) have showed 
the inadequacy of the present earth system models in giving proper information on crucial 
geophysical factors in climate engineering like long time scales, differences in regional 
impacts, and the potential low-probability/high impact events, that are essential for assessing 
issues of distributive justice in climate engineering.20 They propose that an appreciation of 
the issues of distributive justice would require a specific research agenda that would analyse 
comprehensively the social and physical impacts of SRM with a particular focus on their 
benefits and harms.21Ray (2010) also regrets over the lack of a proper mechanism for 
deciding on the global issues of distributive justice.22Jamieson (1996)23 too thinks that no 
reliable prediction of the consequences of climate engineering is feasible due to the 
cascades of uncertainties.24 
In a similar tone, Bunzl (2007), dwelling on the issue of harm, states that although 
there are concerns that it “[…] may seem obvious that at best then, the benefits of 
geoengineering will be unequal and at worst, some will benefit while some will be harmed.”25 
                                                          
18 Carr et al. 2014, p. 185. 
19 Wylie et al. 2014, p. 180. 
20 Tuana et al. 2012, p. 142 
21 Tuana et al. 2012 p. 144 
22 Ray 2010, p. 40. 
23 Jamieson 1996. 
24 Jamieson 1996, pp. 327-328. 
25 Bunzl 2007. “Geoengineering and the problem of Comparative Judgements of Harm,” from the abstract of the 
paper, available at http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2007AGUFMGC52A..12B. Accessed May 3, 2015. 
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He opines that from an operational point of view, these are harder claims as there is no 
appropriate baseline for reaching at such conclusions and it is unclear as to whether those 
baselines would be commensurable.26 
 
4.2.3 The Issue of Compensation 
The question of compensating the harms is a concern over which many have pondered 
siginificantly. Preston, Bunzl and Gardiner have especially tried to pin point some of the 
subtle nuances of harm and compensation. Preston (2013) is also one of the leading ethicists 
to underscore the issue of compensation to the most affected in the likely scenario of the poor 
becoming poorer in the aftermath of climate engineering deployment.27 Svoboda et al. (2011) 
also checked if SAG coupled with compensation would be justified. They warn that such a 
deal would significantly shoot up the cost of SAG.28 Without ruling out sulphate aerosol 
injection, they invite the proponents of the same to “to recognize and address these ethical 
obstacles”29 before advocating the implementation of sulphate aerosol injection. 
Bunzl (2011) has focussed in some depth on the intrinsic complexities associated with 
harm and compensation.30 The complexities of defining and deciding harm and 
compensations would invoke disputed baselines, differentiated causes of climate change, 
differing moral standing for harms relative to different nations, the problem of confirming the 
losers and gainers in the absence of clear norms and baselines, the nature of the harms that 
deserve recognition or compensation, and problems with welfarist conception of assessing 
harm and benefits. For instance, Bunzl (2011) draws on the example of the case of harm that 
may be caused to Canada and Uganda due to SRM. Canada may lose in agricultural yield due 
to reduction in global temperature and Uganda may lose due to the reduction in precipitation. 
These two harms are assessed to be of different moral standing. Drawing on the analogies of 
income and inheritance and luck egalitarianism, Bunzl (2011) argues for differentiated moral 
assessment of the harms resulting from SRM.31 It may be concluded that “[…] it is unfair for 
                                                          
26 Bunzl 2007.  
27 Preston 2013, pp. 30-31. 
28 Svoboda et al. 2011, p. 19. 
29 Svoboda et al 2011, p.1. 
30 Bunzl 2011. 
31 Bunzl 2011. Bunzl concludes that “Climate change will produce winners and losers. So, too, may mitigation 
of climate change. But the use of SRM as a mechanism of mitigation raises the possibility that there may be two 
kinds of losers: those already harmed by climate change who are made yet worse off by SRM, and those who 
gain from climate change and are made worse off by losing that gain. I have argued that even if both these 
losses are caused by the same action and are losses of the same degree, they should not be treated as equally 
deserving of compensation” (p. 76).  
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some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own among equally deserving 
people, it follows that it is also unfair for some to be better off than others though no more 
deserving. But in that case, those who are better off under such circumstances can have no 
complaint if they lose their better-off status.”32 But this norm is still problematic in the sense 
that it is “hard to limit its reach.”33 
Similarly, Gardiner (2013b)34has identified some dormant paradoxes in the 
seemingly sound ethical assumption of compensation.35 Provision for compensation is no 
justification for causing harm. The conventionally ethical norm that the beneficiaries must 
compensate to the losers would exhibit its intrinsic irony in the context of climate 
engineering. For, this would presuppose that the benefits of climate engineering must be 
more than the costs irrespective of compensation. This might create a situation, which 
justifies the “infliction of all manner of costs onto some purely for the benefit of others, . . . 
without any discussion of matters such as rights, justice and responsibility.”36 Thus, 
according to Gardiner (2013b), it basically challenges the claim that climate engineering 
“benefits all.”37 
 
4.2.4 The Solidarity Approach 
Marion Hourdequin (2014) advocates a rather pastoral approach suggesting the build 
up of solidarity through our relationship among ourselves, through social, and political 
institutions, and even through technological responses to climate change.38 If we are 
motivated by the ideals of solidarity, there is a greater scope of reducing the harm and sharing 
the burden. He thinks that the solidarity approach can ensure greater distributive justice by 
considering the problem of abating climate change as a collective challenge. In Hourdequin 
(2014), there is the optimism that even in face of technological intervention against climate 
change, there can be distributive justice ensured in a collective response.39 
Though the literature on the issues of distributive justice hitherto is relatively 
nominal, there seems to be a serious apprehension shared by the authors that from the justice 
point of view, even researching climate engineering could be like opening a Pandora’s Box. 
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There seems to be unequivocal consensus among those who address the issue of distributive 
justice in climate engineering that there is a pressing need for expanding the ethicalresearch, 
as the work done so far is quite insufficient and does not absorb the seriousness and 
complexity of the issue.40 Unsurprisingly, almost all the pieces of literature reviewed herein 
find only challenges to distributive justice from whichever form of climate engineering, 
mostly stratospheric aerosol injection, and to our reading, there is no major mention in the 
literature where climate engineering presents itself as providing positive opportunities for 
global distributive justice. 
The literature also shares the tacit assumption that the harms and benefits of climate 
engineering will be significantly disproportionate among regions and peoples. Although some 
authors raise the issue of compensation, no context-specific case studies have been done 
about it. Besides, the debate on distributive justice is extremely polarised towards the analysis 
of SRM technologies with practically little attention paid to the distribution of the harms or 
benefits of CDR approaches. 
Yet a major missing link is between the concerns of distributive justice in climate 
change in general and the ramifications of this change for distributive justice in climate 
engineering in particular. Though there are a number of scholarly publications dealing with 
the issues of distributive justice in relation to the challenges of anthropogenic climate 
change,41 those studies fall short of a due incorporation of the challenges to the same from 
climate engineering. For instance, the paper by Jochen Prantl (2011),42 highlighting a series 
of challenges to distributive justice from climate changes, actually dwells very little on 
climate engineeringand its title seems to be deceptively misleading. It still remains an open 
task for the climate engineering ethicists to build upon the platform provided by Robock et al. 
Preston’s reasonable fear that “The many injustices of climate change foisted on the global 
poor could be unintentionally compounded by geoengineering,”43 also needs to be 
substantiated by more imposing scientific evidences.  
 
4.3 The Rawlsian Principles of Justice as a Theoretical Frame for Distributive Justice in 
Climate Engineering 
                                                          
40 See for instance, Wylie et al., p. 181.  
41 H. Shue, “The Unavoidability of Justice,” in A. Hurrell, B. Kingsbury, Eds., The International Politics of the 
Environment (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1992): 373–397. 
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As a political philosopher Rawls explored the ways to settle the prevalent tension 
within democratic society between liberty and equality. Rawls assumed that the diversity of 
worldviews in the society resulting from the social order can support greater freedom for all 
citizens.44 His first major workwas Theory of Justice first published in 1971, which deals 
particularly with the problems of distributive justice. His theory known as Justice as Fairness 
is further refined and expanded in his subsequent works, Justice as Fairness – A Restatement 
(2001), Political Liberalism (1993), and Law of Peoples (1999).  
 
4.3.1 Justice as Fairness 
The norms of distributive justice developed by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice 
in 1971 and the norms of international distributive justice developed in his The Law of 
Peoples in 1999 provide a tangible theoretical frame to evaluate under which conditions the 
research and application of climate engineering technologies would be just. Since an 
exhaustive presentation of Rawls’ ideas of justice is beyond the scope of this study, we will 
be dwelling only on those aspects relevant for the discussion of distributive justice in climate 
engineering, true to the concern of this chapter. The perspectives of John Rawls on 
intergenerational justice and procedural justice will be discussed later as warranted by the 
concerns of the subsequent two chapters. 
 Rawls is an egalitarian philosopher of the social contract tradition. Relying on 
generalised and abstract variants of the social contract theory, Rawls reaches at his theory of 
Justice as Fairness in his Theory of Justice. Rawls’ theory has two major derivative principles 
of justice, namely, the liberty principle and the difference principle. Reconciling the 
principles of liberty and equality, Rawls’s objective in Theory of Justice is to provide “a 
reasonably systematic alternative to utilitarianism.”45 According to Rawls, there were two 
objectives to developing the conceptions of justice as fairness: “A convincing account of 
basic rights and liberties, and of their priority, was the first objective of justice as fairness. A 
second objective was to integrate that account with an understanding of democratic equality, 
which led to the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle.”46 
Rawls describes justice as fairness in the following terms: “They are the principles 
that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an 
initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These 
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principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social cooperation 
that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be established. This way of 
regarding the principles of justice I shall call justice as fairness.”47 As for his starting point, 
Rawls looks for a common point of view of justice, a set of principles that would be agreed 
upon by all parties, unlike the disputed norms of the just and the unjust in existing societies. 
If such principles are found, those will be the norms followed by major institutions48 in the 
distribution of fundamental rights and duties, and in deciding on fair divisions of benefits 
resulting from social cooperation.  
 
4.3.2 The Original Position 
Rawls  envisages a hypothetical state of affairs where these principles can be derived 
from. This is technically termed as ‘original position’ in Rawls’ theory. Principles of justice 
are the principles chosen by ‘rational persons’ in an ‘original position’ under a ‘veil of 
ignorance.’ Here rational persons are those self-interested individuals who are guided by a 
mutually disinterested rationality. Rawls describes the mutually disinterested rationality as 
follows: “the persons in the original position try to acknowledge principles which advance 
their system of ends as far as possible. . . . The parties do not seek to confer benefits or to 
impose injuries on one another; they are not moved by affection or rancor. Nor do they try to 
gain relative to each other; they are not envious or vain.”49 
An ideal state of justice is explained by Rawls with the help of the hypothetical 
device, the ‘original position’ where rational parties make a relevant agreement on moral 
principles. The term ‘original position’ refers to an imagined state of mind wherein 
individuals choose principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance. The expression “veil of 
ignorance” means that no one knows his/her social position or his/her place in the society in 
deciding on the principles of the distribution of primary social goods. Although the 
contracting parties do not infringe on one another’s interests, they are governed by certain 
interests and responsibilities so that they may protect their liberties.50 The particular form that 
these interests would take is not known by the parties in the original position. The power of 
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the mutual agreement in the original position is guaranteed as the original position embodies 
those conditions widely recognised as fair in choosing and justifying principles of justice. 
The fact that a particular moral principle or theory would be accepted and preferred in such 
conditions against plausible alternatives is a credible argument for supporting the chosen 
moral theory.51 
The notion of the original position is conceived by Rawls to ensure the choice of 
principles of justice in a fair manner. The principles of justice are moral principles to be 
chosen in an impartial position. There should be nothing that would favour the subjective 
positions of the parties. The contracting parties, as they are ignorant of their subjective 
characteristics under the veil of ignorance, are freed from the binding conditions that would 
enable them to insist on principles favouring themselves. Thus for Rawls, the veil of 
ignorance not only brings about unanimity on principles of justice in the original position, but 
is also necessary to the condition of taking up the moral point of view.52 
The original position of equality involves the circumstances in which all persons 
would agree on a just system of distribution. This imaginary situation assumes the equality of 
the competent members of society with respect to primary goods. Further, the individual is 
unaware of his/her own position in society, talents and abilities, conditions of life in society, 
potential opportunities, goals, chances of success, etc. Under this ignorance, one is to choose 
the principles of conduct that would be best for oneself, with a view to maximize the 
possession of primary goods.53 In this maximisation attempt too, each person is assumed to 
calculate rationally.54 This is because he/she is unaware of his/her share of resources. 
Therefore, the possible arrangement to which one is to give consent is one in which all shares 
are equal.  
 
4.3.3 The Two Principles of Justice 
Given this state of affairs, what are the principles that all parties can unanimously 
agree upon? Given his position that justice pertains to the basic structure of the society, 
Rawls does not go for an elaborative list of principles that could deal with particular social 
concerns of our social life. Rather, he draws two central principles pertaining to the basic 
structure of the society. There are two major principles of justice that would be agreed upon 
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by persons in the original position. The initial formulation of the two principles are as 
follows: “First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second: social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to 
everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”55Among these 
two, the first principle has a distinct priority over the second.56 The share of basic liberties for 
each person should be compatible with the share of basic liberties of every other person 
having the same share of basic liberties. 
One of the key features of justice as fairness is that it guarantees a secure protection to 
the equal liberties.57 As Rawls understands, any liberty will consist of three components: 
firstly, the agents who are free, secondly, the restrictions or limitations that they are free 
from, and finally, what is that they are free to do or not to do.58 Liberty is unequal when one 
group enjoys a greater liberty than another, or its liberty is not as much as what it should be. 
Such a basic liberty is restricted only for the sake of liberty itself.59 Justice as fairness 
provides a strong case for individual liberty as well. According to Rawls, “whenever a society 
sets out to maximize the sum of intrinsic value … it is liable to find that the denial of liberty 
for some is justified in the name of this single end. The liberties of equal citizenship are 
insecure when founded upon teleological principles.”60 
Rawls argues that the utilitarian conflation of individuals for the sake of maximum 
happiness or maximum utility will cause serious injustice meted out to humans. An individual 
could reap greater benefits in future by sacrificing a certain comfort. It may be just as the 
concerned individual itself is paying the cost and reaping the benefit. However, it would be 
different if another person is inflicted suffering by which others may reap benefit. This would 
be an unfair deal. It is tantamount to injustice if some beneficiaries are created by forcing 
other persons to be benefactors. Similarly, institutions also can be channels of injustice if they 
produce social benefits and distribute these inequitably or in some fashion that would violate 
the rights of some individuals.61 
 
4.3.4 Primary Goods - A Metric of Individual Benefits and Social Cooperation 
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For Rawls, ‘primary social goods’ are the appropriate metric against which individual 
benefits in social cooperation is to be evaluated. Rawls defines primary goods as ‘all-purpose 
means’ that a rational person would require pursuing his/her conception of the good.62 They 
comprise social background conditions and all-purpose means necessary to form and 
rationally pursue the good. Primary goods are partial conceptions of the good agreed by the 
citizens in order to make interpersonal comparisons that are necessary for establishing the 
principles of justice. 
Rawls classifies primary goods into natural and social primary goods. Examples of 
natural primary goods would be health and vigour, intelligence and imaginations. Natural 
primary goods are not under the control of social institutions although their achievement and 
expressions can be conditioned by social institutions. Rawls recognises that differences in 
natural primary goods also are to be addressed by social justice.63 
Examples of primary social goods listed by Rawls are the following:  
(i) Basic rights and liberties 
(ii) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of 
diverse opportunities 
(iii)  Powers of prerogative of offices and positions of responsibility in the political 
and economic institutions of the basic structure 
(iv)  Income and wealth 
(v) Social bases of self-respect.64 
The principles of justice should ensure that all citizens have access to these primary social 
goods and that these goods are protected. The principles of justice should also provide each 
individual with a fair share of these all-purpose means. According to Rawls, when an index 
of primary goods is incorporated into the two principles of justice, the principles along with 
the index permits the characterization of what are citizens’ appropriate claims to social 
resources.65 
Rawls has underlined the importance of the primary social goods to enable citizens to 
develop and exercise the following two moral powers: (a) the capacity for a sense of justice, 
                                                          
62Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 79-81. 
63Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 54. 
64 The social bases of self-respect are elucidated in institutional terms supplemented by features of the public 
political culture such as the public recognition and acceptance of the principles of justice. See, John Rawls, “The 
Priority of Rights and Ideas of the Good,” in Samuel Freeman, ed., Collected Papers: John Rawls 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 454-455.  
65 John Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Samuel Freeman, ed., Collected Papers: John Rawls. 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 370. 
136 
the capacity to understand, to apply and to act from the principles of political justice that 
specify the fair terms of social cooperation; and (b) the capacity for a conception of the good, 
i.e. the capacity to have, to revise and to pursue rationally a conception of the good.66 It also 
enables them to pursue their determinate conceptions of good.67 Rawls states, “primary goods 
are now characterized as what persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, and as 
normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life.”68 
 
4.3.5 Principle of Efficiency 
Rawls takes recourse to the principle of efficiency in relation to distribution in 
economics. Every policy is to be evaluated in terms of the possible worst scenario resulting 
from that particular theory. According to the principle of efficiency, a system cannot be 
efficient if there is an alternative arrangement that could improve the situation of some people 
without rendering the situation of any of the other people worse.69 Rawls distinguishes two 
views on social justice, namely, the ‘general’ and the ‘special.’ In the general view, which is 
more basic, “[a]ll social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social 
bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or 
all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage.”70 This view holds in instances of low social 
wealth when establishing basic liberties is impossible and cannot be effectively exercised for 
all. The special view “removes the indeterminateness of the principle of efficiency by 
singling out a particular position from which the social and economic inequalities of the basic 
structure are to be judged.”71 
 
4.3.6 Difference Principle 
The issue of arranging the inequalities is addressed by the second principle, known as 
the difference principle. The interests of the least advantaged in the society are safeguarded in 
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the difference principle with an added norm for the distribution of the primary goods.Rawls 
advances the difference principle in order to address the issue of social and economic 
inequalities in the society within the framework of the principle of equal liberty. The 
difference principle is more concerned with institutions or practices in general than with 
particular actions or persons. The only circumstance under which social inequalities would be 
justified is when they turn out to be beneficial to the least well off. Justice is done to someone 
who is least advantaged, only if one is rendered better from a state he/she would be in without 
the inequality. According to the difference principle the benefits to the least advantaged 
group must be maximized,72 for, “social and economic inequalities should be evaluated in 
terms of how well off they leave the worst off.”73 The only acceptable deviations from 
equality in this situation are those that would bring maximum benefit to the least privileged 
members of society.74 For example, if a high salary to some individual is to induce the build 
up of the economy leading to the better quality of life for all, then this inequality is not unjust 
and would be acceptable.  
Precisely, who are the least advantaged? For Rawls, they are those whose family and 
class origins are more disadvantaged than those of others, whose natural endowments permit 
them to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in a course of life turn out to be less 
happy.75 The least advantaged are born into and would remain in such groups throughout 
their life.76 As primary social goods and resources in terms of income and wealth are used in 
defining the worst off, it is clear that they are the poorest in the society. 
There are three variants of the difference principle in Theory of Justice. In the first 
version, the principle suggests that economic and social inequalities must be “to everyone’s 
advantage.”77 In the second variant, there is greater light shed on the “everyone.” “Assuming 
the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, the 
higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a 
scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society. The 
intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive 
prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate.”78 In 
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this formulation, society consists of only the ‘more fortunate’ and the ‘less fortunate,’ in 
terms of the social and economic advantages they possess. In the third formulation, “social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
equality of opportunity.”79Van Parijs comments that the third formulation achieves the 
maturation from the requirement of ‘some improvement’ to a ‘maximal improvement’ of the 
least advantaged.80 The difference principle, by defining the fair expectations of the 
members, is geared towards providing adequate resources for realizing everyone’s capacities 
for free and responsible agency.81 
In his Theory of Justice: A Restatement, Rawls has imposed certain constraints upon 
the application of the difference principle. For instance, the concept of ‘the most extensive 
equal liberties for all’ has priority over the difference principle.82 Even if forced labour may 
be somehow considered to be improving the position of the least-advantaged in the society in 
the long-run, it cannot be justified. Indeed, because it conflicts with the first principle, which 
states each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 
 
The two principles of justice are supposed to regulate the social and economic 
inequalities in the basic structure of the society. Governed by the principles of justice, these 
inequalities are meant to evolve over time to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged in the 
society. Thus there is a rational agreement shared by these principles. Since these principles 
follow equitable division of primary goods as the benchmark of comparison, they also 
facilitate equality.83 The social circumstances of the individuals are compared and evaluated 
against the social primary goods. However, Rawls is keen to add that the index of primary 
social goods is not a measure of individual’s overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction, though it 
serves as a ground for interpersonal comparisons for the purpose of justice.84 The distribution 
of primary goods according to the principles of justice is the standard for the basic structure 
of the society to be just. 
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Given the conditions of choice in the original position, the principles chosen will be 
fair to everybody. This is the basis of justice as fairness in Rawls’ theory. Such an 
understanding of justice as fairness, would deliver fundamental rights and duties, benefits and 
burdens, within a society, striking a proper balance between competing claims to the 
advantages of social life. This public conception of justice will be the standard for a well-
ordered society.85 
 
4.3.7 International Distributive Justice 
In his The Law of Peoples, Rawls reflects extensively on international justice. Here 
Rawls describes principles that should govern the foreign policy of a liberal people.86 It could 
be noticed at the outset that - as Michael Blake and Patrick TaylorSmith have observed - in 
the Law of Peoples, “Rawls' perspective is unabashedly international rather than global. 
Unlike the early left institutionalists who conceive of the world as a single cooperative unit 
and seek a single principle of distributive justice to govern everyone, Rawls explicitly seeks 
principles that will regulate the interactions among territorially defined political, corporate 
agents that have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, called peoples—and, only 
indirectly, govern individuals.”87 
Rawls’ concept of international distributive justice centres on the notion of ‘well 
orderliness.’ It requires a ‘realistic utopia.’88 Rawls assumes that an international system 
composed of well-ordered peoples with representative governments will be peaceful.89 Rawls 
thinks that a world state would be impractical due to the cultural and communication 
obstacles.90From the provisional list of principles to be followed by the peoples91 as given by 
Rawls, we could identify the following principles that are relevant for climate engineering 
discussions. 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
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3. Peoples are to honour human rights. 
4. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.92 
Michael Blake and Patrick TaylorSmith make the critical observation that a version of the 
difference principle or anything of the sort is absent in this list. “[…] unlike individuals in the 
first original position, the peoples represented in this second, international original position 
will not demand that inequalities among them be justified by improving the lives of the least 
well-off person or people.”93 
Michael Blake and Patrick TaylorSmith identify the following distributive elements in the 
Law of Peoples. “If a deep material inequality among peoples undermined their ability to, 
say, be considered equals in the negotiation of treaties or tempted peoples to inappropriately 
intervene in the domestic affairs of other peoples, then that would be a reason—from the 
standpoint of international justice—for eliminating that inequality.”94 For Rawls, when every 
citizen in a well-ordered nation is able to lead a well-ordered life and assured of protection 
against starvation and poverty, the fact of some being wealthier than other is not tantamount 
to injustice. 
 
 
4.4 Climate Engineering and Distributive Justice from the Rawlsian Perspective95 
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As we can easily see, there is no reference to climate engineering in Rawls, especially 
as climate engineering is a recent development. However, our review of literature has shown 
that Rawls has been referred to by a number of ethicists on climate engineering. Our choice 
of Rawls for dealing with the issues of distributive justice was already justified in the 
introductory chapter. In this section, we shall be appropriating the concerns with distributive 
justice in climate engineering within the theoretical frame of distributive justice developed by 
Rawls. We shall apply various principles of distributive justice advocated by Rawls to the 
various challenges emerging from the potential scenario of research and development and 
deployment of climate engineering. The prominent elements of distributive justice in Rawls 
relevant for climate engineering are the following: 
1. Justice as fairness where Rawls underscores principles of basic liberty and freedom 
and the equality of opportunity. The various principles of distributive Justice 
developed in his The Law of Peoples where he dealt with international distributive 
justice can also be coined alongside.  
2. The Principle of Efficiency. 
3. The Difference principle. 
As we have seen, the postulation of an original position of equality and the adherence to 
this position as providing the norms of social interaction is the starting point of the Rawlsian 
theory of justice as fairness. The detachment from the subjective positions of the parties for 
making fair choices, impartial positioning of the rational parties, unanimity of moral 
principles, protection of one’s own rights and liberties without infringing on others’ rights, 
and the original position of equality with a mutual consensus on a just system of distribution 
are the major emphases in justice as fairness. Anticipating the findings for this study, we are 
inclined to agree with the other authors who hold that Rawls’s principles of justice cannot 
endorse climate engineering proposals in the present manner for the vast challenges to 
distributive justice that they offer. However, it could also be noted that an in-depth 
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appropriation of Rawls can open up new opportunities to the debate on climate engineering as 
the awareness of the challenges suggests new directions and measures for advancing the 
debate in its future course. 
4.4.1 Challenges to Equality and Liberty 
The research and development phase as well as the post-deployment scenario of 
climate engineering are loaded with serious challenges to the principles of distributive justice 
advocated by Rawls. In fact, appropriating the Rawlsian moral principles in the context of 
distributive justice in climate engineering cannot start with the ideal original position that 
Rawls envisaged for the just distribution of primary goods.  For, the very context of climate 
change, which warranted the discussion on climate engineering, presents itself as an unequal 
situation with huge disparities at the natural, social and geographical levels. As many authors 
have noticed, the climate change scenario brings forth the greatest havoc on the lives of the 
global poor because of mere “geographical bad luck.”96 There is almost a consensus among 
ethicists that the poor populations of the world are susceptible to the challenges of climate 
change. For example, a rise in sea level by one meter would submerge 18% of the land 
inhabited by 11% of the population.97 One third of the African people live in drought prone 
areas. As per the IPCC 2007 report, a significant impact of the climate change is the large-
scale loss of agricultural land in Africa. There are also the fears of the projected rise in 
several diseases due to the rise in temperatures in several parts of Africa. The IPCC 2007 
report also predicts water shortage and land degradation leading to severe poverty throughout 
Asia due to shrinking glaciers.98 
The primary condition for determining the choice of principles by rational people is 
that they be ignorant of their particular status in the society as individuals. The already 
differentiated responsibilities for climate change and the consequent inequalities already 
prevalent in the climate change scenario does not provide the ideal state of an original 
position with equal opportunities and equal rights that would enable people to make fair 
choices by following the moral norms as envisaged by Rawls. The initial position of equality 
that is to define the terms of association among the various parties is already absent in the 
context of climate engineering. Overcoming the self-interest of the parties through their 
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inability to choose principles that unfairly suit them may not be relevant in the context of 
present state of affairs with climate change and conversely to climate engineering. 
While the pre-deployment context itself is a matter of concern, the research and 
development and deployment of climate engineering is poised to go against the equal right to 
the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others, as envisaged by Rawls. Although there are several elements of 
uncertainty in regard to the impact of climate engineering, the simulation studies show that 
the impact of climate engineering, especially SRM, will be unevenly distributed. The 
prevalent uncertainties in the assessment of risk and harm associated with SRM are also 
swinging more towards worsening the regional imbalance in regard to the risks of SRM. The 
data from various simulation studies show that SRM and distributive justice are very much 
incompatible. Relying mainly on the four major simulation tests in SRM by Matthews and 
Caldeira,99 Robock et al.,100 Trenberth and Dai,101 and Brewer,102 we shall show that climate 
engineeringwould violate the fundamental principles of the Rawlsian view of distributive 
justice. 
Matthews and Caldeira studied the future scenarios of transient climate simulations in 
which CO2 emissions continue unabated and climate engineering is used to stabilize the 
temperatures. In their method they took the globally averaged absorbed solar radiation as 
equal to the radiative forcing from anthropogenic CO2.
103 In the simulation there were 
interesting results showing differentiated spatial changes in precipitation. In the simulation 
model of climate change without climate engineering, there was only a slight decrease in 
globally averaged precipitation by 0.02 mm/day from 1900 to 2100. However, in the model 
with climate engineering, the atmosphere did not warm sufficiently at 2100 relative to 1900. 
Here, the global averaged precipitation decreased by 0.18 mm/day from 1900 to 2100. Most 
surprisingly, the regional differences went up to 1.0 mm/day over tropical land areas.104 
Regions like Africa, South America, and South-Eastern Asia are predicted to be hit most 
severely by the reduction in the precipitation.  
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It is feared that the presence of radiative forcing agents in the atmosphere would produce 
complex patterns of changes in warming, precipitation, and patterns of climate like El Niño 
and monsoons, which vary from region to region. The impact of sulphate aerosol in balancing 
the global mean radiative forcing upon local climate patterns leading to substantial changes 
has been predicted by Lunt et al.105 Bala et al. have shown that although global mean surface 
air temperature may be restored, it does not restore the global mean precipitation.106 
As we have seen already, many proponents of the SRM models of climate engineering 
have used the Mount Pinatubo effect in 1991 as a justifying reference to climate engineering. 
However, many scientists were eager to show the side effects of the Pinatubo eruption, which 
are often overlooked. For assessing the issue of distributive justice in SRM, learning the 
lessons from the dark sides of the Pinatubo effect is crucial. Scientists at the National Centre 
for Atmospheric Research showed the huge impacts caused by the eruption leading to 
reduced precipitation, soil moisture, and river flow in many regions.107 The study by 
Trenberth and Dai in 2007 shows that the drastic reduction in precipitation and consequent 
drought in Southern Africa, South America, and South-Eastern Asia were associated with the 
Mount Pinatubo effect.108 They warn that SRM has greater potential than the Pinatubo effect 
in bringing out dangerous results. Peter Brewer also shows how the Pinatubo effect gave rise 
to a series of related events like global cooling, reduction in agricultural productivity, famine, 
food riots and “hundreds of thousands of untimely deaths.”109 
The case of the other volcanic eruptions also underscore the varying regional impacts of 
such events and conversely of SRM climate engineering. Robock et al. have shown that 
tropical volcanic eruptions can cause changes in the atmospheric circulation resulting in 
winter warming in the Northern hemisphere.110 The precipitation reduction can be up to 3.0 
millimetres per day in the South-Eastern Asia, compared to a scenario without climate 
engineering.111 Robock also argues that SRM can disturb the summer monsoons in Asia and 
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Africa that would affect the food and water supply of millions.112 Luke Oman et al. have 
shown that eruptions at high latitudes can weaken the Asian and African monsoons resulting 
in reduced precipitation.113 
From the intersection between the predictions of the computer simulations of SRM and 
the Rawlsian understanding of distributive justice, we could deduce a number of conclusions. 
Firstly, as there is much consensus that the effects of SRM will be unevenly distributed from 
region to region, there will most likely be unequal distribution of the benefits and harms of 
climate engineering. That is to say, there will be losers and winners as a result of SRM. This 
violates the two fundamental principles of justice as fairness: “each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme 
of liberties for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both …reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage…”114 In the climate 
engineering scenario, the liberty and freedom of a vast number of populations across the 
globe will be affected by the impacts of climate engineering. The impoverishment of one’s 
natural background will certainly condition the social and political rights. Therefore, the 
principles of freedom and liberty which are necessary for a just system will be at stake. The 
natural conditions emerging from the climate engineering scenario are such that they cannot 
guarantee the secure protection of equal liberties. It can be seen that the SRM scenario also 
poses serious challenges, especially, to the second of the three components of liberty 
envisaged by Rawls,115 i.e., the restrictions or limitations which people are free from. Rather 
than alleviating the existing limitations and restrictions, climate engineering only worsens it. 
Secondly, dwelling on the second principle of justice as fairness, i.e., “social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both …reasonably expected to be to 
everyone's advantage…”116 it could be seen that climate engineering would be an unfair deal 
as it inflicts misery to many by which others may reap benefit. Climate engineering is likely 
to create beneficiaries at the expense of forced benefactors. As Preston observes, “To the 
degree that the characteristics of an engineered climate can be predicted, choices will have to 
be made about who gets what in a geoengineered world. Clearly there are concerns that the 
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interests of the most powerful would be protected, while those less powerful will get 
secondary consideration (if they are considered at all).”117 Morrow et al. articulate the irony 
of the favourable risk-benefit ratio analysis that they overlook the mismatch between the 
beneficiaries and those who would bear the risk.118The institutional dimension of the injustice 
hinted at by Rawls becomes predominantly significant in the context of climate engineering 
as any practice of climate engineering without proper homework would distribute the benefits 
and harms inequitably or in a manner that would violate the rights of some individuals. 
Thirdly, the dialogue between Rawls and the ethics of climate engineering would call for 
re-emphasising the concept of natural primary goods in Rawls. If Rawls were to draft his 
theories in the climate engineering context, we are inclined to think that he would have dwelt 
at greater length on the notion of natural primary goods. For Rawls, the liberty for all is 
optimized by access to the primary goods, or the all-purpose-means. Rawls classified primary 
goods into natural and social, and, opined that natural primary goods are not under the control 
of the social institutions although social institutions can condition their achievement. 
However, the climate engineering scenario might significantly challenge the assumption that 
natural primary goods are not under the control of the social institutions. The climate 
engineering practice, as an invasive technique into the earth-system, does create a state of 
affairs where access to the natural primary goods like health, environment, etc., are defined 
and controlled by social and political institutions. For example, a designer climate by SRM 
techniques with reduced precipitation, as warned by the simulations, would certainly carry 
several health hazards. Therefore, the just distribution of social primary goods in climate 
engineering has to be built up on the foundational platforms of equitable natural primary 
goods. The long list of social primary goods necessary for a just society, given by Rawls like 
basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement, free choice of occupation, income and 
wealth, and self-respect, cannot be facilitated if sections of populations are deprived of their 
access to the natural primary goods through climate engineering. 
Rawls’ expanded idea of international distributive justice as developed in his Laws of 
Peoples is equally important for treating the concerns with distributive justice for a scientific 
technique like climate engineering exercised in a non-encapsulated system with trans-
boundary applicability. The provisional list of principles laid down by Rawls to be followed 
by peoples, like respect for the freedom of people, respect for human rights, and duty of non-
intervention carry direct implications for distributive justice in regard to climate engineering. 
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Unprecedented levels of caution and care will be needed for abiding by the principles of non-
intervention and respect for human rights for a novel technology like climate engineering 
with a global outreach. At the present range of technological development, it will be 
impossible for any nation to deploy SRM without intervening into the spatial and territorial 
integrity of the other nations and without causing any interference with the patterns of climate 
and life in that region. 
 
4.4.2 Difference Principle and the Compound Injustice119 
 As discussed above, a uniqueness of the Rawlsian understanding of justice is the 
postulation of the difference principle. In its developed form, the difference principle holds 
that the benefits to the least advantaged group must be maximized,120 and, “social and 
economic inequalities should be evaluated in terms of how well off they leave the worst 
off.”121 “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged…”122 Invoking the difference principle in the context 
of climate engineering, we find that the net results of SRM will be diametrically opposed to 
the difference principle in all its three variants. Moreover, contrary to the call of the 
difference principle to make the most disadvantaged better off, SRM only impoverishes 
further the least well off and the most unfortunate. The “geographical bad luck”123 that has 
conditioned the plight of the poor will be compounded by the side effects of climate 
engineering.  
Rawls’ understanding of the least advantaged in the society as those whose natural 
endowments permit them to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the course of their 
life turn out to be less happy,124 is all the more relevant in the context of climate engineering. 
As primary natural and social goods and resources are the parameters for defining the worst 
off, it is clear that they are the poorest in the society. Ironically, in the context of climate 
change, the victims of climate change who have contributed very little to the causes of 
climate change are further made victims to bear the harms of proposed technological 
solutions to climate change like SRM. It would mean that climate change with climate 
engineering will be worse than climate change without climate engineering for populations 
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like India and Bangladesh.125As Bunzl observes, “… the use of SRM as a mechanism of 
mitigation raises the possibility that … those already harmed by climate change … are made 
yet worse off by SRM…”126 If we can rely on the data from computer simulations this could 
be the scenario that “roughly 10% of the World’s population might be worse off even if the 
other 90% was better off.”127Present estimations of the effects of climate engineering, 
however uncertain they may be, show a heavily skewed vulnerability towards harming some 
of the poorest populations of the world including the sub-Saharan region. 
The report of the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI) warns 
that “SRM research could constitute a cheap fix to a problem created by developed countries, 
while further transferring environmental risk to the poorest countries and the most vulnerable 
people [...]”128 The significant regional variability to the results of SRM is said to “pose a risk 
to local food security if subsistence farming prevails and adaptation is not possible.”129 The 
2011 report of the Woodrow Wilson Center states that “[p]opulations living at the edge of 
subsistence—those with the least capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate change and 
almost no voice in international deliberations—are precisely the populations that will be most 
vulnerable to any negative side effects that geoengineering experiments may have […].”130 
These studies show that the various injustices related to climate change to which the global 
poor are already exposed are likely to be compounded by climate engineering.131 
It is estimated that nearly 3.9 billion people in Asia live in rural areas and over one third 
within close distance (less than 100 km) off the coast.132 Since water and agriculture would 
be most vulnerable to climate change and the consequent climate engineering, a huge 
population in the Asia-Pacific region is likely to be made worse off by climate engineering.133 
Therefore, the fear is that climate engineering might widen the socio-economic inequalities 
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already prevalent in the world. As Gardiner (2013c) comments, “…SSI (stratospheric 
sulphate injection) raises serious concerns about justice and the plight of the most 
vulnerable….”134 
It becomes clear that the Rawlsian difference principle and the potential impacts of 
climate engineering are very much at loggerheads. As climate engineering runs contrary to 
the vision of justice envisaged by difference principle, this principle may present a strong 
case against climate engineering as it is presently conceived. 
 
4.4.3 The Principle of Efficiency and Climate Engineering 
As we discussed above, Rawls takes recourse to the principle of efficiency in 
developing his notion of justice. According to the principle of efficiency, a system cannot be 
said to be efficient if there is an alternative arrangement that could improve the situation of 
some people without rendering the situation of any of the other people worse.135 As for 
Rawls, any unequal distribution of social values is justified if only such an arrangement is to 
everyone’s advantage. It is our contention that the principle of efficiency and climate 
engineering are incompatible at least on two counts. Firstly, the foregoing discussions have 
shown that climate engineering would certainly cause a differentiated distribution of harms 
and benefits and such a distribution is not justifiable as it would not be to everyone’s 
advantage, rather it only causes more harm to the most disadvantaged. Secondly, the 
possibility of alternative arrangements, like mitigation and adaptation, for tackling climate 
change that could improve the situation of some people without making the situation of any 
other people worse further confronts climate engineering on the ground of the principle of 
efficiency. 
 This takes us back to the discussion on the status of climate engineering as Plan A or 
Plan B, a theme upon which we dwelt at some length in the third chapter of this study.136 In 
the overall debate, there is a hidden framing of the status of climate engineering, treating this 
technology as a Plan B - a supplementary tool facilitating the efforts of mitigation and 
adaptation - as a possible insurance policy against climate change. In this approach, climate 
engineering forms synergies with mitigation and adaptation in tackling climate change.137 
Another approach in regard to the status of climate engineering is to treat it as a last resort 
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option. As reflected in the optimism of Lenton and Vaughan: “[s]trong mitigation, combined 
with global-scale air capture and storage, afforestation, and bio-char production, i.e. enhanced 
CO2 sinks, might be able to bring CO2 back to its pre-industrial level by 2100, thus removing 
the need for other geoengineering.”138  The principle of efficiency does seem to be 
reconcilable with the primacy of mitigation and adaptation in combating climate change. As 
Keith et al. (2010) have warned, “it is vital to remember that a world cooled by managing 
sunlight will not be the same as one cooled by lowering emissions.”139 The principle of 
efficiency would imply that irrespective of the practical challenges, a firm commitment to 
mitigation with due political will and determination would be the natural course of action in 
combating climate change, especially as there are serious issues of justice at stake in climate 
engineering. Although, the entire complexity of the ethical polyvalence of climate 
engineering cannot be subsumed into the principle of efficiency, it raises disturbing concerns 
from the subaltern perspective about the drastic consequences of the pragmatic adjustments 
that we uncritically propose in combating climate change.  
 
4.4.4 The Rawlsian Perspectives on CDR Approaches 
 As we have noted already, most of the discussions on climate engineering and 
distributive justice are confined to SRM techniques. The CDR approaches are almost absent 
from the scene. However, it does not mean that CDR approaches are freed from the 
vulnerabilities of SRM. CDR techniques, too, have the potential to increase benefits for some 
whilst by increasing harms for others. The net result of the CDR techniques are also said to 
be unevenly distributed and weakening the case of the vulnerable populations of the world.140 
For instance, many of the consequence of ocean acidification, one of the schemes under 
CDR, will have direct impact on the lives of the fisher-folk. Ocean acidification could lead to 
reduction in the fish yield from the ocean. As we have seen, one third of the population in 
Asia is living on the coastal areas with ocean as the main source of sustenance. Thus CDR 
also faces obstacles in meeting the requirements of the various principles of distributive 
justice in Rawls. 
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 Yet another instance of the CDR techniques being a challenge to distributive justice is 
the area of agriculture and food ethics.141“Furthermore, mitigation and adaptation measures to 
counter or slow down climate change have already resulted in considerable changes in agri 
and silvicultural land-use. This is, among important other reasons of environmental decline, 
due to the significant increase in growing plants for energy supply (‘biofuels’). Another 
perspective is the purchase or long-term tenancy of arable land or of water rights in the 
countries of the global south by wealthy nations and by transnational enterprises.”142 This 
observation, e.g. byThomas Potthast et al. (2015), is only likely to be aggravated by some 
forms of CDR techniques. Considering biomass and biofuel to be falling under the category 
of CDR techniques and the possibility of huge amount of cultivable land being diverted for 
such purposes may adversely impact the fate of justice in the agriculture sector. Kortetmaki 
and Oksanen (2016) have argued that more procedural injustices and greater threat to food 
security arise even under CDR climate engineering than under mitigation and adaptation.143 
Similarly, in regard to ocean upwelling and downwelling it has been feared that there are 
non-local impact of the exercise. Upwelling on one side of the ocean being compensated by 
an upwelling on the other side of the globe might distort the carbon equilibrium,144 which in 
turn could affect the ocean yield and the sustenance of the fisherfolk. 
 
4.5. Recommendations 
 Employing the Rawlsian principles of freedom and liberty, his principle of efficiency 
and his difference principle to the debate on climate engineering may appear to suggest a 
negative assessment of climate engineering on the grounds of justice. The Rawlsian frame of 
justice may not endorse climate engineering as it is conceived now. The limitations of 
applying a social theory of justice, as of Rawls, to a natural context like climate engineering 
also become vivid in the intersection between Rawls and climate engineering. However, a 
rejection of climate engineering from the viewpoints of Rawls may be only apparently and 
deceptively true. A proper accommodation of the principles and values of justice advocated 
by Rawls into the climate engineering debate is helpful for the maturation of the debate in 
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very many ways bringing the issues of justice to the forefront. It can be helpful in reorienting 
the priorities and emphases of the debate as it cautions against the hitherto undeveloped or 
less developed aspects of the debate. 
Our preceding discussion shows that climate engineering as envisaged in the present 
manner is almost incompatible with the principles of distributive justice outlined by Rawls. 
We need to see further whether climate engineering can be developed and applied whilst 
complying with Rawls’ ideas and principles of justice, both intra-nationally and 
internationally. Towards this, we shall try to suggest some new directions and fresh additions 
to the climate engineering debate that would make it more compatible with the principles of 
distributive justice intra-nationally and internationally.  
 
4.5.1 Research Agenda Focused on the Vulnerable 
On the scientific part, there seems to be lopsidedness in some simulation models to the 
flowery aspects of climate engineering by ignoring the inputs with adverse impacts. This 
needs to be rectified. As many climatologists have suggested, inputting the adverse impact 
events into the earth-system models and computer simulations145 is vital for the proper 
assimilation of the principles of distributive justice. Tuana et al. have opined that the present 
earth-system models are inadequate in giving proper information on crucial geophysical 
factors in climate engineering that are very essential for assessing the issues of distributive 
justice like long time scales, differences in regional impacts, and the potential low-
probability/high impact events.146 Their proposal of a specific research agenda that would 
analyse comprehensively the social and physical impacts of SRM with particular focus on 
their benefits and harms147 will be a significant step towards better appreciating the issues of 
distributive justice. The guidelines for the researchers from the perspective of justice, offered 
by Morrow et al. (2009),148 after analysing the consequences of the climate engineering 
research beyond the computer models, are worth revisiting here. According to them, the 
principles of beneficence and justice warrant the favourable risk-benefit ratio, fair distribution 
of risks and anticipated benefits, and protection of the basic rights of affected individuals.149 
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Hence the greatest attention of the researchers should be on those who bear the risk and gain 
little. Accordingly, they also advocate a maximin approach for risk-benefit assessment 
whereby researchers should try to minimise the risks to the maximum to those whose welfare 
will be affected by the research.150 
 
4.5.2 Addressing the Intricacies of Compensation 
If climate engineering becomes an indispensable option in future, the issue of 
compensation becomes very crucial. Gardiner (2010b) laments that in the public and political 
discussion of climate engineering there is virtually no mention of compensation or global 
justice.151Although there is mention of compensation by several authors, our review found 
only one paper that ventures seriously into the concrete intricacies of compensation in climate 
engineering.152 Ensuring the rights, liberty and self-respect of those who bear the harms of 
climate engineering is a prelude to any research programme in climate engineering. It is a 
challenging task for climate engineering ethicists to ensure that the “geographical bad luck” 
of the unfortunate victims of climate change is not compounded, but compensated by climate 
engineering. There should be compensation of extra costs triggered by negative side effects 
of climate engineering. The differentiated causal responsibility for the harms on whom the 
obligation falls, identifying the true victims, the legal framework and moral imperatives for 
compensation, the measurement and the modes of compensation including rehabilitation, etc., 
are still undeveloped issues in the present phase of the debate. It is an irony that the cost-
benefit analysis of climate engineering does not include the parameters of compensation. 
Redefining the cost-benefit calculus may challenge the “incredible economics of climate 
engineering” with such artificially hyped ratio of 1:100.153 
 
4.5.3 Developing the Political Determination 
The discussion on justice in climate engineering is, to some extent, one of the political 
dimensions of the climate engineering debate. As the present research is mostly confined to 
the scientific and social aspects of the issue, it is necessary that due political interventions are 
incorporated into the debate from its early phases. The poor treatment of the issues of justice 
in climate engineering, let alone distributive justice, by formal bodies like IPCC and Royal 
Society may be partly due to the lack of the political awareness on the issue. Probably, this 
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state of affairs is partly due to the fact that the present trend of engagement with climate 
engineering is mostly at the scientific and technological level, and the concerns with ethics 
are still confined to the ethicists and philosophers. The climate engineering scientists, social 
scientists, political think tanks and policy makers are still to apply themselves seriously to 
this emerging challenge. Hence the maturation of the justice concerns in the debate is 
possible only with the proper integration of the political and social ramifications of the 
climate engineering technologies. The political will must apply itself to adequately 
developing the ethical, legal and social implications of climate engineering from the early 
phases of the climate engineering researches.  
 
4.5.4 Revised Conceptions of Rights and Obligations 
Given the force of the challenges to justice in climate engineering, ensuring distributive 
justice would require broad range of policies, measures and activities that are perhaps hitherto 
unprecedented in international relations, practices and treaties. Insulating climate 
engineeringagainst compounding the climatic injustice further may need broadening the very 
moral concepts of rights and obligations. Rich and affluent societies and nations of the world 
should be more accountable for the historical and relational dimension of their present well-
being and be held more responsible for the ecological impacts of their affluent ways of life 
including the overshoot with their eco-footprint. Rights and obligations of nations and 
societies should be reconceived within such a wider historical and ecological matrix. For 
instance, although the present rate of carbon emission of a particular country (say, Britain) 
may not be beyond the stipulated limits, its historical progress through industrialisation may 
have already contributed to the compounded climatic injustice to which the poor nations of 
the worlds are presently exposed to. 
 
The estimate of the World Resources Institute is that from 1950 to 2000, 90% of the CO2 
emission has been produced by just 25 countries.154 Therefore, understanding the rights and 
obligations of the poor and rich nations in the context of climate engineering cannot be 
defined within the present time frame alone. In the climate engineering case, rights and 
obligations should be appropriated also within the historical and futuristic setting of climate 
change. The intuitive norm for justice in climate engineering should be that the rights of those 
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who have contributed little to climate change, but are most vulnerable to the climate change 
and to the harms of climate engineering deserve privileged protection. This norm should be a 
binding obligation on those who have contributed to the climate change. Therefore, there can 
be no build-up of distributive justice in climate engineering without specifying the specific 
obligations on the rich nations, though deciding the proportions in this regard may be very 
complex. The prophetic value in Preston’s fear deserves appreciation: “Given the uncertain 
future ahead in a warming world, the concepts of obligation and responsibility may be neither 
broad enough nor flexible enough for the demands that climate change and SRM will 
make.”155 
Along with the normative force of rights and obligations, an appreciation of the moral 
concept of ‘desert’ would be an added protection for justice in climate engineering. Desert is 
a moral concept introduced by Sher (1987). Desert is “central to our pre-reflective 
thought.”156 Desert is the intuitive view that some particular groups or persons deserve more 
while some others do not. For example, a hardworking student deserves to score more. 
Preston thinks that, “At this pre-reflective level, it seems likely that the developing nations do 
not deserve the hand that climate change and the prospect of SRM deals them.”157 The point 
about desert may be the hermeneutical force of the need for “… more conscience”158 in 
climate engineering advocated by Svoboda et al. (2011). Concerns of distributive justice in 
climate engineering should be addressed both under the direct obligations and matters of 
desert. Preston (2014) thinks that financial compensation and logistical support with 
adaptation would fall under the direct obligations and new immigration policies and 
technology transfer would be matters of desert.159 Formulating an international calculus for 
the skewed responsibilities and differentiated causal obligations of climate change and 
apportioning the compensation to the vulnerable nations among the rich nations against such 
a calculus may be a viable step to assuring justice in climate engineering. 
 
4.5.5 Reliable Forecasts and Contingency Plans 
As the clouds of several scientific uncertainties are still looming over the techniques of 
climate engineering, the “Extreme vigilance, and more conscience”160 advocated by Svoboda 
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et al. (2011) become the imposing imperative for climate engineering. As there are several 
forecasts expressing the fear that the plight of the global poor will be worsened by climate 
engineering, alleviating the uncertainties in regard to the side effects of climate engineering is 
necessary for initiating the proper measures to ensure justice. Reducing the uncertainties and 
refining the scientific proofs and evidences is necessary for developing policies and structures 
for ensuring distributive justice in climate engineering. The awareness of the grave 
limitations of the computer simulations in climate engineering tests deserves special scientific 
attention.  
As the issue of who would bear the burden of proof is still open in the debate, due 
recognition of Rawls’ principles of justice would demand that proponents of climate 
engineering should assume the burden of proof in regard to the impacts and side-effects of 
climate engineering, alleviating the scope for unexpected harms as much as possible. 
Accordingly, the vulnerable regions and nations should be equipped and empowered to stand 
up to any foreseen or unforeseen, known or unknown side effects of climate engineering. 
Raising a contingency fund for financial aid to the vulnerable nations, providing logistical 
support with adaptation, relaxed immigrations rules towards ecological refugees, technology 
transfer to the poor nations, and contingency plans for rehabilitation are some of the ethically 
warranted practical measures and preparations to ensure distributive justice.161 
 
 
 
4.5.6 Greater Regional Engagement 
The predicted regional imbalance in the benefits and harms of climate engineering invites 
improvements upon the present format of the debate. It is highly commendable that though 
there are presently no authors from those regions that are potentially most vulnerable to 
climate engineering, European and American authors like Svoboda, Gardiner, Preston, 
Prantle, etc., have forcefully pushed the concerns of the disadvantaged regions to the 
forefront. However, the contextual proprieties in the debate demand that ethicists, policy 
makers and social analysts from the vulnerable regions of the world be engaged more 
extensively and substantively in the climate engineering debate. Historically, there were 
several instances where the initial neutrality of the scientific research was eventually skewed 
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towards the legitimisation of self-interest.162 As many have suggested, concerns with 
distributive justice demand that there be more social interdisciplinarity163 and regional 
interaction in climate engineering policy-making.  
 
4.5.7 Exploring the CDR Impacts 
The debate on distributive justice is extremely skewed towards the analysis of SRM 
technologies with practically little attention paid to distribution of the harms or benefits of 
CDR approaches. However, the irony is that Royal Society and IPCCare recommending CDR 
schemes to begin with. If such recommendations are accepted, there is the likelihood that the 
CDR methods are deployed with inadequate homework done. That is to say, as the attention 
of the ethicists is now focussed on SRM, they may be ill prepared to address the challenges 
emerging from the deployment of CDR methods. The lack of political awareness about 
distributive justice in climate engineering is further corroborated by this situation. It is 
recommended that more scientists and ethicists study the implications of the various CDR 
techniques for distributive justice. 
 
4.5.8 New Legal Frameworks 
As Rawls has commented, institutions also can be channels of injustice if they produce 
social benefits and distribute these inequitably or in a fashion that violates the rights of some 
individuals. Ensuring distributive justice in climate engineering would entail a critical 
introspection at the various international laws, protocols, treaties and guidelines (for example, 
the Kyoto Protocol or the UN treaty on Biodiversity) as to whether they become channels of 
institutional injustice or structural violation of rights. The concerns with justice in climate 
engineering may not be feasible without formulating new international laws and protocols. 
Probably, for the first time, international bodies are confronting a potential technology with 
such long-term impacts and planetary outreach. Climate engineering schemes, if deployed, 
will be ranging beyond territorial and national boundaries. Thus the socio-political 
consequences of this technology would be unprecedented. Hence, ensuring distributive 
justice would entail developing new legal frames. Even a quick overview of the justice 
concerns in climate engineering shows that it invokes “the need for new or strengthened 
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global norms of justice and community, and novel institutions…”164 As Ray (2010) has 
observed, “… at the moment, we lack a credible means of deciding global questions of 
distributive justice.”165 The recognition of the ‘differential responsibilities’ for the 
anthropogenic climate change in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change is a right step in this direction, to be followed up with due seriousness in the climate 
engineering context. As of now there is internationally a juridical missing link in deciding 
which risks and harms are acceptable and in which manner. The need for new legal frames is 
all the more important in the wake of the increasing presence of the private stakeholders with 
profit-driven motives on the climate engineering scene. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter constitutes the first of the three normative chapters on climate 
engineering and justice. In this chapter we have dealt exclusively with the issues of 
distributive justice in climate engineering. Our concern was to see the challenges that climate 
engineering pose to distributive justice and to see the conditions of distributive justice, mostly 
from the Rawlsian perspective, under which climate engineering may be desirable. In the first 
part of this chapter, we reviewed the current literature on distributive justice in climate 
engineering. In the second part, we looked for a normative and conceptual ground for 
examining the concerns of distributive justice in climate engineering and we identified the 
views of Rawls as relevant for this discussion. Having highlighted the principles of justice in 
Rawls’ work, in the third part, we applied those principles to see climate engineering from 
the point of view of distributive justice. Analysing the side effects of climate engineering in 
the light of Rawls’ principles of distributive justice, we saw that climate engineering faces 
obstacles in meeting the requirements of the principles of distributive justice. The prevalent 
uncertainties in the assessment of risk and harm associated with climate engineering are also 
swinging more towards worsening the plight of the global poor. In the light of the vivid 
challenges to distributive justice, we also made some recommendations for advancing the 
debate on climate engineering with due recognition of the principles of distributive justice. 
The main message of the chapter is that as of now the climate engineering proposals do not 
meet the requirements of distributive justice as they are mostly pro-rich and the fundamental 
condition for ensuring distributive justice is to make climate engineering as much poor-
friendly. 
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This chapter has addressed the first part of our research question, that is, can climate 
engineering be just compatible with the Rawlsian principles of distributive justice. Now in 
the following two chapters we will take up the second and third part of the research question 
respectively on intergenerational and procedural justice, with the next chapter dealing 
precisely with the issue of intergenerational justice. 
.  
 
 
Chapter 5 
Intergenerational Justice in Climate Engineering 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Exactitude and precision, essential characteristics of any scientific knowledge, cannot 
be fully claimed by the climatic sciences especially in matters of prediction. It is still difficult 
to predict scientifically the full spatio-temporal outreach of a natural climatic development or 
a deliberate climatic intervention. The climate of a region or of a period is the result of a 
series of geographical factors and processes spanning over hundreds of years. Geographical 
history underscores that impacts of any intervention in the earth’s climate in a particular 
period or region will not be confined to that period or region alone. Instead its long-term 
impacts are likely to be effective for generations to come. True to this concern, ethicists have 
vociferously warned on the challenges posed by climate engineering to future generations. 
While the spatial imbalances and inequalities emerging from climate engineering 
interventions constituted the questions of distributive justice that we discussed in the previous 
chapter, the temporal impacts invoke yet another crucial element in the ethics of climate 
engineering, that is, the issue of intergenerational justice.  
 Intergenerational justice involves the distribution of the benefits and harms between 
the present generation and the future generations. No generation has unlimited entitlements to 
natural resources; each generation also has certain obligations as a custodian of natural 
resources which are to be preserved for the well-being of the future generations. Accordingly, 
intergenerational justice plays a role in most theories of ethics, and it finds major inroads into 
the international treaties and conventions.1Intergenerational justice forms one of the 
fundamental principles in debates concerning sustainable development.2Justice concerns in 
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climate engineering warrant serious analysis of the just distribution of benefits and harms 
among the present and future generations. Understandably, ethicists have repeatedly raised 
the issues of intergenerational equity in climate engineering.3 As we discuss below, the 
dangers of sudden termination, the polluter-pays principle, moral hazard, the treatment of the 
symptom over the cause, and the risk transfer issue, are the major challenges to 
intergenerational equity in climate engineering. 
For methodological integrity, here too, we evaluate the issue of intergenerational 
justice against the theoretical frame of John Rawls. Accordingly, our lead question in this 
chapter is: what are the conditions of ethical research and application of climate engineering 
technologies as seen from the perspective of the Rawlsian view on intergenerational justice? 
Before venturing into the Rawlsian view of intergenerational justice, first we shall present a 
brief review of the academic literature on intergenerational justice in climate engineering. 
Next, drawing on the principles and perspectives of intergenerational justice in Rawls, we 
shall apply them to climate engineering. We shall conclude with some recommendations 
from the point of view of intergenerational justice from the Rawlsian perspective. 
 
5.2 Review of Literature 
5.2.1Ethical Concerns 
As we have seen in chapter three, there are 13 papers4 dealing with the issue of 
intergenerational justice in a manner worth mentioning. Among these, the paper by Burns 
(2013) directly and exclusively deals with the issue of intergenerational equity and other 
papers have only a subsection or passing reference to intergenerational justice. We shall 
present below a short picture of the various issues related to intergenerational justice in the 
present literature on climate engineering. 
 
5.2.1.1 Current Generation on Trial 
A glance at the literature on intergenerational justice shows that concerns about the 
unequal distribution of harms and benefits between the present and future generations are 
strongly voiced. Most authors aggressively hold the present generation responsible and 
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UNEP/IEL/WS/3/2 (1996), 13-14, para 30, 44-45. 
3 See Chapter 3; 3.3.2.5. 
4 Bodansky 2013; Gardiner 2007; Jamieson 1996, p.330ff; Burns 2011, p.41ff; Gardiner 2013b, p.30f; Goes 
2010, p.1; Leal-Arcas and Filis-Yelaghotis 2012, p. 130; Hale Benjamin 2012, p. 19; Preston 2013, p. 31; 
Gardiner 2006, p. 408; Gardiner 2010, p. 304; Svoboda et al. 2011, p. 22; Royal Society 2009, p. 276. 
162 
accountable for its policies and actions in regard to climate change.5 Risk-transfer, polluter-
pays, and responsibility abdication are the intergenerational ethical challenges highlighted by 
various authors.6 Goes et al. (2010) and Burns (2013) think that SRM would fail in the ethical 
test, as it would violate the principles of intergenerational justice.7It is alleged that the present 
generation creates undue benefits for themselves by transferring the risks and burdens of 
climate change to future generations. This may be called the risk-transfer argument.8The 
polluter-pays principle accompanies this argument. This principle, formulated by Betz and 
Casean (2012), holds that those who cause the problem of climate change should also solve 
it.9 Abdicating our responsibility for climate change and evading our responsibility in 
combating it is a kind of injustice to future generations. Hale (2012) calls it the responsibility 
abdication objection.10 In this argument, climate engineering acquits us of our responsibility 
for our actions. It means that we can get away with our offences without being held 
responsible for them. The get-out-of-jail-free card argument – an argument we have 
discussed in chapter three11 - also goes along with it. 
 
5.2.1.2 Moral Hazard 
Many authors view climate engineering as watering down the efforts at mitigation. 
This is technically termed as “moral hazard”. A similar phrase coined in the literature is “get 
out of jail free” card.12 Although moral hazard is a major ethical issue that is extensively 
discussed in the climate engineering debate, here we consider only those papers dealing with 
moral hazard as challenge to intergenerational justice. It is feared that future generations will 
be paying the price for the moral hazard caused by climate engineering. Further, the danger 
of moral hazard can be increased by the economic feasibility of climate engineering claimed 
by the proponents. Some estimates claim that even a single nation can develop and deploy 
climate engineering techniques.13The false hope given to the present generation that there is a 
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technical solution available and that too at a cheap rate does undermine the present attempts 
at mitigation. This puts future generation in greater trouble. 
Gardiner (2006) finds yet another problem resulting from the moral hazard. The hope 
that there is a solution can lead the present generation in easily avoiding its moral obligations 
in relation to climate change. Gardiner (2006) forcefully attacks the evasive loopholes that 
each generation is likely to solicit in avoiding the moral obligations with regard to climate 
change. The intergenerational nature of the climate change, the geographically dispersed 
nature of its agents and its effects, the scientific uncertainties, etc., are some of our justifying 
weapons against our otherwise clear moral obligations. For Gardiner (200), climate change is 
the type of problem that “provides each generation with the cover under which it can seem to 
be taking the problem seriously … when really it is simply exploiting its temporal 
position.”14 He considers climate engineering as a mask for a number of vices. These vices 
include moral corruption, laziness and buck-passing, as well as knowingly putting the future 
generation that would actually initiate climate engineering in an undesirable position. The 
decision to pursue research in climate engineering shows that we have “failed to take on the 
challenge facing us, and instead have succumbed to moral corruption. Indeed, the decision to 
geo-engineer might reveal just how far we are prepared to go to avoid confronting climate 
change directly, and this may constitute a tarnishing, even blighting, evil.”15 
 
5.2.1.3 Termination Problem 
While there are several aspects to the termination problem in the wider spectrum of 
the climate engineering debate,16 here we mention only those papers dealing with the 
termination problem in relation to future generations. There is almost a consensus in the 
literature regarding the termination problem as the most difficult challenge at stake in climate 
engineering to intergenerational justice.17 The point of the termination problem is that future 
generations will be forced to continue with a strategy for which they are not responsible and 
which they have not initiated. The termination problem restricts their freedom of choice in 
the future. Further, if SRM has to be discontinued for unforeseen reasons or even for policy 
matters, it can lead at worst to the extinction of the human species itself. Svoboda et al. 
(2011) have done significant work relating to the termination problem and intergenerational 
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justice. Using the theoretical models of Rawls (1999), Dworkin18 (1981), Wigley19 (2006) 
and Sen20 (1982), they show how the effects of termination will have an adverse impact on 
intergenerational justice. They conclude that it violates the principles of intergenerational 
equity in all these models. According to them, “... intergenerational justice requires the 
present generation to ensure that future generations have access to food, water, shelter, and 
education.... any generation that implements SAG [Sulphate Aerosol Geoengineering] 
accepts the risk that it might later be discontinued, but the subjects of this risk are the future 
generations who would suffer the harmful effects if SAG should be discontinued abruptly.”21 
The long-term impact of SRM is a major concern discussed in the literature. As per scientific 
estimations, once launched SRM may have to be continued for 500-1000 years; therefore, it 
poses disturbingly long-term challenges to the values and interests of future generations. It is 
also feared that policy decisions or ethical reasons may lead to abandoning SRM.22 
 
5.2.1.4 Prevalent Uncertainty 
The prevalent scientific uncertainty in determining the impacts of climate engineering 
in the future is a concern shared by two authors.23 Determining to what precise extent a future 
burden is the consequence of a ‘natural’ weather event, of anthropogenic climate change, or 
of climate engineering will be next to impossible. As of now we could only speculate as to 
how many generations will be exposed to the impacts of climate engineering. Beneﬁts and 
burdens are also likely to fall more upon future generations - whose number and identity are 
not yet known-than on the present generation.24 The concern with scientific uncertainty thus 
invokes the issue of the methodological constraints in assessing intergenerational justice in 
climate engineering.  
 
5.2.1.5 CDR and Intergenerational Justice 
There is a discussion in just two paragraphs on CDR methods in relation to 
intergenerational justice in one of the papers.25 It is true that CDR avoids the termination 
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problem and may be considered to be addressing the root of the problem rather than the 
symptom. The bright side of the CDR approaches for intergenerational justice is that it does 
not involve any threat of the danger of sudden termination as in SRM scheme. However, 
CDR schemes are not freed from the issue of moral hazard as it can downplay the efforts at 
mitigation by the present generation. Burns (2011) observes that compromising with 
mitigation means the responsibility for averting the dangers of climate change is transferred 
to the future generations. Further, CDR techniques need to be deployed in a sustained 
manner. It “would deny them (future generations) the full panoply of options that the 
principle of intergenerational equity demands.”26 Thus CDR schemes also pose challenges to 
intergenerational justice. However, he observes that compared to SRM, CDR challenges may 
be less pressing from the point of view of intergenerational justice.27 
 
5.2.1.6 Theoretical Perspectives Applied 
Though no author dwells significantly on any particular theoretical model, there are 
passing references to various theories of intergenerational equity in the literature. The models 
include Rawls (1999), Dworkin (1981), Wigley (2006), Sen (1982) and Weiss (1989). 
Svoboda et al. (2011) use Rawls (1999), Dworkin (1981), Wigley (2006), Sen (1982) and 
Weiss (1989). They also have a quick recourse to utilitarian theory. Burns (2011) uses mostly 
Weiss’s perspective and concludes that termination problem would violate the second 
principle of intergenerational equity outlined by Weiss, that is, conservation of quality.28The 
notion of “original position” in Rawls,29the “social contract” theory of Edmund Burke,30 the 
notion of “unjust enrichment” in Shelton31 the “public trust” doctrine in E. B. Weiss,32 the 
freedom of choice in UNESCO Declaration on Responsibilities of the Present Generations 
Towards Future Generations,33Dworkin’s view of persons having an initially equal share of 
resources,34Sen’s capability approach,35Arneson’s view of all persons having an equal chance 
for welfare,36and desert-based theory of intergenerational justice37 are the other theoretical 
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frames used in assessing the issue of intergenerational justice in climate engineering by 
various authors. Interestingly, the conclusion in all these accounts is that climate engineering 
is problematic from the point of view of intergenerational justice.  
 
5.2.2 Some Observations on the Debate 
Most authors are inclined to look at climate engineering as a challenge rather than as 
an opportunity, as reflected in Burns’ (2013) formulation that SRM “sows the seeds of a 
major peril for future generations.”38 There is an excessive preoccupation with the perils of 
SRM for intergenerational equity and no author seems to explore the scope for the 
justification of climate engineering from the intergenerational point of view. Thus the 
incompatibility of climate engineering and intergenerational equity is almost a foregone 
conclusion in the debate such as those pointing out that1) climate engineering is fairer than 
mitigation, 2) it buys time for mitigation, and 3) it fulfils our responsibility to future 
generations.The dangers of climate engineering seem to be an unquestioned premise upon 
which the ethicists begin their evaluation of climate engineering. Perhaps, any opportunity 
that climate engineering may provide to future generations, for instance, developing a ready-
technology against all the odds of climate change, does not seem to be catching the attention 
of the ethicists. However, there is some vindication in this regard in Preston (2011), who 
thinks that at the end of the day, it may be a lesser evil.39 
Although there are several objections to climate engineering from the 
intergenerational justice point of view, the debate landscape does not reflect a serious 
engagement with the proponents of climate engineering who hold that it may be exercised in 
a manner that would comport with the norms of intergenerational justice. A major exception 
in this regard is the commendable engagement made by Burns (2011) who confronts the 
claims of the proponents that it shields the future generations from future disasters and 
thereby we fulfil our obligations to the future generations. Burns (2013) considers this 
argument as a false dichotomy of choices created between our failure to initiate meaningful 
measures to curtail emissions and our use of climate engineering as a bandage to cover the 
wound inflicted upon the future generations resulting from our failure.40 Burns (2013) also 
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questions the buying-time argument of the proponents that climate engineering will allow 
enough time for mitigation strategies by calling for alternatives that can help us buy time.41 
The overemphasis on the termination of SRM and inadequate attention paid to the 
CDR technologies seem to be two unbalanced areas in the debate. The focus on the 
termination effect is deservingly significant. However, it has almost hijacked the debate to 
the extent that it practically ignores the equally important concerns like the argument of lesser 
evil and the concern of moral hazard that would deserve greater attention. More scientific 
details of the CDR techniques are to be analysed for a balanced assessment of its implications 
for intergenerational equity. The present discussion on CDR identifies only pragmatic 
concerns of governance as a real challenge, which alone is no convincing reason for ruling 
out CDR. On a critical scrutiny of the review of literature, it seems to be insufficiently 
developed. Thus the topic of intergenerational justice and climate engineering warrants a 
more exhaustive analysis.  
 
5.3Intergenerational Justice – The Rawlsian Perspective 
As our concern in this chapter is to assess the desirability of the climate engineering 
within the Rawlsian theoretical frame of intergenerational justice, we shall first briefly 
discuss Rawls’ perspectives on intergenerational justice. According to John Brätland (2007), 
John Rawls “[...] can be credited with provoking the most recent angst over the issue of 
intergenerational equity.”42Lukas Meyer (2015) also thinks that to Rawls we owe “[...] the 
first systematic discussion of obligations to future people.”43 
Rawls’ idea of intergenerational justice unfolds within the general framework of his 
principles of distributive justice. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the equal liberty 
principle and the difference principle are the two central pillars upon which Rawls builds up 
his theory of justice applicable to a democratic nation state. According to these principles, 
each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties. 
Moreover, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged in the society. The question of intergenerational equity is a 
natural outcome of these principles.  
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Rawls addresses the issue of justice between generations in his three main works, 
namely, Theory of Justice (1971), section 44; Political Liberalism (1993), 274; Rawls, Justice 
as Fairness(2001), sections 49.2 and 3. It could be noted that only in his Theory of justice 
Rawls significantly dwells on the issue of justice between generations and there are only 
passing references to the same in Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness. As we will see 
below, much of his recourse to intergenerational justice in Political Liberalism and Justice as 
Fairness are minor modifications or additions to his position in Theory of Justice. 
 
5.3.1 Intergenerational Justice in Theory of Justice 
Rawls takes up the issue of justice between generations in section 44 of the seventh 
chapter of his Theory of Justice. Rawls considers this topic to be very difficult subjecting an 
ethical theory to almost impossible tests.44 He explores the issue of intergenerational justice 
in the context of setting the social minimum.45 He thinks that the right level of social 
minimum cannot be set up by the average wealth of a nation or conventional expectation as 
they lack in precision and proper criterion.46 He thinks that the social minimum should be 
decided in terms of the difference principle following a just savings principle. 
The appropriate expectation in applying the difference principle is that of the long-
term prospects of the least favoured extending over future generations. Each 
generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain 
intact those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside in 
each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation. This saving may 
take various forms from net investment in machinery and other means of production 
to investment in learning and education.47 
Rawls thinks it is impossible to fix the precise measure of the just savings: “How the burden 
of capital accumulation and of raising the standard of civilization and culture is to be shared 
between generations seems to admit of no definite answer.”48 He only recommends avoiding 
any type of extremes in formulating the ethical constraints in fixing the rate of savings.49 
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Rawls realizes that the two principles of justice (i.e., the equal liberty principle and the 
difference principle) will have to be subjected to some adjustment when applied to the just 
savings principle. For, ensuring the equal liberty of the least favoured in a given context might 
imply very little savings or no savings for the future generations and “[t]here is no way for 
later generations to help the situation of the least fortunate earlier generation.”50This is no 
violation of justice as the flow of economic benefit is one directional in history. That is to say, 
the present generations cannot make the past generation economically better. For Rawls, 
justice or injustice pertains to how institutions deal with natural limitations.51 
A just savings principle is to be adopted by making some compensating adjustments in the 
original position. The veil of ignorance is complete in the original position as the contracting 
parties do not know to which generation they belong or the economic status of their 
generation. However, here there is a problem that runs contrary to the motivation for savings. 
Since the original position takes the present time of entry interpretation,52 the parties may find 
no motivation for saving for future generations, as they are contemporaries. To overcome this 
difficulty, Rawls makes an adjustment to the original position. He assumes the contracting 
parties to be representing family lines who have gained from their predecessors and are 
willing to save for their descendants. 
So to achieve a reasonable result, we assume first, that the parties represent family 
lines, say, who care at least about their more immediate descendants; and second, 
that the principle adopted must be such that they wish all earlier generations to have 
followed it. These constraints, together with the veil of ignorance, are to insure that 
anyone generation looks out for all.53 
For Rawls, “[...] a savings principle is a rule that assigns an appropriate rate (or range of 
rates) to each level of advance, that is, a rule that determines a schedule of rates.”54 Therefore, 
there will be different rate of savings for different stages. And once the just institutions are 
established and the first principle of justice (equal liberty principle) is achieved, the savings 
rate falls to zero. Rawls holds that the schedule of savings cannot be fixed. However, certain 
motivational and ethical guidelines can be followed in piecing together this schedule. Firstly, 
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the parties should consider themselves to be fathers. Secondly, they must balance the savings 
for the immediate sons and grandsons against what they have inherited from the immediate 
fathers and forefathers. “When they arrive at the estimate that seems fair from both sides, with 
due allowance made for the improvement in circumstances, then the fair rate (or range of 
rates) for that stage is specified. Once this is done for all stages, the just savings principle is 
defined.”55 
5.3.2 Just Savings in Political Liberalism 
In his second major work, Political Liberalism, Rawls revised his principle of just 
savings. The revised just savings principle is based on a revision of the original position. In 
Political Liberalism, Rawls introduces the notion of a thicker veil of ignorance.56 The 
understanding of the original position in Theory of Justice, as we discussed it in the previous 
chapter, is a thinner original position where there was no rational impetus for the parties to 
agree on a just savings principle. In order to solve this issue, Rawls introduced the 
motivational assumption of the contracting parties representing family lines, whereby they 
care for their descendants. 
In the thicker understanding of original position in Political Liberalism, Rawls 
eliminates the possibility of the parties refusing to agree on a just savings principle and 
replaces the familial motivational assumption with a rational motivation. In the thicker 
original position, the contracting parties are contemporaries, but they do not know the present 
state of the society and they have no knowledge of the present stock of natural resources, 
productive assets or the level of technology.57Rawls formulates the thicker original position 
likewise: “And so we arrive at a thicker rather than a thinner veil of ignorance: the parties are 
to be understood so far as possible solely as moral persons and in abstraction from 
contingencies. To be fair, the initial situation treats the parties symmetrically, for as moral 
persons they are equal: the same relevant properties qualify everyone.”58 In the thicker 
original position, when the parties agree on how to treat each other and the future generations, 
they will have to be rationally considerate to the factors of historical accident and social 
contingency found within the basic structure.59 As such, there is no rational provision for the 
parties to evade their agreeing to a principle of just savings. Conversely, it means that all 
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generations will have saved for the generations to come. This becomes another rational 
requisite of each generation to save for the following generation. That is to say, because we 
have received from the preceding generations, it is rationally warranted that we save for the 
following generations. Thus in Political Liberalism, the motivational assumption for just 
savings has been shifted from the caring principle to a rational assumption.  
The content of justice must be discovered by reason [...] since society is a 
system of cooperation between generations over time, a principle for savings is 
required. Rather than imagine a (hypothetical and nonhistorical) direct 
agreement between all generations, the parties can be required to agree to a 
savings principle subject to the further condition that they must want all previous 
generations to have followed it. Thus the correct principle is that which the 
members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the one their 
generation is to follow and as the principle they would want preceding 
generations to have followed (and later generations to follow), no matter how far 
back (or forward) in time.60 
Rawls holds that the revised understanding of the original position and the just savings 
principle removes the difficulty of the parties not being forced to agree on a rate of just 
savings. The condition of all preceding generations having agreed on a just savings principle 
had found no mention in Theory of Justice.61 
 
5.3.3 Just Savings in Justice as Fairness 
Rawls has reinstated his revised understanding of the just savings principle further in 
his Justice as Fairness. The difference between Theory of Justice and Justice as Fairness, in 
Rawls own words, is that in Theory of Justice it was not required of the previous generations 
to have followed the savings rule.62 However, it is rationally binding on all generations in 
Justice as Fairness. In Justice as Fairness Rawls clarifies the conditions of the veil of 
ignorance necessary for the just savings principle. “Along with other conditions on the 
original position, the veil of ignorance removes differences in bargaining advantages, so that 
in this and other respects the parties are symmetrically situated. Citizens are represented 
solely as free and equal persons: as those who have to the minimum sufficient degree the two 
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moral powers and other capacities enabling them to be normal cooperating members of 
society over a complete life. By situating the parties symmetrically, the original position 
respects the basic precept of formal equality [...].”63 This position is a vantage point for a 
rational agreement on the savings rate. The contractors’ agreement now is subject to the 
condition that all previous generations should have followed the same savings principle. 
The correct principle, then, is one the members of any generation (and so all 
generations) would adopt as the principle they would want preceding 
generations to have followed, no matter how far back in time. Since no 
generation knows its place among the generations, this implies that all later 
generations, including the present one, are to follow it. In this way we arrive at a 
savings principle that grounds our duties to other generations: it supports 
legitimate complaints against our predecessors and legitimate expectations about 
our successors.64 
 In Justice as Fairness, Rawls has also distinguished between the difference 
principle and the just savings principle. The difference principle holds within a 
generation whereas the latter holds between generations. The difference principle does 
not require continual economic progress over time, whereas the just savings is necessary 
to set the conditions to establish and preserve the just basic structure of the society. 
5.3.4 Commentators on Rawls’ Views on Intergenerational Justice 
Lukas Meyer thinks that Rawls’ original difficulty with the previous generations not 
having to save for the following generation was a problem of non-ideal theory.65 Original 
position being an ideal theory, there can be no issue of non-compliance or partial compliance, 
since strict compliance with whatever principles are agreed upon is obligatory.66Meyer holds 
that it is this loophole in Theory of Justice that Rawls fixes in his later writings.67 
Meyer also identifies two stages of just savings in Rawls’s theory, namely, the 
accumulation stage and the steady state stage.68We have seen that in Theory of Justice, Rawls 
is not specific about the rate of savings and he thinks it is impossible to define the precise rate 
                                                          
63 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 87. 
64 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 160. 
65 See Meyer 2015. 
66 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 144-45; See also Meyer 2015. 
67 See, Meyer 2015. 
68 Meyer 2015. 
173 
of such a savings. He only recommends that extremes should be avoided. Imagining 
themselves to be fathers, the contracting parties are to decide on the amount of savings. And 
the just savings rate will fall to zero when just institutions are established. Meyer calls the 
savings period as the accumulation stage and the stage where the rate of savings falls to zero 
as the steady state stage.69 
Stephan Wolf (2010) looks at the Rawlsian intergenerational justice from the viewpoint 
of the difference principle and identifies a problem of intertemporality, of which Rawls 
himself was aware.70Attention to the future generations is necessary given the assumptions of 
the difference principle. Since the difference principle wants the resources to be allocated to 
the benefit of the least well off in the society in the current generation, it is likely that very 
little savings are possible and adequate resources are not maintained for the benefit of the 
future generations. For, the first generation cannot be blamed for consuming the resources in 
order to facilitate equal liberty for all and to make the worst-off better off. This eliminates the 
very scope for progress too. As Wolf (2010) has observed, from the viewpoint of a sustained 
progressive growth of humanity, the first generation is the worst off among all generations. 
This would mean that the future generations would have to transfer back resources to the 
earlier generations, which is physically not possible.71 Thus the difference principle confronts 
the problem of intertemporality faced by any reciprocity-based theory of justice. The problem 
of intertemporality is that no member of the current society can enter into a co-operative 
scheme with the future generations. While the present generation can be influential in 
conditioning the well-being of the future generations, say, by reducing their options, the 
future generations can reciprocate nothing to the past generation acting retroactively.72 
Wolf also holds that the just savings principle of Rawls is revealing an argumentative 
weakness of Rawls. Wolf (2010) opines that Rawls has been criticized much for postulating 
an altruistic motivation rather than a rational one.73Rawls switching over to altruistic 
motivation like caring for the descendants makes his rational grounds slippery. It is argued 
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that while the entire project of Rawls is to establish rational foundations for justice, he slips 
out of this ground when it comes to intergenerational justice and lands up on altruistic 
grounds. As Wolf puts it, “[...] he ad hoc had to assume altruism for the intergenerational 
case, whereas he explicitly demanded people to be self-interested in the intra-generational 
case.”74It is this argumentative weakness that Rawls fixed in Political Liberalism and Justice 
as Fairness by revising his understanding of the original position. 
5.4 Climate Engineering and Intergenerational Justice from the Rawlsian Perspective 
In this section, we shall apply the Rawlsian view of intergenerational justice to assess 
climate engineering in the intergenerational context. Although the issue of intergenerational 
justice is very complex in regard to climate engineering and there are diverse models for 
approaching this issue, we look at it strictly from the viewpoint of Rawls. This approach is 
necessitated by the lead questions of this research in general and of this chapter in particular. 
It is true that the Rawlsian theory does not lay down specific rules of intergenerational justice 
for dealing with a particular issue like climate change as his theory pertains to justice at the 
level of the basic structure of the society. However, Rawls does provide a unique and sound 
theoretical frame that can inform the debate on intergenerational justice in climate 
engineering. We are not aiming at a critical modification of the Rawlsian theory or to assess 
the strengths and weaknesses of Rawls with regard to climate engineering and 
intergenerational justice, though certain such observations will be figuring in the outlook 
section in the concluding chapter of this study.75 Here our precise focus is to see if climate 
engineering can meet the requirements of the Rawlsian scheme of intergenerational justice. 
We assume this to be an original contribution to advance the debate, as hitherto there is no 
systematic and detailed engagement between any specific theoretical model of 
intergenerational justice, let alone Rawls, and climate engineering. 
As we have seen, it is characteristic of Rawls to draw his principles of justice from the 
thought experiment of the original position. This feature of the Rawlsian system is evidently 
reflected in developing the just savings principle too. Further, the just savings principle has 
an instrumental and procedural role as well, as it is envisaged to be facilitating the promotion 
of the two fundamental principles of justice in the Rawlsian scheme, namely, the equal liberty 
principle and the difference principle. Just savings can be dispensed with when these 
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principles are actualised in the society. Hence, a comprehensive application of the just 
savings principle - the flagship of the Rawlsian intergenerational justice –entails recourse to 
the hypothetical foundation and final objective of this principle, namely, the original position 
and the principle of equal liberty. While we will be dwelling significantly on the just savings 
principle, our analysis draws fruitful resources for appropriating climate engineering from the 
overall theoretical scheme of Rawls. This clarifies our recourse to the original position and 
the equal liberty principle in applying his views to a particular issue like climate engineering. 
That is to say, we find the general frame of the Rawlsian theory equally helpful for 
appropriating climate engineering along with the just savings principle of intergenerational 
justice.76 We ask, what is the rational desirability of climate engineering under the veil of 
ignorance? Asked to choose, which of the two– mitigation or climate engineering – will the 
parties in the original position find better facilitate intergenerational justice? What are the 
implications and suggestions of the just savings principle for the issue of intergenerational 
justice in climate engineering? 
5.4.1 Climate Engineering and the Original Position under the Veil of Ignorance 
It should be stated at the outset that any intersection between Rawls and the climate 
engineering debate is possible if only we move some of the strict constraints of the thicker 
original position. In the thicker original position, the contracting parties do not know the 
present state of society, of the present stock of natural resources, productive assets or the 
level of technology.77 We assume that for a meaningful deliberation on the principles of the 
contract in the context of climate change we input the most essential information regarding 
the dangers of climate change and the scope of climate engineering to the contracting parties. 
As we discussed in chapter 4,78 primary goods in Rawls will certainly include the 
environment, natural resources and healthy climatic conditions. The rational decisions in the 
original position should pertain to the distribution of these goods as well. The ideal original 
position is a vantage point for formulating just principles that are rationally justifiable. As 
Rawls argues, “The content of justice must be discovered by reason: that is, by solving the 
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agreement problem posed by the original position.”79 There is a tacit presupposition among 
some ethicists that in the intergenerational context, the future generations will be better off 
than the current generation.80 This thinking could lead to an asymmetry of policies between 
generations. Hoping the future generations to be richer, the present generation may squander 
away more resource without feeling obliged to the future generations. It can be seen that 
original position does not provide room for such asymmetries. In the original position all 
contracting parties are contemporaries and there is no separation between present and future 
generations. 
Let us postulate a situation where the contracting parties who are unaware of their social 
positions but aware of the global problem of climate change and the scope of mitigation and 
climate engineering at its present phase venture on deciding rational principles of justice for 
every generation. They consider climate as a primary good and envisage a sustainable good 
climate for the present and future generations. Though they are self-interested, they have no 
pre-conceived agenda to safeguard, as they are unaware as to which generation they would 
belong. What would be the strategy they would agree to? Intuition tells us that a decision 
under the veil of ignorance would go for the normal course of averting dangerous climate 
change. For, it is to be recollected that many arguments for climate engineering recommend 
climate engineering due to pragmatic difficulties associated with a conservative solution like 
changing life-style in mitigation. The veil of ignorance removes this difficulty against 
conservative choices. To cite Rawls again, “[...] the veil of ignorance removes differences in 
bargaining advantages.”81The natural resistance of the present generation to restructuring the 
policies, practices and life-style in order to restore the global temperature to 20C from the 
preindustrial age will be almost absent in the original position. The force of the difficulty 
with the change-of-life-style argument against mitigation gets weakened as they consider the 
possibility that they need not necessarily belong to the current generation. The force of the 
economic feasibility argument in favour of climate engineering weakens as they consider the 
benefits of mitigation over the ages and the huge amount of money required for sustained 
climate engineering and its long-term impact for about 500-1000 years given the possibility 
that they may belong to one such future generation, and the huge amount of compensation 
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they will have to set apart for those who will be harmed by climate engineering for 
generations to come. 
Viewed from this perspective, it could be seen that much impetus for climate engineering 
may be drawn from the “generational selfishness”82 of the present generation as it looks at 
climate change from its relative temporal position. The original position removes this 
constraint on the contracting parties.To substantiate our claim, let us imagine this scenario: 
We input the findings of a recent study on mitigation to the veil of ignorance of the parties. A 
study by Azar and Schneider (2002)83 concluded that the cost of achieving a reduction in 
emission by 75-90% by 2100 would be 3-6% of the global GNP in this century. However, 
looking ahead, they estimate that even if the world has to forego temporarily a growth of 
otherwise 6% GNP for the sake of mitigation, still the world will be 10 times richer in 
2102.Though the first finding (3-6% reduction in global GNP in this century) seems to weigh 
heavily against mitigation, the second finding (world being ten times richer in 2102) 
alleviates this negative weight. As Azar and Schneider (2002) hold: “[…] since […] global 
income grows by 2–3% per year, […the] abatement cost would be overtaken after a few years 
of income growth. Thus, the cost of ‘climate insurance’ amounts to ‘only’ a couple of years 
delay in achieving very impressive growth in per capita income levels.”84 
Though the fear of belonging to this generation may move some of the contracting parties 
to make a choice against mitigation, the chances of belonging to the next generation remove 
this fear. Thus the original position transcends the limits of any narrow temporal framework 
in assessing the mitigation. Rather than opting for an artificial solution, which is irrevocable, 
the parties will find it more rational to make a short-term adjustment to the existing 
distribution of the primary goods in order to accommodate the demands of mitigation, which 
will then be self-sustainable.  
The overarching temporal framework of all generations present at the original position 
redefines the normative time scales in climate change debate. What is considered as short 
term in the present context may become long term and the long term may become short-term 
in the original position. For instance, mitigation, considered only from the point of view of 
the current generation is a long-term measure and climate engineering is a short-term 
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exercise, as claimed by the proponents of climate engineering. The weight of the 
differentiation between the long-term and the short-term will differ within the wider 
framework of the original position when applied to the entire generations. The original 
position thus removes the limitations of the relative advantages or disadvantages of temporal 
positioning of the parties in the climate change debates today.85 Entering into the climate 
change debate with the present generation as the entry point poses major conceptual 
constraints to the debate, and proposals like climate engineering get undue mileage from such 
constraints. The analogy of the original position provides a more objective frame for such 
debates. From the original position’s perspective, it appears that climate engineering, as a 
first option for averting dangerous climate change would find it hard to withstand the test of 
rational critical scrutiny. 
The element of conservation emphasised by the argument from planetary obligation86 – a 
main contender for intergenerational justice – is implicit in the original position. Contracting 
parties are likely to agree on the condition of the planet they are to inherit that in every 
generation it should be as good as in the original condition. Now, if they choose to 
geoengineer by means of SRM, the presence of the accumulating CO2 in the atmosphere does 
not assure the original health of the planet in future and choosing in favour of climate 
engineering would not be rational.  
The original position holds that parties leave to future generations at least the equivalent 
resources they inherited from the preceding generation. Viewed against this assumption, 
climate engineering does not seem to be a viable option at least for two reasons. Firstly, 
deploying SRM climate engineering would mean the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere 
even though the global temperature may be temporarily lowered. In this case, the quality of 
planet left for future generations is not the same as the one inherited by the present 
generation. Secondly, some of the CDR techniques are loaded with dangerous side-effects 
due to increased alkalinity of the ocean. It will lead to reduction in the ocean yield. The 
reduced ocean yield means we do not hand over the oceans resources to the future generation 
in the way we have inherited them. Thus it implies a violation of the just handing over of the 
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resources to the future generations. It can be seen, thus, that rational choice does not permit 
even some of the CDR techniques like ocean acidification being considered. Further, 
preserving the ocean resources for future generations would imply moderate fishing. 
Moderate fishing is a choice against overconsumption and therefore a gesture towards 
changing the ways of life. Refusal to change the ways of life is the cause of the dangerous 
climate change that necessitates mitigation. Thus moderate fishing will be a rationally better 
choice than staking the quality of the ocean resources due to increased alkalinity of the ocean 
by some CDR techniques. Given a choice between climate engineering and mitigation in the 
original position, the rational parties are likely to cast their vote in favour of mitigation for 
fear of the uncertain world of climate engineering. Rational choices founded on human nature 
will have the distinct preference for a certain scenario over an uncertain one. 
Further, given the inclination of the parties to avoid a generation where they may be 
worst off, they are likely to take a decision that is most risk-free. As the consumerist critiques 
of Rawls’ original position have argued, under the veil of ignorance, the parties are likely to 
avoid as much risks as possible.87 Behind the Rawlsian veil, the behaviour of the people 
could be such that they will act as “infinitely risk averse.”88Lack of exact information will 
lead to a rational option for equal distribution of available positions. This principle is known 
as the rule of insufficient reason.89 Using the rule of insufficient reason coupled with the 
standard economic assumption of risk neutrality,90 the parties behind the veil would consent 
to reducing the emissions than going for a risk-prone technical fix for climate change. 
Revisiting the lesser evil argument from the original position, it could be argued that the 
contracting parties are likely to do away with a risk inviting decision by preferring to be on 
the safer side of mitigation. Avoiding uncertainties and risks for the future implies that the 
parties hold on to mitigation rather than deciding in favour of climate engineering. This 
means that there is no room for the lesser evil argument in the original position. 
Looking at the Rawlsian intergenerational justice from the original position, Edith 
Brown Weiss finds a rationale for an intergenerational obligation upon every generation:  
In order to define what intergenerational equity then means, it is useful to view 
the human community as a partnership encompassing all generations, the 
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purpose of which is to realize and protect the well-being of every generation and 
to conserve the planet for the use of all generations. Although all generations are 
members of this partnership, no generation knows in advance when it will be 
living, how many members it will have, or even how many generations there 
will be. It is appropriate to adopt the perspective of a generation which is placed 
somewhere on the spectrum of time, but does not know in advance where . . . . 
Such a generation would want to receive the planet in at least as good condition 
as every other generation receives it and to be able to use it for its own benefit. 
This requires that each generation pass on the planet in no worse condition than 
received and have equitable access to its resources.91 
5.4.2 Climate Engineering and the Principle of Equal Liberties 
The Rawlsian principle of equal liberties, which we have discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter,92 also provides a normative tool for appropriating intergenerational justice 
in climate engineering. Is climate engineering compatible with the Rawlsian principle of 
equal liberties? It is our contention that the freedom of the future generations is largely at 
stake if climate engineering, especially sulphate aerosol geoengineering (SAG), is deployed. 
In the Rawlsian scheme, the contracting parties in the hypothetical original position include 
the representatives of the future generations. The agreement that they rationally choose 
should uphold the freedom and liberty of all generations to come. Citizens of the generations 
belonging to the future are free if and only if nothing constrains their freedom in accessing 
the primary goods on parity. It can be seen that the freedom and liberty of the future 
generations will be largely conditioned by SAG at least on three counts. 
Firstly, once deployed, the future generations have no choice but to carry on with 
SAG, failing which they will be confronted with the drastic consequences of the termination 
effect. Studies have shown that SAG, if deployed, will have to be carried on for five hundred 
to thousand years.93 According to Vaughan and Timothy (2011): “[A] significant fraction of 
the effect will need to be maintained for >1,000 years, because approximately 20% of the 
CO2 added to the atmosphere is only removed by natural sedimentation and weathering 
                                                          
91 Edith Brown Weiss, “Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity and International Law: An Introductory 
Note,” 15 Climatic Change 15 (1989): 327-335; Edith Brown Weiss, “Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity 
and International Law,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 9 (2008): 615-627. 
92 See Chapter 4; 4.3.3. 
93 Dianne Dumanoski, Resisting the Dangerous Allure of Global Warming Technofixes, YALE ENV’T 360, 
Available at http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_dangerous_allure_of_global_warming_technofixes/2224/. 
Accessed Nov. 21, 2015.  
181 
processes on timescales of 10,000 to 1,000,000 years.”94 And if the SAG is discontinued for 
technological, catastrophic, or policy reasons, a future generation is dragged into a 
catastrophic situation, which may even endanger their survival. Govindasamy et al. (2002) 
has described the consequences of a sudden termination of SAG to be “catastrophic.”95 The 
possibility of sudden termination cannot be ruled out for reasons of technological failure and 
policy decisions.96 Studies have highlighted the dangers of sudden termination: “[S]hould the 
engineered system later fail for technical or policy reasons, the downside is dramatic . . . . 
The climate suppression has only been temporary, and the now CO2-loaded atmosphere 
quickly bites back, leading to severe and rapid climate change with rates up to 20 times the 
current rate of warming of ≈0.2ºC per decade [...]”97 Within thirty years of the termination of 
SAG, there will be a temperature increase of 6-10 degrees Celsius in the winter98 and 7 
degrees in the tropics.99 Projected estimations of the increases in temperature will be 
unparalleled in history.100 A recent study has found that an increase in temperature by 0.1 
degree Celsius per decade will be highly detrimental to most major ecosystems.101 
Here we find the future generation being deprived of the very fundamental principle 
of justice in Rawls, i.e., equal liberty for citizens from different generations. For Rawls, “each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.”102Buck, Ott and Preston also have 
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anticipated a type of lock-in problem103 created particularly by SAG that might dangerously 
restrict future options.104 
There is still a deeper level to the loss of freedom for future generations. Citizens 
pursue their conception of the good aided by primary goods. In distinguishing the primary 
goods into natural and social Rawls maintained that natural primary goods are not under the 
control of the social institutions. It is by assuming the independent existence of the primary 
natural goods that Rawls built up his whole system of justice. Now, with climate engineering, 
defined as “the deliberate manipulation [emphasis added] of the earth systems”105 there arises 
a situation where primary natural goods are no longer freed from the control of social 
systems.106 This is a not a state of affairs that can be tolerated within the Rawlsian scheme. 
With climate engineering social institutions within one generation are able to dictate the 
condition of natural primary goods of future generations, for instance, by forcing them to 
continue with SRM and by exposing them to the problems of sudden termination. The 
conditioning of the natural primary goods means that future generations are deprived not only 
of their freedom but also of the very fabric of freedom within the Rawlsian scheme of justice. 
That is to say, future generations will not only have limited freedom, but also the primary 
goods for facilitating their conception of the good of freedom in future will be impoverished.  
Secondly, it can be reasonably argued that given the dangerous consequences of a 
sudden termination, SAG may not be discontinued, and conversely, sustained SAG would 
lead to dangerous consequences at several regions of the world, especially those regions that 
are economically worse off, a concern of distributive justice, which we discussed in the 
previous chapter. That even a single nation can develop and deploy climate engineering on its 
own increases the chances of the adverse and irrevocable side effects for other regions. This 
would deprive several future citizens off their ability to participate in the well-ordered 
society, a development least reconcilable with the principle of equality of freedom and 
liberty. 
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Thirdly, if the fear of the moral hazard issue, discussed in the third chapter on 
literature review,107turns out to be realistic, it will be the future generations who will bear the 
brunt of this slippery slope. The deceptive conviction created by climate engineering that 
there is a magic bullet to avert the climate change will water down the efforts at mitigation 
and adaptation. The “premature conviction”108 of the present generation gives them an easy 
outlet to evade their moral responsibility to change their life-styles, and if climate engineering 
is not as effective as expected, the whole burden of the compounded dangers is placed on 
future generations. The moral hazard issue too thus sets serious limits to the freedom and 
liberty of the future generations. 
It is clear from various studies that future generations could be exposed to serious 
potential harms resulting from climate engineering.109 If the present generation takes recourse 
to climate engineering to cling on to its ways of living, it could be inflicting serious harms to 
the future generations. It means undue advantage for one generation at the cost of justice to 
future generations. This is not an outcome that can be accommodated in the ideal theory of 
the original position. In the Rawlsian scheme, all contracting generations should rationally 
agree on principles that everybody has equal access to the primary goods of the society. In 
dialoguing between climate engineering and Rawls, it can be seen that the issues of 
responsibility abdication, lock-in problem, passing the buck, etc., have no place in the 
Rawlsian scheme of intergenerational justice and any chances of such loopholes is a matter of 
non-ideal theory. As Rawls puts it: “[...] persons in different generations have duties and 
obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it 
pleases but is bound by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define 
justice between persons at different moments of time. In addition, men have a natural duty to 
uphold and to further just institutions [...].”110 
Accordingly, there is very little desirability for climate engineering in its present 
manner within the ambit of the Rawlsian intergenerational justice. Svoboda et al. (2011) also 
confirm our conclusion: “Further, Rawlsian intergenerational justice also requires that any 
socio-economic inequality among future persons benefit all future persons (including the 
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worst off), but discontinuous SAG could cause economic damages for future persons that 
increase socio-economic inequality without benefiting all.”111 
5.4.3 The Just Savings Principle and Climate Engineering 
5.4.3.1 The Primacy of the Primary Good of Environment 
The context of climate change gives a deeper nuance to the concept of just savings in 
Rawls. Although Rawls did not think of just savings in an ecological setting, the notion 
becomes more foundational and substantive in this context. While Rawls recommended just 
savings as a means to the establishment of just institutions, in the context of climate change, 
saving the climate becomes foundational, as environment is a primary natural good. In the 
climatic context, it appears so that one of the basic structures of the society itself needs to be 
saved for prospect of every other basic structure in future. Primary goods in Rawls like 
opportunity, money, knowledge, skills, etc., are meaningful only in a healthy environmental 
context. As for the human body, the natural good of health has primacy over other social 
goods like shelter and clothing. So too, for justice, saving the environment for future is more 
primary than saving material resources, forming consensus on a saving rate, or creating a 
contingency fund for establishing just basic structures. It is a primary saving which will be 
justified by altruistic as well as rational norms. 
In the setting of climate change, the contracting parties in the original position are likely 
to discuss the content and object of saving prior to the rate of saving. In the climatic context, 
holding a rational discussion under the veil of ignorance exclusively on the saving rate in 
order to facilitate the establishment of just institutions in future, overlooking the dangers of 
climate change, seems irrational. The primary content of the savings will be the environment 
itself.  
Once the primacy of the primary good of environment is acknowledged by the parties, a 
natural rational decision for the environment or a saving meant for the environment will be 
towards the sustained maintenance of quality environment rather than saving for a technical 
fix to the environment, which is a temporary solution. Now, saving the primary structure of 
the environment means safeguarding oceans, forests and glaciers, and cultivable land. 
Therefore, acknowledging the primacy of the primary good of environment is likely to lead 
the parties to a radical consensus that will avoid any dangerous climate change in future that 
will have to invoke mitigation, or, let alone climate engineering. However, given the present-
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time entry interpretation of the original position, if at all the contracting parties have to agree 
on a saving rate for avoiding dangerous climate change, it is likely to be towards sustained 
mechanisms for saving the climate than for any temporal technical fix, for in an ideal state of 
mind detached from hidden motives, as in the original position, human nature does not 
confuse between the perennial and the temporal.  
Now, does climate engineering have the potential to save the primary good of 
environment for the establishment of just institutions in society? If climate engineering were 
a full-proof technique for averting dangerous climate change we could have treated it as the 
best contribution of this generation to the future fulfilling the criterion of the Rawlsian just 
savings. However, the perceived side-effects, potential risks and speculated harms112 
associated with this technology do not entitle climate engineering as a legitimate candidate 
for this title. As per the available scientific estimations, climate engineering has several 
adverse side-effects whereby the above mentioned ecological values will be compromised in 
future. Rational choices demand that parties in the original position who are keen to ensure 
justice to all generations out of fear of belonging to an unlucky generation will allocate the 
resources such a way that they avoid the conditions that would cause the loss of the natural 
primary good of healthy environment rather than first risking the health of the environment 
and then following it up with a dubious technical solution. In other words, the just savings 
principle in the original position will address the root cause of dangerous climate change 
rather than treating its consequences. This takes us to the point of major contention between 
the proponents and opponents of climate engineering, as discussed in the third chapter,113 that 
climate engineering treats the symptoms of climate change rather than the root cause. The 
Rawlsian just savings principle has an implicit preference for treating the root cause over the 
symptoms. Therefore, a rational just savings decision would favour savings for maintaining 
the conditions of a healthy environment – the strategy of mitigation –rather than saving for 
the research and development of climate engineering technologies.  
This observation does suggest something about the present-day debate on mitigation as 
well. Favouring a saving for maintaining the conditions of a healthy environment for future 
generations is the implicit motivational assumption behind the present strategies coined in the 
context of climate change, like the carbon fund, the contingency fund, compensation by the 
developed nations to the developing and underdeveloped nations based on differentiated 
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responsibility, funding for developing renewable energy resources and reducing fossil fuel 
consumption, as reflected in the Kyoto and the Paris agreement. The agenda of reducing the 
consumption of non-renewable energy sources, say for instance, crude oil, has the double 
advantage of saving such resources for future generations as well as saving the conditions for 
a healthy environment for future generation. Thus, the just savings principle of Rawls is 
tacitly subsumed in many of the present mitigation strategies evolving from international 
climate change summits. 
Now, the professed claim of the hard-core advocates of climate engineering is that the 
economic feasibility of climate engineering can save the nations from the challenging 
constraints of the demands of mitigation. But on a critical scrutiny it could be argued that 
while it promises to avoid the constraints of mitigation, it offers no real solution to the 
dangers of climate change. Climate engineering deceptively claims that the present 
generation can do away with the obligations to the future generations, or in the Rawlsian 
terms, it can evade the just savings at least in the context of climate change. In the Rawlsian 
theoretical frame of intergenerational justice, climate engineering is not only incompatible 
with the just savings principle, but it also runs contrary to the aspects of the just savings 
currently exercised in the society. Therefore, in the Rawlsian scheme of intergenerational 
justice, there is little rational force for climate engineering to be a choice for the contracting 
parties to comply with the just savings principle. 
5.4.3.2 Weighing the Family Line Argument 
It is our contention that the family line argument of just savings in Theory of Justice 
has the potential for redressing the root cause of dangerous climate change and as such it will 
partly eliminate the need for climate engineering by removing some of the conceptual 
difficulties with mitigation. Rawls had modified his original idea of the just savings principle 
to make it rationally more credible by removing its altruistic motivation. However, the 
scientific wisdom of five decades since the Theory of Justice seems to inform something 
otherwise. An altruistic principle gets better rational respectability in the scientific worldview 
today. In the Rawlsian understanding of rationality in the original position, the parties are 
self-interested and mutually disinterested. This idea of rationality that Rawls assumes in his 
theory seems to be old fashioned, as it does not absorb the imposing tenets of the 
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anthropology emerging from the latest scientific findings, especially in neuroscience.114 
Organisms are structured as to care for the other. The organic and biological continuity of 
species is also based on principles of “altruism.” Contemporary biological and neurological 
sciences speak of the genes of altruism.115Thus the Rawlsian motivation as caring for the 
descendants is not without its rational support. Today altruism appears to be a sound 
biological and anthropological factor. Therefore, the mutual disinterest among parties 
postulated by Rawls so as to make his theory ideally rational does not seem all that necessary. 
Probably, the present scientific anthropology provides a better framework for fixing this 
apparent argumentative weakness in Rawls. This justifies us in using the original 
motivational assumption of care for just savings in our assessment of the desirability of 
climate engineering.116 
These observations give us a direct allusion to the care ethics. The new 
anthropological dimensions outlined above are considered by Christ Gastmans as essential 
for care ethics: “Ethics of care stands for a unique normative perspective from which human 
behavior can be interpreted and evaluated. In order to have normative power, ... care ethics 
needs an explicit anthropological basis – a view of mankind that underlies care. This explicit 
anthropological basis helps us to clarify concepts closely related to care ethics such as 
vulnerability, interdependence, care, responsibility, relational autonomy, dignity, 
personhood.”117 Gastmans thinks that relational and contextual embeddedness of the ethical 
issues is the central factor in care ethics.118 Tronto gives four dimensions of care, namely, the 
attitude of caring about, taking care, care giving and care receiving. Caring about refers to the 
concern for the conditions of a suffering fellow human and taking care means assuming the 
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responsibility to provide care. Care giving requires necessary competence and attentiveness. 
Care receiving is the responsiveness of the care receiver to the care giver.119 Gastmans holds 
that care as a virtue must be distinguished from emotional involvement. For care involves 
cognitive, affective and motivational components.120 
Does the revised understanding of care as a rational motivation for just savings 
suggest anything to the debate between mitigation and climate engineering? We think, in the 
ecological context, the motivation of care does serve a double purpose. Firstly, the parties 
decide to preserve the natural resources for their immediate descendants out of their caring 
attitude for their immediate descendants. Secondly, there is an added impetus for preserving 
the natural resources in this perspective. That is to say, as the old Darwinian model of the tree 
of life is getting replaced by the new metaphor of the web of life – a metaphor which speaks 
of the interconnectedness of living beingsand the biological continuity of species - each 
organism in particular and nature in general are intrinsically entitled to care and protection. 
This takes us to another major argument in the climate engineering context, which is the deep 
ecology argument. As we have seen in chapter three, deep ecology holds that ecological crisis 
is a consequence of our overconsumption and failure to care for nature. It means that the 
current generation, in the Rawlsian terms has not been caring enough. Many ecological 
writers have stated that the masculine value system empowered by machine and materialistic 
attitude towards nature is responsible for the ecological disasters.121In the Rawlsian 
perspective, the fatherly motivation is concerned only with the welfare of the future 
humanity. However, as we have argued above, the emerging tenets of an evolutionary view 
of life with its emphasis on altruism, harmony and the human relatedness to the rest of the 
species would expand the range of “caring” to the non-humans and to nature in general. The 
Rawlsian perspective of the just savings in its original version of the parties representing 
family lines has the potential to address the root cause of the ecological crisis. Since climate 
engineering is often treated as a technical fix, treating the symptom over the root cause, the 
caring motivation will conversely rule out the need for climate engineering. Therefore, from 
the Rawlsian perspective of the just savings in its original conception, there is no choice 
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between mitigation and climate engineering; rather, the chances of creating dangerous 
climatic conditions that warrant climate engineering are eliminated. 
5.4.3.3 Interrupting the Progressive Ascent of Justice 
As we have discussed above, a major force of the just savings principle revised by 
Rawls in his later writings122is that the parties ought to save for their descendants because 
their predecessors had saved it for them. Thus just savings is meant to serve the final goal of 
justice, that is, the establishment of just institutions. Refusal to comply with mitigation, 
viewed from the perspective of the Rawlsian just savings principle, raises questions on the 
moral identity of the present generation. Each generation, in the Rawlsian scheme, is 
envisaged to be both as a recipient as well as a giver. The goal of economic and social 
development as the establishment of justice is to be seen as a continuous, cumulative and 
dynamic process in which all generations are responsible partakers. Any generation refusing 
to assume its responsibility would obstruct the progressive ascent of social and economic 
benefits and thereby interrupt the continuum of justice marching towards the establishment of 
just institutions. Such an obstruction to the normal course of the continuum of justice is 
irreconcilable with what Rawls holds as “[...] natural duty to uphold and to further just 
institutions [...].”123Any lethargy inflicted to the progressive movement of justice cannot 
uphold the ideal of intergenerational justice of viewing “[...] human community as a 
partnership encompassing all generations [...].”124Refusal to mitigate or an option for a 
technical fix will earmark the present generation as ungrateful receivers or as selfish takers, 
instead of being responsible givers. Refusing to take the conservative position of changing 
life-styles would mean that with the current generation, the flow of justice as a dynamic and 
ongoing continuum is broken. Thus the just savings principle, literally as a principle of 
savings, is opposed to overconsumption, which is said to be the root cause of the climatic 
change.  
Rawls always looks at the just savings principle within a historical continuum. This is 
a principle, which all preceding generations will have followed and the following generations 
will be following. To cite Rawls again, “The correct principle, then, is one the members of 
any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the principle they would want 
preceding generations to have followed, no matter how far back in time. Since no generation 
knows its place among the generations, this implies that all later generations, including the 
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present one, are to follow it.”125 Assessing climate change historically, we find the epithet 
‘anthropogenic’ itself as suggestive of a deviation from the ideal values of the just savings in 
our present phase of evolution. It is a more or less accepted view that the exponential 
economic progress beginning with industrial revolution has led to excessive consumption of 
natural resources against the moderate use of the same in the pre-industrial age. The 
excessive patterns of consumption resulted in many developed nations overshooting their 
eco-footprint and bio-capacity. In the Rawlsian terms, without subscribing to the extremities 
of ecological fundamentalism, we could legitimately observe that the present generation 
significantly deviated from the correct principle that was faithfully followed by the preceding 
generations. Resorting to climate engineering as a rectification to our historical deviation, 
even if it is successfully developed and employed, does not seem to restore the historical 
continuity of the correct path of development based on the revised just savings principle. 
Applying the Rawlsian just savings principle to the climate engineering debate, we 
find that the arguments of the opponents of climate engineering like “responsibility 
abdication” and “passing the buck” get greater rational and ethical plausibility from the point 
of view of intergenerational justice. It shows that in an ideal theory of intergenerational 
justice, the theory rectified by Rawls with his thick veil of ignorance, a justification for 
climate engineering and any preference for climate engineering over mitigation becomes very 
much dubious.  
5.4.3.4 Steady State Stage ever Attainable? 
In Rawls, what commands the present generation’s obligations to future generations is 
defined as, “the conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over 
time.”126The just savings principle is one of such conditions to preserve a just basic structure 
over time. Rawls holds that just savings can be discontinued once just institutions are 
established and the generations only need to maintain the just basic structure at this steady 
state stage. It is clear that the current generation is still at the accumulation stage. The 
looming threat of dangerous climate change shows that the fate of the present generation is 
far from being safe and steady. If the just institution of a sustainable climate were already 
established there would have been no need for a debate on climate change and climate 
engineering. Applying the just savings principle to the climate engineering debate, it is a 
matter of contention whether steady state stage is ever attainable. There are at least two future 
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scenarios emerging from the deployment of SRM climate engineering that makes the steady 
state stage ever unreachable. Firstly, if SRM is deployed, future generations will have to keep 
on deploying this technology for a very long period for fear of the consequence of sudden 
termination. As long as the primary natural good of a sustainable environment remains 
technology-dependent, it cannot be claimed that just institutions are established, because the 
proposed technology as of now is prone to several risks. Secondly, for hypothetical reasons, 
even if we concede to the argument that SRM can be terminated at a certain stage in the long-
term future, still there is the problem of the impoverishment of the worst off as a result of the 
deployment of SRM for a long period. This issue of distributive justice will have to be 
tackled from the perspective of the difference principle in Rawls. Having to invoke the 
difference principle in the future and having to allocate a significant amount of natural 
resources for the welfare of the least well-off in the society in the future, minimises the scope 
for future societies to reach a steady state stage, or to the minimum, it significantly delays the 
steady state stage. In either case, SRM climate engineering does not seem to be compatible 
with the ultimate objectives of the just savings principle for intergenerational justice. 
The revised version of the just savings principle implied that there is transfer of resources 
from generation to generation. People should leave their descendants at least the equivalent of 
what they received from the preceding generation. Will the parties in the original position 
decide to use freely the natural resources handed over to them and develop the technological 
resource of climate engineering to be handed over to the future generation in order to balance 
the resources they consumed? Now it could be examined, in the setting of climate change, 
which one is more suited to achieving the steady state, whether natural resources at the 
sustainable level or the climate engineering technique as a technical resource to be counted as 
the resource to be transferred to the future generations. If the contracting parties were to make 
a rational choice in this regard, it appears as a straightforward option that they would go for 
natural resources as they are more primary, whereas climate engineering technique can be 
developed any time in future especially given the chances of the availability of more 
advanced technology as society makes progress over time. And if they decide to develop a 
technology to be transferred to the future generations, there is the more proximate scope for 
developing state of the art technologies for tapping renewable energies. Developing 
renewable energy is a step towards mitigation. Further, if they irrationally consider climate 
engineering technology as the resource to be handed over to the future generations, it appears 
that such a choice would violate yet another aspect of the just savings principle, i.e., the 
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preservation of quality: “Each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and 
civilization, and maintain intact (emphasis added) those just institutions that have been 
established [...].”127Having to switch over to climate engineering implies that the quality of 
the institution of nature is not intact. That is to say, if the contracting parties decide to save 
for climate engineering without curtailing emissions, there will be significant increase of the 
CO2 in the atmosphere and the quality of the climate they hand over to the next generation 
will be significantly impoverished.  
It appears that almost every aspect of the Rawlsian view on intergenerational justice 
underscores the primacy of mitigation strategies over a technical fix. So climate engineering 
cannot be considered as a first option in combating climate change.  
5.4.4 Climate Engineering Compatible with Intergenerational Justice? 
It might be argued by the proponents that the Rawlsian system can be compatible with 
intergenerational justice. Here we try to respond to some of such possible argumentsfrom a 
general point of view as well as the from the Rawlsian point of view of just savings.  
It could be asked whether SRM is compatible with intergenerational equity. Would a 
proper governance mechanism make it more compatible with intergenerational equity? We 
must answer in the negative. It can be seen that as of now there is no proper governance 
mechanism over SRM that can ensure that it will be deployed with due regard to 
intergenerational justice.128 Burns (2013) highlights the limits of UNFCCC in governing 
SRM.129 Burns (2011) looks at the existing treaties related to the environment such as 
UNFCCC, ENMOD, and CBD. None of these treaties are found to be adequate to exercise 
governance over climate engineering techniques in a comprehensive manner. Even if there 
was authority under UNFCCC, the absence of political will does not assure the exercise of 
such a mandate. After all, the motive for climate engineering comes from a failure to achieve 
adequate mitigation.130 Although SRM would come under the ENMMOD, the clause on 
‘peaceful purpose’ may be used as legitimising the exercise of SRM. Further, it is a treaty 
with a limited number of subscriptions. Although CBD is already invoked in climate 
engineering experiments (CDR), its resolutions are not legally binding on the parties.131 The 
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limitations of these legal frameworks show that the chances of SRM being deployed without 
ensuring intergenerational justice are high.  
Svoboda et al. consider SRM to be incompatible with intergenerational justice given 
the chances of uneven distribution of harms and benefits of SRM for future generations.132 
Svoboda et al. (2011) use the theoretical models of intergenerational justice in Rawls (1999), 
Dworkin (1981), Wigley (2006) and Sen (1982) and conclude that SRM “would increase the 
harms suffered and decrease the benefits enjoyed by some future persons.”133 Thus even if 
future generations were to be richer because of SRM, still there would be “socio-economic 
inequality between particular future persons.”134 
It may possibly be argued by some proponents that SRM helps restoring the just basic 
structure. SRM will bring the climate to a steady state stage, which only needs to be 
maintained. This argument deserves some respect as it holds legitimacy in the precise context 
of the earth having crossed the tipping points and all our genuine efforts at mitigation are 
proven to be inadequate to avert the imminent catastrophes. Then probably, climate 
engineering, coupled with mitigation, becomes desirable from the Rawlsian perspective as a 
resource to be developed and handed over to future generations. Here future generations are 
enabled to deploy climate engineering in order to tackle the problem of climate catastrophe. 
In the Rawlsian scheme, this scenario may fall under the wider spectrum of the elements of 
just savings covering infrastructure, knowledge and skills.  
However, this argument cannot be stretched out disproportionately in favour of 
climate engineering. Will SRM enable us to handover a basic structure to the future that they 
only need to maintain? We should answer in the negative. Even in the scenario mentioned 
above, climate engineering does not assure future generations that they only need to maintain 
the climate attained by climate engineering. For, the climate restored by climate engineering 
is far from being steady. After all, as long as there is CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere, 
there can be no climatic steady state. If the promotion of the just basic structure is the norm 
for intergenerational justice, as of now it seems that mitigation is the right strategy.  
Secondly, it could be argued that in Rawls, the just savings principle refers not only to 
material resources, but also to infrastructure, knowledge, skills, etc. Therefore, research and 
development of climate engineering may be treated as a step towards promoting just 
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institutions. This argument seems to be in consonance with the spirit of the just savings 
principle. However, this argument is not freed from the arguments against research and 
development raised by several opponents.135 As Gardiner (2007) has rightly observed, in 
terms of knowledge there may be better technologies, say green energy solutions, which 
could be developed with the funding used for climate engineering research.136For instance, 
suppose the parties in the original position were to be given the finding by McKinsey and 
Associates and Vattenfall Institute in 2010 that if we make massive efforts at developing 
technologies for renewable energy and for enhancing energy efficiency, twenty seven 
gigatons of annual potential carbon dioxide can be abated at a cost of $40 per ton that would 
suffice to stabilize the atmospheric concentrations at 450-550 ppmv.137The parties, given the 
choice for developing climate engineering technologies or alternative energy technologies, 
would likely invest in the latter. So, if given a choice between mitigation and climate 
engineering, it seems mitigation provides better knowledge conditions to establish and 
preserve just basic structures over time. The risk-proneness and the open-ended uncertainties 
associated with this technology do not qualify it to be reliable and firm knowledge. Owing to 
the risk aversive behaviour of the contracting parties in original position, they would prefer to 
go for research and development of green technologies. 
Thirdly, one might argue that we can attain the target of achieving the temperature of  
20C prior to the industrial age through climate engineering and it helps us leave the earth to 
the future in the manner we have received, which would imply compliance with Rawls’ just 
savings principle. It should be noted that from the previous generation we have received the 
total earth and not just earth’s temperature in isolation. Leaving the earth in its ecological 
wholeness to the future generations and leaving an artificially cooled earth are different. To 
quote Keith et al. (2010) again, “it is vital to remember that a world cooled by managing 
sunlight will not be the same as one cooled by lowering emissions.”138 It is our position that 
cooling the earth through climate engineering and handing it over to the next generation do 
not meet the objective of just savings, for two reasons. Firstly, the possibility of an artificial 
technical fix, given the looming scientific uncertainties around it, is not likely to invite 
serious attention of the contracting parties in original position. Secondly, the sustained 
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technical intervention reduces the chances of the society reaching at a steady-state stage. 
Parties in the original position would not consider climate engineering as a natural means “to 
uphold and to further just institutions”139 for from the perspective of original position, the 
anthropogenic climate change itself is a problem, in the Rawlsian terms, of non-ideal theory. 
That is to say, dangerous climate change is the result of non-compliance of present or 
preceding generations with the ideal decisions of the original position. The dangerous climate 
change occurs because parties in the original position did not formulate the ideal principles 
with which they should have been shaping their social interactions. Now envisaging future is 
to go for the ideal way that is formulation of the ideal principles and compliance with the 
ideal terms of the original position. Technical fix in this context is an artificial means that is 
likely to fall outside the purview of the original position. Therefore, from the point of view of 
original position, the preferred means to the restoration of the global temperature to a pre-
industrial state is strict compliance with the rational terms of the original contract.  
In conclusion, though some of the elements of the Rawlsian view of intergenerational 
justice seem to deceptively support climate engineering, on critical scrutiny such arguments 
can be found to be not favouring climate engineering.  
5.5 Recommendations 
Our analysis of the principles of intergenerational justice from the Rawlsian 
perspective has shown that climate engineering poses serious challenges. Highlighting those 
challenges was not meant to show that climate engineering should be ruled out altogether. 
Rather, awareness of those challenges should enable policy makers to approach the topic with 
due caution and to prepare in advance with maximum homework done if climate engineering 
becomes a policy option in future. Accordingly, in tune with our dialogue between Rawls and 
intergenerational justice in climate engineering, we shall make five recommendations for the 
future course of debate in climate engineering.  
Recommendation1.The encounter between climate engineering and Rawls has 
underscored the futility of climate engineering as a Plan A or the best option argument.140 It 
was found that many hard-core exponents of climate engineering present climate engineering 
as the first option in combating climate change. It becomes clear that such extreme views do 
not find favour with an intergenerational scrutiny and they could be founded only on untested 
scientific assumptions, biased philosophical premises, skewed ethical perspectives or even 
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discard of intergenerational concerns. Our analysis in the preceding section has shown that 
the Rawlsian view of intergenerational justice does not endorse the primacy of climate 
engineering over mitigation. If climate engineering is to be resorted to in combating climate 
change, it could be only as a complimentary tool to mitigation and not a substitute for 
mitigation. Better for the climate engineering debate to do away with its megalomaniac 
promises and hubristic rhetoric and begin to engage the issue on more realistic terms. Giving 
away such rhetoric has the pragmatic benefit of eroding the moral hazard challenge. Rather, a 
reverse logic could use the helpless choice of having to resort to a “last resort”141 option like 
climate engineering as a means to aggravate the efforts at mitigation. Thus the clear 
identification of the status of climate engineering in the overall efforts at combating climate 
change has the benefit of turning the tables on the dangers of moral hazard in climate 
engineering.  
Once the status of climate engineering is positioned as supplementary to mitigation, 
being fair to the future generations necessitates affirming the political will for mitigation. The 
political will to mitigation in curbing the emissions in the present generation could be a 
yardstick to measure as to how much political willingness does exist to safeguard the interests 
of the future generations. As of now the picture is very oblique as the contemplation of 
climate engineering itself is due to the lack of political determination at curbing the 
emissions.142 There are reliable predictions that carbon emissions may go up 43% by 2035 
from the levels in 2007.143 The reluctance of the present generation at reduction even in the 
face of such looming immediate threats does not leave us optimistic as to the assurance of 
justice to the future generations. Therefore, any serious deliberation on climate engineering 
should ensure a tangible treaty reflecting a determined political will to curb the emissions. 
Probably, the signing of the historic Paris agreement on the Earth Day on April 22, 2016 by 
175 nations is a small step towards this direction.  
Recommendation 2.We have observed on a couple of times in the preceding chapters 
that the climate engineering debate is heavily skewed towards SRM schemes.144This skewed 
focus on SRM implies more potential harms for future generations. In the choice between 
SRM and CDR techniques against the interest of the future generations, the CDR techniques 
will certainly enjoy the upper hand. The CDR approaches seem to be relatively less 
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challenging to the interests of the future generations, particularly as it involves no termination 
issue. Hence the future course of the debate should seriously consider the recommendations 
made by Royal Society and IPCC to rely on CDR techniques to begin with. 
Recommendation 3.The range of governance mechanism in climate engineering 
should necessarily include the intergenerational concerns. The proposed models of 
governance145 do not dwell significantly on the intergenerational issues. Policy decisions 
formed by a well established governance mechanism may be able to regulate climate 
engineering curbing any chances of complaints like passing the buck, responsibility 
abdication, lock-in problem, and get-out-of-jail-free card. For instance, as Burns (2013) has 
observed, conditioning the deployment of SRM scheme on a scheduled reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions of sufficient magnitude can thwart the termination effect for future 
generations.146 Governance authorities, especially democratic ones, often have the tendency 
to yield to the pressures of the immediate problems and proximate population. Unprecedented 
levels of systematic farsightedness and commitment to the needs of the future will have to be 
anticipated in any governance mechanism in climate engineering, as though the governance 
body consists of representatives of all generations, as in the Rawlsian hypothetical original 
position.  
Recommendation 4. Another recommendation in the governance aspect in ensuring 
intergenerational justice is to make necessary amendments to the existing international 
treaties and laws relevant to climate change. Climate engineering being a relatively new 
candidate on the climate change forums, none of the existing international treaties or laws 
directly covers climate engineering. Nonetheless, treaties like UNFCCC, ENMOD and CBD 
seem to be the obvious references for climate engineering.147 Article 3 of the UNFCCC refers 
to intergenerational justice: “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity [. . .].”148 However, the 
objectives of these treaties do not extend to the full range of climate engineering schemes. As 
Burns (2013) has observed, UNFCCC is the only treaty that includes intergenerational equity 
considerations in non-preambular provisions.149 Therefore, treaty amendments with necessary 
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force to intergenerational justice is a mechanism to be in place for climate engineering 
schemes to take off, especially with the participation of the profit-driven private stakeholders 
in the climate engineering research proposals. Given the universal and intergenerational 
impact of climate engineering, treaties should elicit as much consensus on climate 
engineering schemes. Single-nation deployment is a feasibility consideration for the 
proponents. This feasibility does not augment well with the rights of the future generations 
and will have to be pruned by necessary terms. 
Recommendation 5.The issue of compensation will have to be revisited from the 
perspective of the Rawlsian intergenerational views. The present international compensatory 
mechanisms like carbon fund targeting those harmed by mitigation in the present generation 
cannot be paradigmatic in the context of climate engineering as the adverse side effects of 
climate engineering become active in future. Where we cannot anticipate the full 
consequences of the climate engineering for future generations, more than compensation 
what is warranted is perhaps a deliberate saving mechanism for future, which may partly 
alleviate the dangers of unforeseen side-effects. The Rawlsian emphasis that the difference 
principle should be operational subject to the just savings principle carries clear message to 
the current deliberations on compensation issues in climate change policies. It calls for 
pruning our consumption and saving for future even against the odds of resources being 
insufficient for the current generation. It is likely that the compensatory demands on 
individual nations will be more rigorous in the context of climate engineering than in 
mitigation. The recent Paris agreement being criticised by some of the developed countries as 
skewed unduly to the benefit of the developing populations like India and Brazil show that 
individual nations, even affluent ones, would find it hard to transcend the subjective interests 
in handling an international and intergenerational problem. International approval of any 
climate engineering proposal without clear clarity on the rate of saving, the rate of 
compensation, the beneficiaries of compensation and saving, the duration of compensation 
and saving, etc., is not advisable, though currently these all may remain much at the 
speculative level. Further, the cost analysis methods of climate engineering need to be 
amended as to include some provision for addressing compensations and savings for future 
generations in some manner. The present claim on the economic feasibility of climate 
engineering has little attention paid to the potential harms to future generations. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
Our concern in this chapter was to assess the desirability of climate engineering from 
the perspective of the Rawlsian idea of intergenerational justice and to outline the conditions, 
which any climate engineering project may have to incorporate from the same point of view. 
Accordingly, in the first part we saw the various dynamisms of the debate on 
intergenerational justice in the climate engineering context. In the second part, we presented 
the Rawlsian view of intergenerational justice especially focusing on the just savings 
principle. In the third part we evaluated the climate engineering proposal against the 
Rawlsian principles of original position, equal liberty and just savings. Although, in this part, 
the odds are shown to be much against climate engineering, in the fourth part, we made some 
recommendations that are helpful to make climate engineering somewhat comply with the 
demands of intergenerational justice. It is acknowledged that we did not dwell on a specific 
form of the climate engineering technology to assess its compatibility with the Rawlsian 
scheme. 
 
Our study suggests that intergenerational concerns from the justice point of view pose 
a significant challenge to climate engineering. The analysis from the Rawlsian point of view 
shows that the almost exclusive focus on the termination effect as the biggest challenge to 
intergenerational justice is much arbitrary ignoring the issues that are equally or perhaps 
more important in this context. Further, the analysis shows that it is legitimate to be sceptical 
towards the claims of the proponents about climate engineering as the best option in 
combating climate change. Based on the analysis we are inclined to concur with Burns that 
“The potential intergenerational consequences of climate engineering counsel strongly in 
favor of doubling our resolve to address an issue for which this generation is profoundly 
responsible.”150 The self-criticism and introspection of the present generation, as vividly 
demonstrated in the writings of a number of climate engineering authors who caution the 
present generation not to evade its responsibility is a testimony to the critical advancement 
that the debate has made. 
                                                          
150Burns 2011, p. 220. 
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The aim of our research is to see if climate engineering can be developed in a just 
manner compatible with the Rawlsian principles of distributive, intergenerational and 
procedural justice. So far we have addressed the compatibility of climate engineering with 
distributive and intergenerational justice. In the following chapter we will take up the final 
part of our research question that is the issue of procedural justice. 
.  
 
Chapter 6 
Procedural Justice in Climate Engineering 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
There is an inalienable bond between ends and means in ethics, which in itself is one 
of the hot topics of ethics.1The concerns with procedures are all the more overarching and 
self-imposing when it pertains to normative judgements over a pioneering and untested 
technology like climate engineering, the range of which is truly global. As a seminal 
technology still searching for its methods, standards, techniques and testing grounds and 
confronted with an array of uncertainties and side-effects, articulating the morally required 
procedures proper to it is extremely relevant and rewarding. Procedural justice stands tall 
among the contenders for the ethical analysis of climate engineering from the justice point of 
view. That explains the rationale for our focus on procedural justice in climate engineering in 
this chapter. 
In the first part, glancing quickly over the present landscape of issues in procedural 
justice as exposed in the existing literature, we move on to developing a specific theoretical 
model of procedural justice drawing on John Rawls in the second part. The Rawlsian model 
of procedural justice is applied to the various procedural dynamics of the climate engineering 
debate in the third section that enables us to make some concrete recommendations in the 
final part. Accordingly our lead questions in this chapter will be: can the development of 
climate engineering be compatible with the Rawlsian view of procedural justice? What are 
the conditions under which a practice of climate engineering is procedurally fair and just 
from the Rawlsian point of view? 
 
 
                                                          
1 Means to an end is a popular coinage in philosophy referring to an action used for the purpose of achieving a 
goal. A major contention of the philosophy of ends and means is the justifiability of means by the ends. Some 
basic questions include, does the end justify the means? Can some means be used for achieving some ends? The 
issue has been debated almost from the beginnings of philosophy, particularly with the Aristotelian system. See, 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: Books I to IV, Translated by W. D. Ross (Kithchener: Batoche Books, 1999); 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (A Treatise on Theology), Parts I & II; Catechism of the Catholic Church 
(Massachusetts: The Crown Publishing Group, 2013); A.I. Melden, Ed.,Ethical Theories: A Book of Readings, 
Translated by Lewis Beck White (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1950). 
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6.2 Review of Literature 
6.2.1 Ethical Concerns 
In the existing literature on procedural justice in climate engineering, Preston (2013 & 
2014), Svoboda et al. (2011), Gardiner (2013) and Corner and Pidgeon (2013) deserve a 
special mention.Issues of participation and consent, questions about how to balance climate 
engineering efforts with mitigation efforts, how rapidly to ramp up the chosen technology, 
how to evaluate the impacts of the technology, what to set as targets, and which governance 
mechanism should take charge, and concerns about the security threats posed by the 
technology are the major issues of procedural justice voiced in the literature. 
6.2.1.1 Consent and Participation 
Preston (2013) and Svoboda et al. (2011) are the only papers that address the issue of 
procedural justice in climate engineering in a couple of paragraphs under the specific subtitle. 
Preston considers participation and consent to be formidable issues at the level of research 
and development as well as implementation. “If the problems of participation and consent 
first arise in the context of research, there is no doubt whatsoever that their reappearance in 
the context of implementation is one of the biggest ethical challenges climate engineering 
faces. As an engineering project promising global impacts, some form of consent—at least 
from the representatives of those affected—would appear to be a non-negotiable requirement 
of just procedure.”2 
Obtaining informed consent for climate engineering research is very problematic.3 
The principle of informed consent is traditionally focussed on participation in research and 
holds that a person who might participate in research should be adequately informed about 
the implications and risks of the research and his/her consent must be obtained for carrying 
out the research. In the case of climate engineering the conventional understanding of 
informed consent faces many limitations. It is difficult to clearly identify the parties who 
might be affected by climate engineering. There will be a huge number of people who will be 
affected by such a globally impactful technology. It is difficult to get a unanimous consent 
from a huge population. In that case, it may be argued that the representative consent of 
populations may be sufficient. However, the representative consent also involves several 
concerns. One might ask, for example, who is to represent whom, and what is the opinion to 
be represented? The desperate or self-defence scenarios as highlighted by Gardiner (2013) 
                                                          
2 Preston 2013, p. 29. 
3 ETC 2009; Hale 2009; Hale2011; Morrow et al. 2009, p.4; Gardiner 2013b, pp. 28-29. 
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also invoke the issue of informed consent.4 Assuming informed consent in a desperate 
scenario does not absorb the complexity of the problem. 
Morrow et al. (2009) invoke the principle of respect as a motivation for obtaining 
consent for climate engineering. Their principle of respect, unlike the limited range of 
application of the same in the medical context, shows some adaptation to the global context 
of climate engineering in obtaining consent. They suggest “[…] the scientific community 
secure the global public's consent, voiced through their governmental representatives, before 
beginning any empirical research [on geoengineering].”5Svoboda et al. (2011) comment that 
the norm advocated by Morrow et al. (2009) will be helpful in satisfying the requirements of 
procedural justice as it precludes the public being affected by a policy to which they have not 
consented.6 
 
6.2.1.2 Theoretical Models 
Svoboda et al. (2011) look at the issue of procedural justice from the theoretical 
models of Rawls (1971), Norman Daniels and James Sabin (1998). Though limited to a small 
paragraph, Svoboda et al. (2011) think that unilateral deployment of SAG (Sulphate Aerosol 
Geoengineering) would violate the Rawlsian view of procedural justice, which requires that 
all parties who would be affected by a decision should be part of that decision. Unilateral 
SAG, cannot assume the consensus in the decision making process of all parties who would 
be affected by it. Svoboda et al.(2011) also list the four conditions of procedural justice laid 
down by Daniels and Sabin (1998): (1) that the rationales behind policy decisions be public, 
(2) that the rationales behind policy decisions be relevant to those decisions, (3) that policy 
decisions be subject to appeal, and (4) that there be mechanisms in place to enforce the other 
three conditions.7 In their assessment of SAG from the perspective of Daniels and Sabin 
(1998), Svoboda et al. (2011)think that unilateral SAG would violate the last two conditions 
of procedural justice as there cannot be an appeal against the unilateral deployment as in 
climate engineering there is no governance mechanism in place to enforce such appeals. 
Preston (2013) also seems to presume the models of Rawls (1971) and Grasso8 (2007) as he 
lists them under the references in his discussion on procedural justice. 
 
                                                          
4 Gardiner 2013b. 
5 Morrow et al. 2009, p.1. 
6 Svoboda et al. 2011. 
7 Daniels and Sabin 1998, p. 57. 
8  M. Grasso, “A Normative Ethical Framework in Climate Change,” Climatic Change 81 (2007): 223–246. 
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6.2.1.3 Public Engagement 
Forming public opinion and ensuring public engagement from the beginning is a point 
forcefully stressed in the literature. There are at least 12 papers dealing with public 
engagement in climate engineering and that too on an optimistic note exploring various 
models of engaging the public.9 Upstream public engagement,10 supermajority rule,11 and 
participatory democratic governance of bottom up model,12 are some of the models proposed 
towards forming and appraising the public view on research into climate engineering. 
6.2.1.4 Oxford Principles 
Given the large scale and long-term impact of climate engineering some authors 
suggest treating climate engineering as a global public good.13 The consideration of climate 
engineering as a public good was developed in the Oxford principles for climate engineering, 
which were developed and submitted to UK House of Commons in 2009.14 The following are 
the five recommendations of the Oxford principles on climate engineering: 1.climate 
engineering should be treated and regulated as a public good. 2. There should be due 
participation of the public in the decision making on climate engineering. 3. The transparency 
of the research should be ensured with public disclosure of the research and its results should 
be published. 4. There should be independent assessment of the impacts of climate 
engineering. 5. Proper governance strategies should be developed before deployment.15 
Accordingly, the Oxford principles developed by Rayner et al.16 (2009) are invoked by some 
authors in the debate over climate engineering.17 Rayner et al. (2009) consider the climate 
engineering projects, including research and deployment, within the framework of the Oxford 
principles.18 The Royal Society has also underscored the role of the public participation along 
                                                          
9 Amelung 2012b, pp.41-48; Blackstock et al. 2009, p. 4; Corner and Pidgeon 2010; ETC 2009; Corner and 
Pidgeon 2010, p.32ff; Gramstad and Tjøtta 2010, p.13; Hulme 2009, pp.698-699; Parthasarathy et al. 2010; 
Prantl 2011, p.4; Preston 2013, p. 28; Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013, p. 6ff; Poumaderel et al. 2011. 
10 Corner and Pidgeon 2010. 
11 Gramstad and Tjøtta 2010, p.13. 
12 Parthasarathy et al. 2010. 
13 Rayner 2011, p. 50; Preston 2013, p. 27. 
14 See also Chapter 3, 3.3.1.5.  
15 Rayner 2011. See also, Preston 2013, p. 27. 
16 Rayner et al. (2009a), “Memorandum on Draft Principles for the Conduct of Geoengineering Research,” 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee enquiry into the Regulation of Geoengineering, 
www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/research/sts/Documents/regulation-of-geoengineering.pdf. Accessed on February 19, 2016 
17 Feliciano 2013, p. 386; Kwa & van Hemert 2011, p. 6; Preston 2013, pp. 27-29. 
18 Rayner et al. 2009b. 
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similar lines calling for transparency of research. The Asilomar gathering19 in March 2010 
also endorsed the Oxford principles with some variation. 
 
6.2.1.5 Unilateral Deployment 
The fear of the unilateral deployment is a leading concern in the risk ethics with 13 
references.20The leading position is that SAG should not be implemented unilaterally. The 
mere fact that unilateral SAG is procedurally unjust is not sufficient to establish that SAG as 
such is procedurally unjust. However, given that SAG is inexpensive and can be implemented 
without multilateral agreement, the prospect of unilateralism poses a challenge for SAG to 
meet the requirements of procedural justice. Advocates of a just form of SAG, assuming there 
is one, might urge the international community to develop safeguards against unilateralism. 
At any rate, it is the responsibility of proponents of SAG to recognize and address this 
potential problem. 
 
6.2.1.6 Principles of Beneficence and Minimization 
Many of the concerns with procedural justice in climate engineering are related to the 
issue of research and development. Morrow et al. (2009) have invoked the principles of 
beneficence and minimization to provide some tips towards doing research in climate 
engineering. They hold that the principle of beneficence, along with justice, requires that 
there should be a “favorable risk–benefit ratio and a fair distribution of risks and anticipated 
benefits […].” They also think that given the long time span of the deployment of technology 
and its effects, it will be difficult to achieve a favourable risk-benefit ratio for climate 
engineering experiments. According to the minimisation principle, the extent and intensity of 
the experiment should be kept to the minimum avoiding as much risks as possible due to 
unnecessary prolongation of the experiment. As of now, there is no adequate scientific 
knowledge about the possible risks and benefits. Therefore there is a real difficulty with the 
“risk-knowledge calculus.”21 Given this difficulty, Morrow et al. (2009) advocate a maximin 
approach towards the assessment of the risk-benefit ratio, whereby the population that is most 
risk-prone and least beneficiary will deserve the greatest ethical attention.22 
 
                                                          
19 See Chapter 3, 3.2.2.1. 
20 Banerjee 2011, p.16; Virgoe 2009; Barrett 2008; Bodansky 1996; Goodell 2010, pp.195-197; Bracmort and 
Lattanzio 2013, p. i; Mooney et al. 2012, p.228; Resnik and Vallero 2011, p.8; Scholte et al. 2013, p.4.; Svoboda 
et al. 2011; Virgoe 2009, p. 115; Weitzman 2012; Parson 2013. 
21 Morrow et al. 2009, pp. 5-6. 
22 Morrow et al. 2009, p. 5. 
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6.2.1.7 Moratorium 
 The advocacy of a moratorium on research and development also obtains significance 
from the viewpoint of procedural justice. There are 8 papers dealing with a moratorium on 
climate engineering tests23 though not directly in relation to procedural justice. Different 
variants of the precautionary principles are invoked by different authors. Some interpretations 
of the precautionary principle call for a ban or moratorium on climate engineering.24 The 
weak version of the precautionary principle states that the precaution of avoiding harm 
should be given preference in case of a choice under uncertainty. There are several elements 
of uncertainty and potential risks in climate engineering. This is adequate reason for a ban on 
climate engineering as a precaution against the adverse impacts on the ecosystem. Besides, 
worries about moral hazard, and possible commercial misuse of technology are arguments 
listed for a ban or moratorium.  
 
6.2.3 Comments on Procedural Justice in the Literature 
Unlike the case of intergenerational justice, there is not a single paper exclusively 
dedicated to the issue of procedural justice or dealing with the topic in some detail. 
Procedural justice is very much an underdeveloped area in the debate, though it is very 
important at this phase of the debate. Though there were a few field tests already performed, 
which invited much public reaction, it does not seem to have caught the attention of the 
ethicists. 
Although the issue of informed consent is emphasised, there is no clarity on the model 
of the consent to be followed in the case of climate engineering. The model assumed in most 
papers is the medical model of the informed consent. Given the international nature of the 
climate engineering technology, the feasibility of the public good model25 needs to be 
explored. The public good model will need to use the representative model of decision 
making and the intricacies of the representative process of decision making in such a global 
project need to be analysed further. The suggestion of Morrow et al. (2009) recommending 
the application of the principle of respect, which holds that respect for the autonomy of 
participating subjects should be upheld in SAG, provides a useful model in this regard. 
                                                          
23 Cicerone 2006; ETC 2099; Leal-Arcas and Filis-Yelaghotis 2012, pp. 137-139.; Schneider 2008; Goodell 
2010, p. 2000; Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p. 23; Mooney et al. 2012, p.224; Resnik and Vallero 2011, p.9. 
24 Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, p.7; Mooney et al. 2012, p.224; Banerjee 2011, p. 27; Elliot 2010. 
25 See Chapter 3, 3.3.1.5. 
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Present engagements with procedural justice are confined to SRM methods and there 
is no single mention of the challenges of the CDR approaches to procedural justice. Svoboda 
et al. (2011) deserve special acknowledgement for recognizing that SAG need not be 
implemented unilaterally and the scope for unilateral SAG does not make climate engineering 
procedurally unjust.26 It opens another direction to the debate to see if there is a procedurally 
just way of deploying climate engineering. The future course of the ethical debate in climate 
engineering should concentrate more on the possible ways and means of developing and 
deploying climate engineering in a procedurally just manner. 
Though many of the issues relevant for procedural justice are dealt with in the 
literature, they are not systematically developed showing the particular implications of 
specific issues for procedural justice, for instance, the issue of moratorium or the principle of 
informed consent in research. These are some of the underdeveloped areas. There is no 
country specific assessment of the issues like moratorium, public engagement, etc., for 
climate engineering. Although there are clear historical instances of the weather modification 
being used for military intentions in the Vietnam War, it is not adequately addressed in the 
literature, with only one paper considering it as a major issue for procedural justice.27 The 
emerging terrorist challenges deserve to be particularly appropriated. Summarising, the issue 
of procedural justice, except for its governance part, has significantly evaded the attention of 
the ethicists. It is this shortfall that we wish to partly address in the subsequent pages. 
 
6.3 The Rawlsian View of Procedural Justice 
As in the preceding chapters, we will use the theoretical frame of the Rawlsian view 
of procedural justice to see if the development of climate engineering can be compatible with 
procedural justice. Rawls has extensively dealt with procedural justice. Indeed, procedural 
justice intrinsically pertains to the Rawlsian scheme as his notion of original position is 
envisaged to offer the fair conditions for the contracting parties to reach at a just agreement. 
He develops his view of procedural justice mainly in his Theory of Justice (pp. 58, 73-77, 
104, 118, 112, 173-174, 194, 267-291, 310-312, 318). His later works Political Liberalism 
(pp. 62, 72f., 225, 259, 282), and Justice as Fairness (pp. 50-57, 139-140, 156; 170-171) add 
extra elements to the perspectives advanced in Theory of Justice.  
                                                          
26 Svoboda et al. 2011. 
27 Corner and Pidgeon 2010. 
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Rawls introduces the notion of procedural justice while illustrating the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity. For Rawls, the basic structure of the society is the primary 
subject matter of justice. The basic structure is a system of rules that assigns to each certain 
recognized claims to a share in the proceeds.28 Accordingly, the question of distributive 
justice is a matter of ensuring the claims of each one to a share in the proceeds. Thus 
distributive justice is closely linked up with procedural justice. Procedural justice means that 
whatever the outcome may be, it will be just, provided the social system is designed so 
following the terms of the original agreement.29In Theory of Justice, Rawls introduces three 
concepts of procedural justice, namely, 
 perfect procedural justice, 
 imperfect procedural justice, and 
 pure procedural justice. 
Analysing the first two, Rawls moves on to his ideal view of procedural justice as pure 
procedural justice. 
6.3.1 Perfect Procedural Justice 
Rawls explains the characteristics of perfect procedural justice with the example of 
cutting a cake. Assuming that everyone getting an equal share is the fair division, the one 
who cuts the cake will claim his share after all others. The following definitive features could 
be identified here: “First, there is an independent criterion for what is a fair division, a 
criterion defined separately from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed. And 
second, it is possible to devise a procedure that is sure to give the desired outcome.”30 Rawls 
acknowledges that it is not applicable to employ perfect procedural justice in most practical 
cases.31 In political processes there cannot be perfect procedural justice since voting will be 
needed in many cases.32 
6.3.2 Imperfect Procedural Justice 
Rawls uses the example of a criminal trial to illustrate the category of imperfect 
procedural justice. Ensuring justice in criminal trials means that the defendant is punished if 
                                                          
28 See, Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 74. 
29 See, Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 74. 
30 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 74. 
31 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 74. 
32 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 311. 
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and only if he has committed the offence. The trial procedure is a search for truth in this 
regard. Despite strictly following the law and rightly following the procedure, it cannot 
assure just result always as it sometimes happens that an innocent person gets punished and 
the guilty goes free. Rawls calls the unjust result from imperfect procedural justice a 
“miscarriage of justice: the injustice springs from no human fault but from a fortuitous 
combination of circumstances which defeats the purpose of the legal rules.”33 “The 
characteristic mark of imperfect procedural justice is that while there is an independent 
criterion for the correct outcome, there is no feasible procedure which is sure to lead to it.”34 
Rawls considers a just constitution to be an instance of imperfect procedural justice. “The 
constitution is regarded as a just but imperfect procedure framed as far as the circumstances 
permit to insure a just outcome. It is imperfect because there is no feasible political process 
which guarantees that the laws enacted in accordance with it will be just.”35 
6.3.3 Pure procedural Justice 
The limitations of perfect procedural justice – not applicable in most practical cases 
for want of a perfect criterion – and of imperfect procedural justice – there is no feasible 
procedure which is sure to lead to right outcome – are overcome in the category of pure 
procedural justice. Pure procedural justice is invoked in the absence of an independent 
criterion for the right result. It is pure because “... the outcome is ... correct or fair, whatever it 
is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed.”36 Rawls uses the example of 
gambling to illustrate pure procedural justice. In a fair gambling by a number of persons, the 
final distribution of cash is fair whatever the distribution is, provided the bet is voluntary and 
there is no cheating. In the bet, although the final distribution may not be equal among 
parties, as far as the procedure is concerned, all betting parties have the equal opportunity to 
gain the highest from the bet. Here there is no standard criterion to determine the outcome. 
However, the fair procedure being carried out alone ensures that the result is fair. “A fair 
procedure translates its fairness to the outcome only when it is actually carried out.”37 This is 
the point about pure procedural justice. Accordingly, Rawls calls for impartial social systems 
that would facilitate a just social structure. “In order, therefore, to apply the notion of pure 
procedural justice to distributive shares it is necessary to set up and to administer impartially 
                                                          
33 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 75. 
34 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 75. 
35 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 311. 
36 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 75. 
37 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 75. 
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a just system of institutions. Only against the background of a just basic structure, including a 
just political constitution and a just arrangement of economic and social institutions, can one 
say that the requisite just procedure exists.”38 
Rawls thinks that pure procedural justice has the practical advantage of standing up to 
any unforeseen circumstances without engaging the details of such circumstances. “Now the 
practical advantage of pure procedural justice is that it is no longer necessary to keep track of 
the endless variety of circumstances and the changing relative positions of particular persons. 
One avoids the problem of defining principles to cope with the enormous complexities which 
would arise if such details were relevant.”39 
Pure procedural justice has to be seen from the viewpoint of the original position. As 
we have seen in chapters 4 and 5, the entire Rawlsian scheme is built up on the hypothetical 
notion of the original position. If the agreement between parties is drawn by fulfilling the 
conditions of the original position, that in itself assures procedural justice. “The idea of the 
original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. The 
aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory.”40 The state of affairs 
in the original position is such that any agreement reached at will be procedurally fair, 
because in the original position all parties are equally represented and there are no arbitrary 
contingencies or a relative balancing of social forces.41 Therefore, in the Rawlsian view of 
Justice as Fairness, pure procedural justice will be present from the beginning. 
Rawls also sees that there are occasions when it is possible only to have a quasi-pure 
procedural justice. Quasi-pure procedural justice occurs when “... laws and policies are just 
provided that they lie within the allowed range, and the legislature, in ways authorized by a 
just constitution, has in fact enacted them.”42 An instance of the quasi-pure procedural justice 
is the choice of the just constitution and the enactment of the just laws and policies at the 
legislative stage.43 There is an element of indeterminacy in the adoption of the constitution, or 
                                                          
38 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 76. 
39 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 76. 
40 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 118. 
41 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 104. 
42 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 176. 
43 Rawls envisages a four-stage sequence for the formation of the contract, namely, the original position, the 
constitutional stage, the legislative stage and the stage of governance and administration. “[T]he four-stage 
sequence is a device for applying the principles of justice. This scheme is part of the theory of justice as fairness 
and not an account of how constitutional conventions and legislatures actually proceed. It sets out a series of 
points of view from which the different problems of justice are to be settled, each point of view inheriting the 
constraints adopted at the preceding stages” (Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 318). 
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the economic and social policy, as to which will be chosen from among the several ones. 
Conversely, justice also becomes indeterminate. “Thus” Rawls feels that “on many questions 
of social and economic policy we must fall back upon a notion of quasi-pure procedural 
justice.”44 It occurs also in cases of political settlement by majority rule. Under the principle 
of political settlement, “... if the law actually voted is, so far as one can ascertain, within the 
range of those that could reasonably be favored by rational legislators conscientiously trying 
to follow the principles of justice, then the decision of the majority is practically 
authoritative, though not definitive. The situation is one of quasi-pure procedural justice.”45 
Pure procedural justice cannot be achieved in instances of political settlement because the 
right result is not assured therein, for there are people who disagree with the majority whose 
interests are not recognized in the final result.46 
Rawls has also found that pure procedural justice is operative in deciding the fair 
wages under the veil of ignorance. The choice of the just institution of fair wages can be 
ideally decided under the veil of ignorance.47 Therefore, the parties will avoid wage 
inequalities in deciding on the minimum wages. “Variations in wages and income and the 
perquisites of position are simply to influence these choices so that the end result accords 
with efficiency and justice.”48 It will also be found that wage inequalities will be necessary to 
facilitate the overall performance of the economy. Inasmuch as minimum wages and the 
income are decided following the fair and just deliberations under the veil, they will be 
instances of pure procedural justice. 
6.3.4 Procedural Justice in Political Liberalism 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls reinstates the same view of procedural justice 
developed in Theory of Justice but expands it with certain additional elements. Rawls holds 
that the original position is a case of pure procedural justice and rational autonomy is 
modelled in the original position.49 As in Theory, he contrasts it with perfect procedural 
                                                          
44 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 176. 
45 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 318. 
46 Rawls, Theory or Justice, p. 318. 
47 Roemer comments on Rawls in this regard that deliberations under the veil will lead to a maximin 
formulation, for it is assumed that decision makers are very much aversive to risk (Roemer 1996). See also, 
David A. Green, What is a minimum wage for? Empirical Results and Theories of Justice, IFS Working Paper 
W14/24. Available at https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/wps/WP201424.pdf. Accessed March 13, 
2015. 
48 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 277. 
49 See, Political Liberalism, pp. 72, 225. By rational autonomy Rawls means, “... persons’ intellectual and moral 
powers. It is shown in their exercising their capacity to form, to revise, and to pursue a conception of the good, 
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justice: “This contrasts with perfect procedural justice, where there is an independent and 
already given criterion of what is just (or fair), and the procedure can be designed to insure an 
outcome satisfying that criterion.... The essential feature of pure procedural justice, as 
opposed to perfect procedural justice, is that what is just is specified by the outcome of the 
procedure, whatever it may be. There is no prior and already given criterion against which the 
outcome is to be checked.”50 
In Political Liberalism, “Pure procedural justice means that in their rational 
deliberations the parties do not view themselves as required to apply, or as bound by, any 
antecedently given principles of right and justice. Put another way, they recognize no 
standpoint external to their own point of view as rational representatives from which they are 
constrained by prior and independent principles of justice.”51 Here there is no role for any 
outside authority like God’s law.  
He defines pure procedural justice in relation to the two principles of justice (equal 
liberty and fair equality of opportunity). These principles incorporate pure procedural justice 
and they apply to the basic structure. Further, fair procedures should be actually carried out. 
“A fair distribution can be arrived at only by the actual working of a fair social process over 
time in the course of which, in accordance with publicly announced rules, entitlements are 
earned and honored. These features define pure procedural justice.”52 In Political Liberalism, 
Rawls argues that pure procedural justice is invoked at the highest level. In justice as fairness 
the parties are thought of as free and equal moral persons, and the content of the agreement is 
the first principles that regulate the basic structure. Accordingly, “...the content of justice for 
the basic structure can be ascertained, or at least approximated, by the principles that would 
be adopted. ... Thus pure procedural justice is invoked at the highest level: the fairness of the 
circumstances transfers to fairness of the principles acknowledged.”53 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls underscores the connection between substantive justice 
and procedural justice.54 For Rawls, the distinction between procedural justice and 
substantive justice is only a distinction between the justice of a process and the justice of its 
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outcome.55 Both exemplify values of procedure and outcome and they go hand in hand as the 
justice of a procedure depends on the value of the outcome. Thus, “... fair procedures have 
values intrinsic to them...”56 Revisiting his examples of perfect and imperfect procedural 
justice – cutting a cake and criminal trial respectively - Rawls shows how there can be no just 
outcome without a just procedure and no just procedure without a just outcome. Similarly, he 
proves the same point by analysing majority-rule in democracy, that constitutionalists and 
majoritarians may agree that justice in majority democracy is founded on whether its 
outcomes are substantively just.57 
6.3.5 Procedural Justice in Justice as Fairness 
Rawls had emphasised the importance of background conditions for pure procedural 
justice. That is what he technically confirms by introducing the term background to 
procedural justice in Justice as Fairness. Rawls sees that allocative justice is incompatible 
with justice as fairness. The distribution of wealth in a well-ordered society does not warrant 
allocative justice, and takes care of the background procedural justice by itself. “In a well-
ordered society, in which both the equal basic liberties (with their fair value) and fair equality 
of opportunity are secured, the distribution of income and wealth illustrates what we may call 
pure background procedural justice.”58 With the term “background,” Rawls means that 
“certain rules must be included in the basic structure as a system of social cooperation so that 
this system remains fair over time, from one generation to the next.”59 These rules are 
necessary to maintain background justice like the fair value of the political liberties, fair 
equality of opportunity, and difference principle. The demands of the difference principle are 
part of fair social cooperation in justice as fairness.  
Rawls holds that distributive justice could be understood as a case of pure procedural 
justice even with these rules of background justice. “Taking the basic structure as the primary 
subject enables us to regard distributive justice as a case of pure background procedural 
justice: when everyone follows the publicly recognized rules of cooperation, the particular 
distribution that results is acceptable as just whatever that distribution turns out to be.... This 
allows us to abstract from the enormous complexities of the innumerable transactions of daily 
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life and frees us from having to keep track of the changing relative positions of particular 
individuals.”60 
The primacy of the basic structure and the added emphasis on it is the novelty of the 
procedural justice in Justice as Fairness. Rawls articulates, “...we take the basic structure as 
the primary subject. This structure comprises social institutions within which human beings 
may develop their moral powers and become fully cooperating members of a society of free 
and equal citizens. And as a framework that preserves background justice over time from one 
generation to the next it realizes the idea (central to justice as fairness) of pure background 
procedural justice as an ideal social process (as explained under the first kind of reason).”61 
Rawls also emphasises some concrete strategies to ensure pure background procedural 
justice from generation to generation. Entrusting sufficient productive means to general 
population and not to a few is important. Such means include “... human as well as real 
capital, that is, knowledge and an understanding of institutions, educated abilities, and trained 
skills.”62 
But there are differences in the basic capabilities of individuals. Further, a scientific 
measure of these capabilities is impossible as well. However, Rawls holds that adjustments to 
these differing capabilities will naturally proceed “... by way of an ongoing social process of 
pure background procedural justice in which qualifications suitable for particular offices and 
positions play a distributive role.”63 Thus no political injustice will be caused by the 
differences in basic capabilities. 
 
6.4Climate Engineering in the Rawlsian View of Procedural Justice 
In this section we will take up our lead question, can climate engineering be 
developed in a manner compatible with the Rawlsian concept of procedural justice and what 
are the conditions for climate engineering to meet the Rawlsian view of procedural justice. 
6.4.1Which Category of Procedural Justice? 
 It is necessary to identify the category of procedural justice that is most suited for 
application to climate engineering, from among the three categories, namely, pure, perfect 
and imperfect justice. Is climate engineering compatible with all three categories? Thanks to 
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the enormous complexities in climate engineering, such a claim is frivolous. For perfect 
procedural justice to be suitable there should be an independent criterion; that criterion 
should be defined prior to the procedure; and there should be a procedure that can achieve the 
desired result according to the criterion.64The issue of fairness in climate engineering is not 
anything as simple as cutting a cake. Climate engineering technology is still at the conceptual 
level without any major field test having been performed. It is loaded with a huge amount of 
uncertainties in regard to its outreach, impacts, and side-effects. Therefore it is impossible to 
define an independent criterion, let alone prior to the procedure, and conversely the issue of 
devising a procedure to that effect does not occur. Thus perfect procedural justice is 
inapplicable in climate engineering. Rawls himself has acknowledged that perfect procedural 
justice does not hold up in most practical cases.65 
On the same ground it can be seen that imperfect procedural justice too does not hold 
up in the context of climate engineering. Imperfect procedural justice requires an independent 
criterion, and despite the right recourse to the procedures, the procedure is vulnerable to 
unjust results. It is clear that without an independent criterion and being unable to devise the 
proper procedures, it is sure to result in what Rawls describes as a miscarriage of justice. 
Pure procedural justice holds that the outcome will be just provided the procedure is 
fair. Inasmuch as the result is just based on a fair procedure, there cannot be an ethical 
objection to climate engineering. If for research and application of climate engineering a 
procedure can be devised that is fair in every respect and can lead to just results in every 
aspect, pure procedural justice does hold for climate engineering. Pure procedural justice in 
its ideal vision offers a solution to the problems of uncertainties and known and unknown 
side-effects that is crucial in climate engineering. From the Rawlsian perspective, whatever 
the uncertainties or side-effects maybe, pure procedural justice should have a fair system to 
tackle them in order to ensure that the result is just. According to Rawls, in pure procedural 
justice one can avoid the trouble of keeping track of the endless variety of circumstances and 
of defining principles to cope with the enormous complexities that may arise.66Although 
realizing such a project is more ambitious than practical given the looming uncertainties in 
climate engineering, if it indeed can be translated into reality eventually, that will be a 
sufficient reason for climate engineeringbeing procedurallyjust. Therefore, our intersection 
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between Rawls and climate engineering will be from the point of view of pure procedural 
justice. 
 
6.4.2Pure Procedural Justice and the Basic Structure 
For Rawls ,“[T]he basic structure is the primary subject of justice.”67“[P]rocedural 
justice presupposes that the basic structure satisfies the two principles (of equal liberty and 
fair equality of opportunity.”68Therefore, it needs to be examined whether climate 
engineering ensures a basic structure that meets the condition of satisfying these two 
principles. Let us see the meaning of basic structure in Rawls.“The basic structure is a public 
system of rules defining a scheme of activities that leads men to act together so as to produce 
a greater sum of benefits and assign to each certain recognized claims to a share in the 
proceeds.”69 If climate engineering produces greater benefits and assigns each one certain 
claims, it could be said to be meeting the condition of satisfying the two principles of justice 
and as such one could move on to formulating the principles of procedural justice.  
But, can climate engineering meet the conditions of the basic structure of the society? 
Is climate engineering capable of producing a greater sum of benefits? Does it assign to each 
certain recognized claims to a share in the proceeds? As the present implications of climate 
engineering go, all these questions are to be answered in the negative. As we have seen, as a 
last resort option or a lesser evil choice, climate engineering is not considered to be a 
technique that can fundamentally enhance the benefits of the society. It is true that some of 
the hardcore proponents think that it has incredible economics70 that can outsmart the 
economic challenges of mitigation. Even in that regard, however, the benefits accrued are 
estimated only relative to mitigation. Yet, critical scrutiny of such claims has shown that the 
rhetoric of incredible economics are quite artificial as they completely ignore the indirect 
expenses as well as the issues of compensation or the expenses pertaining to unforeseen side-
effects. Thus, neither the lesser evil argument nor the economic feasibility argument can 
assure that climate engineering will produce a greater sum of benefits. On the contrary, 
climate engineering has the potential to compound the dangers to climate change due to 
accumulated CO2leading to a potential catastrophe. Secondly, as regards ensuring the claims 
to each one, we have seen in the fourth chapter that climate engineering will certainly 
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produce winners and losers.71 Therefore, even if it brings certain claims to a share in the 
proceeds, that share will not be equal and fair to all, but rather at the cost of the losers. Pure 
procedural justice should meet the condition of the fair equality of opportunity. Now we see 
that climate engineering cannot meet this condition. 
The proponents might argue that enabling each nation to unilateral deployment 
ensures certain equality of claim. But we will see below that as regards procedural justice, 
unilateral deployment is an intrinsic contradiction as the impact of regional deployment can 
be global and there is no way of balancing the interests of all parties if one party unilaterally 
decides to deploy climate engineering. Further, given the technological upper hand or 
monopoly of the rich countries today, it will be mythical to assume that all parties will be 
equally equipped to deploy climate engineering. Therefore, climate engineering from the 
Rawlsian point of view cannot meet the conditions of the basic structure for applying pure 
procedural justice that the two basic principles of justice like equal liberty and fair equality of 
opportunity are to be satisfied. 
6.4.3Background Pure Procedural Justice and Restoration of Climatic Justice 
Continuing along the line of our arguments in the preceding section, in this section, 
drawing clues from the Rawlsian emphasis on setting the background conditions right for 
justice, we will argue that in order to meet the demands of the Rawlsian pure procedural 
justice in climate engineering, first ethicists will have to fix the “climatic injustice”72 that is 
prevalent in the world today. Even if a perfect governance system and all other mechanisms 
are in place including agreements on compensation for ensuring just results, it remains that 
from the Rawlsian point of view, pure procedural justice will be far from complete unless 
basic institutions are established in order to ensure equal liberty to all and fair equality of 
opportunity, for justice pertains to the basic structure and the basic structure of the climate 
change context today is disturbingly unjust. As Rawls holds: “In order ... to apply the notion 
of pure procedural justice to distributive shares it is necessary to set up and to administer 
impartially a just system of institutions. Only against the background of a just basic structure, 
including a just political constitution and a just arrangement of economic and social 
institutions, can one say that the requisite just procedure exists.”73 Without restoring climatic 
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justice, in the case of climate engineering, “...the basic structure is a case of imperfect 
procedural justice.”74 
In the Rawlsian scheme, parties in the original position are entering into a contract as 
contemporaries. The nature of the original position is such that it should be possible to 
consider any point of time as the entry-time. Let us assume that the nations of the world are 
the parties today that sit together to form the fair procedures to facilitate the deployment of 
climate engineering as a tool to combat dangerous climate change. The Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance is partly lifted so as to permit the parties to know the essential setting of the 
challenges of climate change, the potentials of climate engineering to combat it, the far-
reaching consequences of climate engineering, and more importantly, the present 
environmental and economic state of affairs with individual nations. However, the veil of 
ignorance holds up in regard to which nation each contracting party represents.  
Understandably, the parties find the basic structure of the society to be highly uneven 
in several respects including the geographical and economic vulnerability to climate 
change.75 They also find that countries are differentiated in terms of their responsibility to 
climate change with the paradoxical observation that some of the least responsible countries 
are the most vulnerable to the climate change. Within the pristine environment of a veil of 
ignorance as to their national affiliation, in analysing the dangerous climate change, they will 
be shocked to see several nations of the world overshooting by several fold their bio-capacity 
and eco-footprint, and several other nations being deprived of their otherwise deserving 
portion of productive land and fresh waters to alarming proportions. For instance, partly on 
account of “geographical bad luck”76Sub-Saharan countries are largely undeveloped and 
conversely least responsible for climate change, but most vulnerable to the dangers of climate 
change. Canada has overshot its eco-footprint four times above the global average, whereas 
the eco-footprint of Bangladesh is half the global average.77 In the meantime the parties in the 
original position find in their deliberations based on the available scientific predictions78that 
Canadians will further benefit from climate engineering and conversely Bangladesh will lose 
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further as one of the nations to be hit worst by the potential side-effects of climate 
engineering. In the first place, the parties identify the irony that climate engineering will 
reinforce and compound the injustice already perpetuated in the present scenario.  
The basic structure of the climate engineering society can be structurally just subject 
to the just nature of the procedures in defining the basic structure of the pre-climate 
engineering society. Ensuring procedural justice in a future climate engineering society has to 
begin with rectifying the disequilibrium of justice in regard to climate change in the present 
world. The Rawlsian view of procedural justice cautions the climate engineering theorists 
about the gravity, complexity and radicality of the homework that needs to be done to prepare 
ethically for climate engineering. 
The concept of the desert advocated by Sher (1987)79comes into force here. Desert 
means that one does deserve something even though one does not have the right to obtain it. 
To understand it with a simple example, say, two persons walking on the road, one stomach-
full and the other hungry for several days. On the way they find a food stall offering a single 
free burger. Common sense tells us that the hungry man does deserve it more than the other. 
It is this pre-reflective level of right - that something in us that entitles the hungry among the 
two to the burger- that is to be termed as desert. Our present ethical deliberations are 
revolving mostly around the concept of rights and obligations. In fact, our concepts of rights 
act as a vindication against our ‘desert-like obligations’ to others. For instance, I have plenty 
of money earned through fair means. My country’s constitution permits private property. And 
hence I have no legal obligation80 to share my money with the poor. Nobody has a right over 
my money and I do not need feel morally obliged to anybody. My awareness of my right to 
my private wealth relieves me of my subjectively-driven moral compulsion to help the needy. 
In other words, desert lacks necessary normative force to lead someone to action. And if 
people can voluntarily strip themselves of their legitimate rights, there would not be so much 
divide between the haves and the have-nots in the world. But desert has no such binding force 
in the array of ethical disputes dominated by rights and obligations. That so much of desert-
like moral impulses remain unfulfilled in the world at large is the reason for so much 
“climatic injustice” – environmental and economic vulnerabilities suffered by many regions 
merely due to their geographical bad luck – prevailing today. 
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Understanding desert under the Rawlsian scheme, we find that, perhaps, desert is at its 
best in Rawls. The moral force therein, however self-interested the parties may be, is the 
force of the desert. More precisely, in the original position, desert becomes the normative 
force of their self-interest. That is to say, since the parties in the original position being 
ignorant of their background and have nothing subjective to safeguard, the desert-like moral 
impulses will have a decisive role to play in their deliberations. At that pre-emptive level of 
rights and obligations, driven by desert-like moral impulses, the parties are very likely to 
rectify any disequilibrium in the existing scenario and try to perpetuate that equilibrium for 
future, progressively of course, due to their self-interest. Thus the primary structure is likely 
to have embodied fully the desert-like motivations which otherwise would have been 
conditioned by several extraneous factors. Strategically, this is very helpful for climatic 
justice and climate engineering justice. It is against this background that parties in the 
original position have to develop fair and just rules of procedure that ensure just results for 
climate engineering. Now, even as they begin to formulate principles, the proverbial saying 
that prevention is better than cure, as an intuitive normative credential of the human thinking, 
begins to be operative in this setting, and they take guard against any potential challenges to 
justice. 
Given this strategy, the root of the justice concerns in climate engineering is 
addressed. It brings us back to the mainstream allegation against climate engineering that it 
does not address the root of the problem. Rawls underscores that only by fixing the issues at 
the root of the problem can the concerns of justice in climate engineering be discussed. If we 
can develop the proper procedural rules applying which just results can be ensured under any 
circumstance against all uncertainty and known and unknown side-effects, then climate 
engineering is procedurally just from the Rawlsian point of view. More than that, climate 
engineering would then be a great opportunity to redress many prevailing instances of 
injustice in the environmental setting. However, such a rosy scenario, though ideally 
desirable is hard to achieve against the real challenges, a point we discuss right below. 
6.4.4Intersecting Procedural Justice and Distributive Justice 
The Rawlsian veil of ignorance can remove the subjective circumstantial conditioning 
of the contracting parties. Under the veil of ignorance, the self-interest of the parties can 
positively act as a normative catalyst to rectify the degree of climatic injustice or imbalance 
currently existing in the system, for in a system freed from self-interests it is normative to 
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give privileged attention to imbalances, especially when each contracting party considers the 
possibility of ending up on the otherwise vulnerable end of the system, when the veil of 
ignorance is lifted. Therefore, in the Rawlsian understanding of procedural justice it is not 
only mandatory to listen to the voice of the vulnerable, but they also get privileged attention 
in the processes of formulating the just rules of procedures. Here we identify a kind of the 
Rawlsian difference principle naturally establishing itself in the contracting deliberations. 
It is a major contention in Rawls that distributive justice is ensured by pure procedural 
justice. “A distribution cannot be judged in isolation from the system of which it is the 
outcome or from what individuals have done in good faith in the light of established 
expectations.”81 “A fair distribution can be arrived at only by the actual working of a fair 
social process over time....”82In chapter 4 while analysing climate engineering from the 
Rawlsian viewpoint of distributive justice, we have seen that climate engineering and 
distributive justice will not go hand in hand as climate engineering would create winners and 
losers. Whereas here we find that fair distribution resulting from fair procedures leaves no 
room open for “an underclass.”83 In the Rawlsian scheme of pure procedural justice, in regard 
to climate engineering, leaving aside the practical concerns, at least theoretically we can “... 
hope that an underclass will not exist; or, if there is a small such class, that it is the result of 
social conditions we do not know how to change, or perhaps cannot even identify or 
understand.”84 
Herein lays the relevance of the new notion of background pure procedural justice 
that Rawls coined in Justice as Fairness. In Justice as Fairness, distributive justice is a case 
of pure background procedural justice. “Taking the basic structure as the primary subject 
enables us to regard distributive justice as a case of pure background procedural justice: when 
everyone follows the publicly recognized rules of cooperation, the particular distribution that 
results is acceptable as just whatever that distribution turns out to be...”85 In such an ideal 
state of affairs where all just institutions are already in place for ensuring just results 
irrespective of any side-effects or unforeseen consequences for every citizen in the post-
geoengineered world, it is procedurally just to develop climate engineering, or the desirability 
of climate engineering is justified only under such ideal conditions. That is to say, if a 
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currently rich Canadian who enters as a party to the contract under the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance (assuming permitting knowledge of nationality) finds that his self-interest is well 
protected though he would find himself as an Ugandan in the geoengineered world, then we 
could be confident that the Rawlsian conditions for pure procedural justice are somewhat 
met.  
However, it is plain that such a rosy scenario is counterfactual and far from being 
visualised, let alone materialised. In the Rawlsian terms, fair procedure will have to consider 
special circumstances. Considering the manifold scientific, ecological, social, economic 
political consequences of such a pioneering technology, of which humanity has no 
foreknowledge, seems rationally impossible. Since fair procedure requires consideration of 
all circumstances and very little special circumstances are known or anticipated in climate 
engineering today, it is difficult to endorse climate engineering. Anticipating all results to 
ensure justice in the absence of an independent criterion and following a fair procedure to 
ensure justice even if all results are not anticipated are counterintuitive. Climate engineering 
technology is such that the outcome or results could be beyond the range of all anticipated 
contexts, invalidating all provisions already agreed upon, or allowing little time for deploying 
the compensatory mechanisms to share the loss. For example, the case of a double 
catastrophe86 can be beyond the reach of the imagination of climate engineering, where there 
is little time for repairing the damage and human species on earth may be irrevocably lost not 
to be possible to restore a just result. It is our practical experience that despite all the 
predictions and security measures being deployed against a hurricane, there are irrevocable 
casualties. Determining the causal connection between climate engineering and the 
consequences like the reduced fish yield due to a CDR technique, or reduction in 
precipitation due to SRM, is still a contentious concern too hard to domesticate for fair 
procedure and just results. Ensuring procedural justice from the Rawlsian point of view of 
pure procedural justice will be a real test of human imagination, farsightedness and human 
preparedness for the unexpected. 
It is doubtful whether there could be a fair procedure for deploying a technology that 
can no longer be revoked. Given the present rudimentary level of the climate engineering 
technology, the complementarity between fair procedure and just result seems to be an 
intrinsic impossibility standing against each other in climate engineering. For instance, it is 
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difficult to devise fair procedures to ensure just results without field test. But the issue of 
research and development is already contentious in climate engineering. Research and 
development itself warrant fair procedure and just results from the Rawlsian point of view. 
Conversely, the question now is: can there be a just procedure for research and development 
from the Rawlsian point of view? In climate engineering, field tests are necessary to know the 
outcome, for without tests, given the amount of uncertainty in climate engineering, there is no 
way to determine the outcome. In the Rawlsian terms, without anticipating the outcome of the 
field test, as of now, there cannot be a “purely” fair procedure for the field test. Thus, from 
the Rawlsian point of view, research and development cannot take place by meeting all the 
components of pure procedural justice that ensures just result. Simply put, developing a full-
proof just procedure that can ensure just outcome for climate engineering is intrinsically 
impossible with the available scientific and technological knowledge about climate 
engineering today. 
It might be objected that the Rawlsian pure procedural justice does not go into all the 
details as for him justice pertains to the basic structure of the society. After all in Rawls, the 
advantage of pure procedural justice is that one can avoid the trouble of keeping track of the 
endless variety of circumstances and of defining principles to cope with the enormous 
complexities that may arise.87In reply, however, it could be argued that the complexity of 
climate engineering is so foundational that it can destroy the very fundamental structure of 
the society, or worse, society itself, to which justice pertains in Rawls. Therefore, a fairness 
of procedure at the theoretical level cannot be expected to be carried out on the practical 
ground. It reminds us of another important strand in the Rawlsian view of procedural justice. 
Rawls says, “A fair procedure translates its fairness to the outcome only when it is actually 
carried out.”88In Political Liberalism, Rawls argued that pure procedural justice is invoked at 
the highest level and pure procedural justice at the highest level implied that “A fair 
distribution can be arrived at only by the actual working of a fair social process over 
time...”89Even if there is a potentially pure procedure that can be devised unless it is actually 
carried out, it does not ensure just outcome. It is at this level of carrying out the fair 
procedure that we encounter real difficulties.  
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While the Rawlsian theory of procedural justice deals with the distribution of 
resources in an ideal society based on co-operation for “mutual advantage,”90 in the climate 
engineeringsetting it is also a matter of ensuring the availability of resources for distribution, 
for, if climate engineering techniques are deployed, the consequences can be such that the 
very availability of essential commodity for sustenance can be at stake, as shown by the 
scientific estimations of the side-effects of climate engineering. 
Therefore, although it may appear that climate engineering may be procedurally just 
in the eyes of the of the Rawlsian pure procedural justice, engaging the intricacies of the said 
suggestion we find that such a suggestion is only apparent and the justification of climate 
engineering from the Rawlsian viewpoint of pure procedural justice is highly dubious. 
 
6.4.5 Consent – A Moral Quandary for Pure Procedural Justice 
In effecting just results from fair procedure under the Rawlsian scheme, the climate 
engineering debate is confronted with a number of other practical issues in regard to 
procedural justice. For Rawls, just outcome is guaranteed by previously agreed rules. It takes 
us to the issue of consent in climate engineering. It is to be noted that here we are using 
consent in the Rawlsian sense as full mutual agreement on a social contract and not as 
acceptance of specific treatment as in the medical setting.The issue of consent has the 
potential to create a real moral dilemma in the climate engineering context. Rawls places the 
issue of consent at the foundational level as his whole system is built up on the mutual 
“consent” among the contracting parties in the original position. Treating the issue of consent 
in its conventional sense in the medical setting, lacks any merit in the climate engineering 
context for unlike the limited number of subjects who need to give consent in the medical 
setting, the participating subjects in climate engineering are all citizens on the globe, for 
climate engineering has such a global impact. 
In the climate engineering context, who are the contracting parties: each human of this 
world or each individual nation? Considering the former, it is against all odds that all citizens 
of all nations are reached at and consent is obtained. Even if all individuals were reached at 
and if there were no unanimous endorsement, it would still be unclear what is the benchmark 
for deciding upon the consent, majority or a supermajority, as proposed by some authors? An 
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agreement by majority or supermajority is fairly democratic, but not Rawlsian. In majority 
rule, the interests of the losing position are not recognized and hence a case of imperfect 
procedural justice.91According to “…a social contract is a hypothetical agreement ... between 
all rather than some members of society...”92 Obtaining consent for climate engineering 
seems to be a real procedural impossibility from the Rawlsian point of view. Without consent 
there cannot be a just procedure in place to ensure a just result as warranted by pure 
procedural justice. 
If individual nations are considered as the contracting parties, the dilemma is only 
aggravated. Even within democratic nations today, the institutions of the society or the 
practice of distribution within nations are not established on just principles, as the disparity 
between the poor and the rich is a startling reality in the supposedly social and liberal 
economies. Particularly in climatic context, the ability to adaptation and vulnerability to 
climate changes vary in different regions or depending on the economic status of the 
population, often exposing the poor regions or poor citizens to greater risk. If the media 
reports can be believed, this was proven in the case of the preparations for and response to the 
hurricane Katrina that hit the United States in 2005. It also remains so that the voice of the 
poor sections of the society is often not given its due merit in the present practice of the 
policy making in almost all nations, as the policy makers and decision making process are 
very much marred by several extraneous factors like corporate influences. Therefore, even if 
there is consent among all nations, it is not likely to be a fair representation of the voices of 
all peoples of the nations. Absence of fair representation of the voices of all peoples is thus 
deemed to be an instance of imperfect procedural justice. Universal consent among all 
nations seems to be mythical given that climate engineering will certainly create losers and 
winners, and the potentially losing nations will not give consent to a technology that can be 
existentially catastrophic to them. Thus the issue of consent poses added challenges to 
procedural justice in climate engineering from the Rawlsian viewpoint of pure procedural 
justice. 
6.4.6 Public Good and Public Engagement in the Rawlsian Perspective 
According to Rawls, fairness requires that, in “... public political life, nothing need be 
hidden... there is no need for the illusions and delusions of ideology for society to work 
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properly and for citizens to accept it willingly.”93 This offers a key to addressing another 
element of the climate engineering debate from the point of view of procedural justice: 
treating climate engineering as a public good. As we have seen in the third chapter, there is a 
serious argument that SRM should be treated as a public good and several models of public 
engagement are treated in the literature. The Oxford principles are precisely emphasising this 
aspect.  
It could be easily seen that this argument self-imposes itself in the Rawlsian view. For, in 
Rawls, justice is ensured by strictly abiding by the rules of procedure agreed upon in the 
original position by the contracting parties. In the case of climate engineering it can be seen 
that there can be no agreement upon the rules without engaging all the parties who are 
involved in it. Without accommodating the views and concerns of all parties who are directly 
or indirectly affected by climate engineering there can be no fair rules of procedure. Without 
fair rules of procedure there is no just result. Therefore, from the Rawlsian point of view, 
engaging the public and adapting an inclusive approach in the deliberative phase is vital for 
procedural justice in climate engineering. This idea is dormant in Rawls’s formulation though 
he does not have climate engineering in mind here: “A fair distribution can be arrived at only 
by the actual working of a fair social process over time in the course of which, in accordance 
with publicly announced (emphasis added) rules, entitlements are earned and honored. These 
features define pure procedural justice.”94 Further, Rawls says, “Now a social contract is a 
hypothetical agreement a) between all rather than some members of society,(emphasis added) 
and it is b) between them as members of society (as citizens) and not as individuals who hold 
some particular position or role within it.”95 
6.4.7Conditions for Climate Engineering to Comply with Procedural Justice 
Since details are unnecessary for pure procedural justice in the Rawlsian sense, we can 
conceive only general procedural assumptions at the moment. From the above discussion, 
summarily, we can identify some such general assumptions that are essential to guide our 
procedures that would bring us somewhat close –not fully satisfying - to the ideal of pure 
procedural justice in climate engineering. 
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1. Although climate engineering may be justified from the viewpoint of the end-result of 
the procedural justice in Rawls, it is doubtful whether all just procedures can be in 
place as to ensure a just outcome. Although there are some positive streams, the 
nature of the climatic deliberations today is far from any promising consensus with 
normative and legal force. In today’s ‘de-globalizing’ world of ‘post-truth,’ it may be 
more romantic than rational to hope so. Therefore, the fairness of procedure in Rawls 
cannot be complete unless the pre-geoengineering agreement carries the provisions 
for post-deployment procedures that any degree of unfairness or injustice due to 
unforeseen consequence will be addressed by a fresh agreement drawn in the same 
way as though they were deliberating for a consensus under a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance. 
2. It may be an added impetus for proponents of climate engineering if they can present 
a convincing scenario, after the model of the Rawlsian scheme, that climate 
engineering will be developed only on a platform from which all climatic injustice is 
uprooted and climate engineering further consolidates and enhances this new found 
system of climatic justice. Climate engineering procedures should assure that the 
Rawlsian principles of equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity and difference 
principle are well intact. Therefore, ethical justifications for climate engineering have 
to be directed adequately to identifying the promising tracks of justice in climate 
engineering. Put simply, it is a substantive requirement of procedural justice that (at 
least in the Rawlsian scheme) there is no isolated treatment of the justice of climate 
engineering apart from the justice of climate change at large. 
3. Since the redress of the present climatic injustice is impossible without change of life-
style – a consequent imperative from mitigation strategies -, it becomes clear that 
procedurally it is irrational to assume that climate engineering alone suffices to tackle 
the environmental social, and political challenges of climate change. It questions the 
claims of the hardcore exponents that climate engineering can be treated as ‘Plan A.’ 
Procedurally climate engineering can be treated at best as ‘last resort’option. 
 
6.5 Recommendations 
In the light of the dialogue between the Rawlsian view of pure procedural justice and 
climate engineering we will make the following recommendations that are indispensable to 
make them somewhat compatible. 
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1. Procedural fairness implied the necessity of treating climate engineering as a public 
good. The emphasis on climate engineering as a public good sets limits and conditions 
upon the extent the private stakeholders can be involved. Rawls’s assumption that “... 
fair bets are those having a zero expectation of gain...” gain currency in the climate 
engineering context. As a research enterprise, climate engineering will require 
unprecedented levels of purity of intention with a global outlook and determined 
focus, freed from every commercial interest. The propriety of the usual procedure of 
investing into research, developing, patenting and selling for profit will not be 
compatible with the extreme sanctity of procedure required for ensuring just results 
out of pure procedures. It is out of question to leave the development of the 
technology to the dynamics of the free-market driven by competition and profit 
motives. The interests of the global public and the interests of a healthy climate 
should be the primary motivations for the project. The remarks of Rawls does hold 
directly for climate engineering: “In pure procedural justice, then, distributions of 
advantages are not appraised in the first instance by confronting a stock of benefits 
available with given desires and needs of known individuals. The allotment of the 
items produced takes place in accordance with the public system of rules, and this 
system determines what is produced, how much is produced, and by what means.”96 
2. Fairness of procedures alone leads to just results in the absence of any independent 
criterion of specific methods. Conversely, the scope of diverting the technology for 
military intentions should be absolutely nil in climate engineering. The result of a 
military benefit means an unjust result which points pre-emptively to an unfair 
procedure. Climate engineering consensus has the precise objective of a healthy 
climate and military misuses are largely counterproductive to this objective. The 
governance mechanism for climate engineering should take every precaution against 
any misuse of technology along the military lines. 
3. Since climate engineering is to be treated as a public good, it is necessary for 
procedural justice, that the public be adequately informed and engaged beginning with 
the early stages of its developments. Complete transparency of the entire procedures 
in the research and development should be ensured. Since the debate is still confined 
to the academic and scientific circles, it should be an immediate priority to take the 
debate to the general public through well-designed campaigns. The SRMGI (Solar 
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Radiation Management Governance Initiative) has underscored this aspect of treating 
SRM as a public good and therefore obtaining the consent of the public. “[T]hose 
responsible for overseeing the research need to make every effort to ensure that the 
public understands and agrees that it wants to pursue this option, and is consulted as 
inclusively as possible in decision-making processes throughout any research 
programme.”97 
4. As more information will be poured into due to developments in environmental and 
other related branches of science, climate engineering field tests, etc., the decision to 
develop climate engineering could be subjected to periodical review. The parties in 
agreement should be free to withdraw their consent at any point of the research if 
subsequent information shows that the technology is likely to affect the party 
adversely. As the parties enter into agreement in fair and free conditions,98the fairness 
of the terms of the agreement will be such that they can pull themselves out at any 
phase of the research and development. 
5. One of the most prominent concerns with procedural justice in climate engineering 
raised by most authors is the possibility of unilateral deployment of climate 
engineering by any one individual nation. The scope for the unilateral deployment by 
individual nations is altogether ruled out from the Rawlsian point of view. For, in the 
Rawlsian scheme, the contracting parties are to agree upon the terms in the original 
position. Now, in the original position, the contracting parties do not know to which 
nation they belong or to which generation they would belong. When they find that 
there will be parties who would be significantly suffering from the blunt of the 
unilateral deployment of any other party and the accompanying fear of the possibility 
of any party becoming one such suffering party, rationally conceived, all parties are 
likely to agree upon a term that would prohibit any unilateral deployment of climate 
engineering resulting in unilateral loss to any other party. The governance mechanism 
for climate engineering should be such that the issue of unilateral deployment should 
be ruled out at the outset and the very scope for the same should be eliminated. 
6. Adherence to the Rawlsian pure procedural justice logically invalidates the fears that 
research and development will naturally lead to deployment – a major contention 
against research and development. If the procedures are fair and complete, there is no 
question of deployment unless for necessity, not for anything that is short of just 
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results, let alone for luxury or fun. Ensuring proper procedures imply that there is no 
provision for any illegitimate deployment. Leaving any such scope open means that 
the procedures followed are far from being fair and complete. That there is such a 
reasonable apprehension about research and development point to the extent of 
homework that remains to be done even before research and development. Our 
recommendation is that just as unilateral deployment needs to be avoided, so too the 
slippery slope towards deployment following research and development should also 
be checked by means of clear governance rules. 
7. Involving climate scientists, social scientists and ethicists from the populations and 
countries vulnerable to climate engineering not only in policy making and ethical 
deliberations, but in the very research and development of the technology is 
mandatory. It should be done from the early phase of the research. As of now, most 
climate engineering scientists are from the rich countries and their Sitz im Leben may 
act as a barrier in fully anticipating or appreciating the concerns of the vulnerable 
population. From the Rawlsian viewpoint of procedural justice, it is not enough to 
treat the vulnerable population as honorary members to the debate, rather they are to 
be given privileged, substantive, and decisive status in the decision making process. 
As Preston has observed, “Yet of all the populations that should participate in the 
early days SRM research, it would appear that the most vulnerable populations in the 
poorest countries are uniquely deserving.”99 
8. Control of technology is a decisive factor in defining liberty and opportunity. Equal 
liberty and fair equality of opportunity - background conditions for pure procedural 
justice – cannot be met without equal access to and equal control over the climate 
engineering technology. Without the sharing of technology among parties, parties in 
the contract do not do the deliberations as equals. As the concept and development of 
the climate engineering technology is concentrated in the hands of the developed 
countries, just procedure will demand that the countries, which are unable to develop 
the technology, should have access to the technology. The countries that are likely to 
be hit by the technology are to be involved from the early phases of developing the 
technology. The interests of the poor countries, if adequately represented from the 
beginning, can influence the nature, course, and the choice of options in technology. 
However, as we have seen that unilateral deployment will be tantamount to unfair 
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procedure, transfer of technology cannot be treated as a licence to unilateral 
deployment. The Rawlsian observation bears direct implications for climate 
engineering: “[I]nstitutions must, from the outset, put in the hands of citizens 
generally, and not only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully 
cooperating members of society on a footing of equality. Among these means is 
human as well as real capital, that is, knowledge and an understanding of institutions, 
educated abilities, and trained skills. Only in this way can the basic structure realize 
pure background procedural justice...”100Though not in the climate engineering 
perspective, UNFCCC has emphasised this aspect by asking the signatories to “... 
promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including 
transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.”101 
9. Our analysis shows that the need for political determination and goodwill emphasised 
by several ethicists are not wishful prayers, but genuine or perhaps the only way to 
address the problem at a radical level. Deliberations by rational but self-interested 
parties in a hypothetical setting show that it is rationally necessary to redefine our 
self-interest in order to be procedurally fair with climate engineering. Putting it 
differently, much of the self-interest of many individual nations protected at 
international climate change forums is not holding up rationally. Today part of the 
challenges with climate change summits is that the parties are doing negotiations as 
US-Americans, Germans, Chinese or Indians who have self-interests to protect. The 
Rawlsian scheme shows that unprecedented levels of dissociation from national 
interest and recourse to conservative solutions like change of life-style will be needed 
to ensure justice in climate change climate engineering. Change of life-style 
demanded by mitigation is not a charity but a rational obligation. In an emerging 
world of ‘surrealism’ where populism and nationalism is on the rise, fair procedures 
of just climate engineering demands a radically different mind-set soliciting relaxed 
migration rules, sharing of potential losses irrespective of national differences, 
reformulation of the existing legal frameworks like CBD, ENMOD and UNFCCC and 
formulation of new legal frameworks that justly engages the present climatic injustice 
as well, privileged consideration of applications for funding the research by the poor 
countries, and mandating the representation of the poor and the potentially vulnerable 
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countries in funding forums, etc. Conversely, the argument of some of the proponents 
that climate engineering provides a magic bullet to get rid of conservative solutions 
like changing our life-styles do not withstand the test of rational scrutiny. 
10. The priorities and emphases for future course of development as reflected in the 
present debate needs to be reconsidered. While the predominant thinking in the 
literature is to place the trust in the governance mechanism to ensure fairness and 
justice, in the Rawlsian scheme, governance rules are only part of the fair procedures 
that lead to just results. In other words systemic fairness in procedures subsumes just 
governance. It should be seen that in the Rawlsian four stage sequence of the 
formation of the contract,102 governance and administration comes only at the final 
stage. Without belittling the importance of governance, more preliminary and 
foundational concerns are also to be prioritized. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
In sequence to the investigation of the compatibility of climate engineering with the 
distributive and intergenerational justice in the preceding chapters, this chapter analysed the 
compatibility of the same from the viewpoint of procedural justice. The first part on literature 
review assembled the scattered elements of the procedural issues in climate engineering. The 
second part narrated the Rawlsian view of procedural justice dwelling mostly on the 
categories of procedural justice - especially pure procedural justice -, background pure 
procedural justice, and relation between procedural justice and distributive justice. In the 
third part, we approached the lead question of the compatibility of climate engineering with 
justice using the theoretical frame of the Rawlsian pure procedural justice that led us to make 
some concrete recommendations in the fourth part.  
Our analysis shows that the complexity and radicality of the concerns with procedural 
justice in climate engineering and the unpreparedness of the scientific and ethical community 
as of now do not offer sufficient justification for climate engineering. It is found that despite 
the serious concerns about its viability, the Rawlsian scheme offers, perhaps the most radical 
and the most demanding standards for perfect fairness and propriety of procedures to ensure 
justice in climate engineering. The intricacies of the procedural justice in climate engineering 
are substantively intertwined with the larger issues of climatic justice altogether and calls for 
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concrete and determined practical exercises to translate the warranted fairness and justice into 
the course of development of the climate engineering technology. Our analysis, while 
exposing the flaws in our preparedness, also suggests essential directions to advance the 
debate to stand up to the hard demands of procedural justice. We wonder if Rawls had 
climate engineering in mind when he wrote, “Granting that existing conditions always fall 
short of the ideal assumptions, we have some notion of what is just. Moreover we are in a 
better position to assess how serious the existing imperfections are and to decide upon the 
best way to approximate the ideal.”103 
In the preceding three normative chapters we have been trying to answer the research 
question can climate engineeringbe developed in a just manner compatible with the Rawlsian 
principles of distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice. Now it is time to stay 
back, evaluate and consolidate the responses and perspectives emerging from our analysis 
and findings. That defines the objective of the concluding chapter that follows. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: Retrospective and Prospective Perspectives 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Having looked at the concerns with justice from the Rawlsian point of view in the 
preceding chapters, in this chapter we will revisit our research question and see summarily 
the answers emerging from the analysis. We will also see how our position is vindicated 
against certain other positions. We will highlight the uniqueness and relevance of this 
research and suggest certain directions for future research in relation to justice in particular 
and ethics in general in climate engineering. With this objective, in the first part of this 
chapter we see retrospectively how our research question is answered and the second part will 
highlight the unique dynamics of this research. Finally we offer some conceptual and 
theoretical outlooks for the future directions of research. 
7.2 Revisiting the Research Question 
Aristotle, true to his rationalistic mindset, emphasised accuracy and exactitude 
particularly in mathematics. “[I]t is ... foolish to accept probable reasoning from a 
mathematician...”1 However, epistemological developments even in physical and 
mathematical sciences have advanced far beyond what Aristotle could envisage, to the levels 
of indeterminacy and probability. It was Einstein who said that “As far as the laws of 
mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; as far as they are certain, they do not refer to 
reality.”2Austrian logician and mathematician Kurt Gödel showed that there are propositions 
that are true but not provable.3 Similarly in philosophy, we have Wittgenstein who coined a 
similar paradoxical statement, “Most of the propositions and questions to be found in 
philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.”4 Our recourse to these seemingly strange 
metaphors is to highlight an intrinsic limit in formulating a definitive response in yes or no to 
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our research question –can climate engineering be developed and deployed in a just manner 
fulfilling the conditions of distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice under the 
Rawlsian scheme? The enormous complexity of the debate landscape of climate engineering 
coupled with the characteristic features of a reflective and speculative discipline like ethics, 
our moral deliberations on the justifiability of climate engineering from the viewpoint of 
justice remain provisional, far from being final and definitive. Our caution against 
oversimplification desist us from making categorical responses in the affirmative or in the 
negative. Gardiner’s response four years ago to the question of whether he is for climate 
engineering that such a question is an “unhelpful distraction”5 seems to be holding still. A 
definitive statement on the justifiability of climate engineering from the point of view justice 
is premature mainly due to insufficient scientific data.  
Summarily, our response to the research question can be articulated in answering the 
following questions: 
1. Is climate engineering more a challenge or an opportunity for justice? 
2. If it is more a challenge, are the challenges surmountable before and after the 
deployment of the technology? 
Answering to the first question, our analysis implies that in the current phase of the 
debate, climate engineering is far short of substance as a policy to be accountable to the 
normative demands of justice in the three counts of distributive, intergenerational and 
procedural justice.  
The bottom-line of our analysis of the distributive justice showed that there will be 
winners and losers in climate engineering. Relying on simulation studies against the Rawlsian 
scheme, we showed in chapter 46 while dealing with distributive justice that deployment of 
climate engineering is poised to go against equal rights to the most extensive scheme of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Despite the elements 
of uncertainty in regard to the impact of climate engineering, as discussed in chapter 4,7the 
simulation studies show that the impact of climate engineering, especially of SRM, will be 
unevenly distributed. Simulation studies show disturbing results that differentiated spatial 
changes in precipitation can hit regions like Africa, South America, and South-Eastern Asia 
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most. Available data undisputedly show that SRM and distributive justice are very much 
incompatible. The results of the studies suggest that the various aspects of injustice related to 
climate change to which the global poor are already exposed are likely to be compounded by 
climate engineering.8Climate engineering will surely violate the principle of equal liberty, the 
difference principle and the principle of efficiency – in the Rawlsian scheme. And the current 
phase of the debate does not show any serious attempt to practically engage the challenges 
that are certain to distributive justice. It is here that our analysis is forced to condone climate 
engineering to be incompatible with distributive justice. 
The case with intergenerational justice too is not anything as promising as to present 
climate engineering as an opportunity. The issue of sudden termination limits the liberty of 
the future generations. The realization of just institutions is necessary for intergenerational 
justice under the Rawlsian scheme. Deploying climate engineering means the primary natural 
good of a sustainable environment will ever be technology-dependent. Therefore, it cannot be 
claimed that just institutions will be established in the future. An option for a technical fix 
over a fundamental solution like change of life-style will earmark the present generation as 
ungrateful receivers or as selfish takers, instead of being responsible givers. Our analysis 
showed that a just concern for future generations will primarily eliminate the context of 
having to make a choice between mitigation and climate engineering by avoiding 
circumstances that create dangerous climatic conditions that warrant climate engineering. 
Accordingly it has been seen that much impetus for climate engineering is possibly drawn 
from the “generational selfishness”9 of the present generation as it looks at climate change 
from its relative temporal position. 
In regard to procedural justice too, the odds are much against any easy rapprochement 
between climate engineering and justice. Although the Rawlsian dictum that a purely fair 
procedure ensures just results is fully acceptable, its effective application to climate 
engineering is doubtful. Thus in all three counts of justice, in our analysis, given the present 
context of the world, climate engineering is more of a challenge to justice than an 
opportunity.  
This position in itself does not invalidate the desirability of the climate engineering 
project. We have also seen that if a purely fair procedure can be in place, it makes climate 
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engineering as a watershed opportunity not only for environmental justice but also to rectify 
the climatic injustice prevalent in the present world at large. Such a fundamental fixation with 
fair procedures will in principle eliminate the apprehensions we shared about distributive 
justice and intergenerational justice. That is to say, if all fair procedures are well in place, 
there is no challenge from climate engineering to distributive and intergenerational justice.  
This observation brings us to the second question that we posed above, are the 
challenges to climate engineering from justice surmountable before and after the deployment 
of the technology? Exactly, this is the issue that the lead questions - what are the conditions 
under which climate engineering may be justified from the point of view of distributive, 
intergenerational and procedural justice in the Rawlsian scheme? – of our three justice 
chapters try to answer. Climate engineering can be an ambitious project if it can meet the 
radical challenges and the stringent conditions under which it may be justified from the 
justice point of view. We saw that such an ideal state of affairs, though hard to achieve, has 
the potential to alleviate the climatic injustice presently prevalent between nations. 
Establishing proper governance mechanism with a decisive role assigned to the 
representatives of the vulnerable populations, detailed provisions for compensation to the 
victims, facilitating reliable forecast and contingency plans, creating provisions for adaptation 
for those who will be affected, relaxed migration policies towards the victims, and specific 
research agenda targeting the vulnerable are some conditions recommended for ensuring 
distributive justice. A deliberate saving mechanism for future, forming clarity and binding 
terms for compensation in regard to the rate, beneficiaries and duration, framing new legal 
frameworks and amending international treaties such as ENMOD, CBD, and UNFCCC, are 
some conditions necessary for just climate engineering from the point of view of 
intergenerational justice.  Insulating technology against military intentions and profit motives, 
treating the technology as a public good, universal consent, addressing the prevalent climatic 
injustice across the globe, ban on unilateral deployment, transparency in procedures, 
provisions for transfer of technology to the poor nations, etc., are the major conditions found 
essential to make climate engineering as much an exercise from the point of view of 
procedural justice under the Rawlsian scheme. Among these, the condition of eradicating the 
climatic injustice existing in the world today – a logical imperative from the Rawlsian 
scheme – is perhaps the most radical of all that is hard to achieve. That is to say, the 
challenges to justice from climate engineering are surmountable provided we employ 
unprecedented levels of political determination and goodwill, international collaboration and 
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the existential readiness to embrace conservative ways to alter individual life-style. 
Ironically, the demands are such that it may require harder measures to ensure justice in 
climate engineering than achieving the same targets set by the mitigation strategies. If 
humanity can exhibit such extraordinary courage to stand up to the test of the times, the 
success with mitigation may acquit us from having to geoengineer at all. 
We do not overlook positive testimonies to what political determination can achieve 
in this regard. The unprecedented levels of consensus and willingness shown by the Paris 
summit stand tall among these. There are also promising reports along the line that despite 
the rollback on the US climate policy, China and India are set to overachieve the targets set in 
the Paris Agreement. The report released at the UN climate meeting in Germany estimated 
that given the present rate of decline in coal consumption China will achieve its target ahead 
of schedule and India will achieve a 40% reduction in emission from coal by 2022.10 It is 
hoped that these developments can potentially outweigh the adverse impact of the recent US 
rollback. 
7.3 Some Pragmatic Considerations 
Viewing our approach to justice from a more pragmatic stream of thought may exhibit 
the limits of our consideration of climate engineering in general and call for taking region-
specific and country-specific approaches. We cannot fail to see the situations where 
miscarriage of justice will be implied to particular nations unless climate engineering is 
exercised. That may set the agenda for another important stream of research in the field. 
From the justice point of view, there could arise circumstances where outright negation of 
climate engineering could lead to negation of justice to the poor and the populations 
vulnerable to climate change, where climate engineering may be inevitable, for instance, the 
possible context of the earth crossing another tipping point. That dangerous climate change 
has already occurred and assuming that the efforts at mitigation are nowhere to achieve their 
target and there is no adequate aid for adaptation, the island nations in the Pacific and the 
Indian Ocean are confronted with an imminent do or drown situation due to rising sea levels. 
If they find that they will manage to borrow some breathing space through climate 
engineering, not allowing them to geoengineer in such a context for reasons of its global 
impact or unforeseen consequences would be tantamount to compound injustice to the 
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peoples of such nations, primarily, because injustice has been meted out to them by 
subjecting them to the dangers of anthropogenic climate change and in not helping them 
adequately with adaptation and secondarily by depriving them of their last resort option for 
survival. There may be circumstances in future where outright negation of climate 
engineering may run contrary to rational solutions. Preston’s (2011) question, what if climate 
engineering were to be used for averting a dangerous climate change not caused by 
anthropogenic factors,11 does deserve a meritorious treatment. The question of Burns et al., 
“if another ice-age is in the offing will climate engineering of a different sort be 
required?”12suggests possible contexts where climate engineering may be a “responsible 
obligation”13 from the justice point of view as well. 
 As we have seen in Chapter 3, Gardiner (2013c) has objected to this strand of thought, 
which in the debate is often referred to as the desperate argument.14According to Gardiner 
(2013c), the desperate argument is a false self-defence not engaging the factors that led to the 
desperate situation in the first place. We can agree with the point of the argument, but we 
cannot confuse between the ideal and the practical; between rational analysis and intuitive 
response. Responsive action inbuilt in our ethical phronesis is provoked by the immediacies 
and intuitions irrespective of the causal factors that may force a thinking otherwise. When 
confronted with a demanding situation of life and death, we do not go to explore the root 
cause, rather to provide the actions that are deemed necessary to avoid catastrophe and 
facilitate life. For instance, on the road we find a reckless rider knocked down against a 
median and is crying for life support. Our immediate intuition is to rush him to the hospital 
without investigating as to what led to the accident. Even if we knew that his rash ride has 
been responsible for his accident, our ethical intuition can supersede and subdue several of 
the extraneous factors that can limit the degree of our rational responsiveness. The Levinasian 
metaphor of the face as the epiphany of the other stimulating action15 does attribute some 
weight to pragmatic considerations in climate engineering deliberations, perhaps overstated 
                                                          
11Preston 2011, p. 471. 
12 Burns 2013, p. 142. 
13 Phrase is of Preston. See, Preston 2013, p. 27 
14 See Gardiner 2013b. 
15 “The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing 
to my own measure. . . . It expresses itself.” Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969), pp. 50-51 
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by Michaelson, for whom “... the right thing exists in the mind. Climate change is in the 
atmosphere.”16 
 The proponents modifying their light-hearted approach to the risks and reinstating their 
commitment to mitigation and the hard-core opponents giving up their treatment as an 
intrinsic evil may offer more responsible pathways for the debate to advance forward. The 
metaphor “rethinking the unthinkable”17 may be relevant in regard to concerns with justice as 
well. Though Preston (2011) considers the entire climate engineering to be a sort of lesser 
evil, at the end of day, we could see that under certain circumstances, certain forms of CDR 
may turn out to be a lesser evil.“An accounting that was global in scale, intergenerational in 
nature, projecting many centuries into the future, and ranging across both human and 
environmental well-being would present insurmountable technical problems. However, there 
is nothing theoretically at odds with the idea that geoengineering could, at the end of the day, 
remain the lesser evil.”18 
7.4 The Conceptual Recommendations of the Research 
 Below we present what we consider to be some foundationalrecommendations 
emerging from the research at hand upon climate engineering ethics in general and justice in 
particular. 
7.4.1 The Rawlsian Scheme and Beyond Rawls 
 Conceptually and strategically, perhaps the major stream of engagement in this research is 
the application of the Rawlsian principles of distributive, intergenerational and procedural 
justice to the climate engineering debate. The Rawlsian strand of the research is found to be 
rich with conceptual resources and normative tools to significantly inform and advance the 
overall climate engineering debate. 
 For Rawls, ethics pertains to the basic structure of the society, as the contractual tradition 
represented and advanced by him is founded on the pristinely ideal and the perfectly non-
circumstantial state of affairs as the conditions for forming the agreement between the 
contracting parties. In the climate engineering context, Rawls is useful to go to the root of the 
issue. As the issues of climate change and responses like climate engineering basically stem 
                                                          
16 Michaelson 2013, p. 107. 
17 See, Preston 2011. 
18 Preston 2011, p. 468. 
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from the anomalies in the basic structures of the society such as patterns of distribution and 
consumption, constitutional and legal systems, economic policies, etc., Rawls cautions us on 
the gravity, complexity and radicality of the homework that needs to be done to be prepared 
for climate engineering to be deployed in a fair and just manner. From the point of view of 
the Rawlsian justice a radical and sustainable response to dangerous climate change is not as 
simple as a policy decision on balancing the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. It needs 
radical restructuring of our existing practices and ways of life, redefining the ratios of 
distribution, rethinking on our worldviews, and redressing the geographical bad luck of 
several of the populations. It is from Rawls that we realize that justice in climate engineering 
reasonably needs primarily a consolidation of environmental justice at large. 
 The emergence of Rawls on the scene exposes the conceptual poverty of certain 
superficial responses to climate change. In climatic negotiations, eliminating subjective 
reservations under a cloud of wishful ignorance about the wider issues requires absolute 
purity of intention and perfect objectivity for climatic policies freed from national, 
geographical and temporal partisanship that limit the horizons of our ecological vision. 
Herein resides the uniqueness of Rawls’s original position for climate change negotiations 
particularly for climate engineering. No artificial patchworks can withstand the pristine 
rational objectivity of a hypothetical original position. Climate engineering does benefit from 
Rawls to shed off the criticism against it as a symptomatic approach by restoring some 
conceptual depth and thereby helping it to address the root of the problems with climate 
change. 
 Climate engineering for mere pragmatic reasons may finally end up as a compounded 
problem rather than a solution. What the Rawlsian scheme shows is the primacy of genuine 
philosophical motivations and nonpartisan conditions devoid of hidden agenda and petty 
political interests. To use a common sense analogy, we will treat a patient for lung cancer 
caused by habitual smoking. While medicine may go all out with trying approaches like 
surgery, radiation, and chemo, it cannot be assumed that the patient can continue with his 
smoking. As the burden of proof now rests with the proponents, it is unto them to convince 
others that they are not content with a short-sighted pragmatic justification, rather prepared to 
address the issue systemically. 
 The Rawlsian preoccupation with the basic structure of the society presents an ideal state 
of affairs whereby climate engineering, if the conditions of justice are met, may even be 
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preferred over mitigation as it is deemed to fix the existing injustice with climate change. 
Though the Rawlsian scheme has its limitations, it may be better than many other theoretical 
frameworks to be used in the context of climate engineering. As Rawls states on one 
occasion: “Justice as fairness will prove a worthwhile theory if it defines the range of justice 
more in accordance with our considered judgments than do existing theories, and if it singles 
out with greater sharpness the graver wrongs a society should avoid.”19 
While we appreciate the theoretical merits of Rawls, recognition of the limits of our 
research imposed by our methodic fixation with the Rawlsian scheme can equally propel the 
maturation of the overall debate. Rawls’s theoretical preoccupation with the basic structure of 
the society has unwittingly obscured our attention from treating some of the down to earth 
considerations in environmental justice like sustainable development, sovereignty and self-
determination of nations and individuals, the issues of human rights and the rights of the non-
-human, cultural and environmental self-determination, quality environment and quality 
health care, etc., that are crucial for justice in climate engineering as well. Hence this research 
needs to be complimented by and completed by an analysis of the issues of justice against 
other useful theoretical models too.  
While Rawls stands for the present time entry interpretation of the original position, 
our present time entry carries extremely lethargic factors against the ambitious designs of 
justice. While some authors in biology and neuroscience have the sunny optimism of 
“altruism genes” and “mirror neurons,”20 what we find in reality is the return of the “selfish 
gene”21 in a de-globalizing world of post-truth, be it the cases of Brexit in Europe or 
Trumpism in the US or the emerging right-wing populism elsewhere. The recent US U-turn 
with its environmental policy invoked the negative paradox of solving the problem by 
negating its existence. The Rawlsian ideal of a rational foundation for fairness and justice in 
practice is still far from transcending the intrinsic traits of selfishness in biological evolution. 
It looks as if the Rawlsian perspectives are intact and ideally safe mainly under a veil of 
ignorance and the reality test presents a far more insecure scenario. 
The international aid in response to the natural disaster of tsunami in 2004 has 
positively testified to the charity of humanity. The silent and prolonged disaster like the 
dangerous climate change and the lack of international goodwill and political determination 
                                                          
19 Theory of Justice, p. 176. 
20 See Chapter 5, 5.4.3.2. 
21 See, Richard Dawkins, Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
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to ensure justice in the face of ecological disasters carry the negative certification that 
humanity has not transcended the level of charity to affirming justice in terms of fundamental 
rights, global responsibilities and moral obligations. Mere charity will not suffice to ensure 
justice against the global consequences of climate engineering that is sure to produce 
ecological refugees and raise serious challenges to fundamental human rights. It needs firm 
commitment to affirming and respecting the universal human rights against every odds, 
foreseen and unforeseen, protected and sustained by universal legal regimes. 
Our lamentations on the negative cultural traits are to show that justice in climate 
engineering in reality has to encounter the psychological and cultural lethargies of the present 
time as the entry point of interpretation. We mean to say that consideration of whatever 
practical issues we did not consider in our research question is likely to make the challenges 
to justice harder for climate engineering than what is highlighted by the Rawlsian 
perspectives. 
7.4.2 Dispelling the Fragmentary and Restoring the Systemic 
Climate change and the responses to it are very complex issues with overlapping 
political, geographical, legal, technological and existential aspects. Among the present 
responses, neither mitigation nor climate engineering seem to have absorbed the complexity 
in its totality and are often dominated by pragmatic considerations, although there are several 
alarms sent by the advocates of environmental philosophy and ecological ethics. Our research 
can be an added conceptual tool to widen the horizons of appropriating the responses to 
climate change, particularly of climate engineering. The pragmatic approach treats the 
problems in isolation with a methodic style of picking and choosing. An analysis from the 
perspective of justice, particularly informed by the Rawlsian scheme, warrants a more 
systemic approach to identify the problems in their social, political, economic and ecological 
embeddedness. 
Firstly, justice perspectives provide a vantage point to partly refute, substantiate, 
revise or reorder some of the leading arguments for and against climate engineering. For 
instance, the feasibility arguments for climate engineering had the flowery rhetoric of the 
incredible economics of climate engineering considering only the cost of development and 
deployment of the technology, completely ignoring the indirect expenses pertaining to risky 
side-effects, compensation, rehabilitation of the displaced, and so on. Our analysis has shown 
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that there can be no just climate engineering assuming such blissful ignorance of the wider 
issues. 
Secondly, the discard of ethics in general and justice in particular, particularly by the 
champions of technology, is proven to be naively reductionistic. The legitimacy of sweeping 
simplifications like the comment of Lane that “moralistic objections are likely to have only 
limited effect”22 is challenged outright by the perspectives provided in this study. It is 
interesting to note that in the process of the maturation of the debate, some of the initial 
hardcore proponents of climate engineering now have opted for a moderate position, as 
epitomised in Michaelson who described climate engineering to be a magic bullet in 1998and 
a lesser evilin2013.23 
 Thirdly, the lesser evil argument in support of climate engineering, when viewed from 
the justice perspective, loses some of its currency as we find that climate engineering will 
necessarily create winners and losers, and what is presumptuously termed as lesser evil may 
turn out to be a greater evil for some populations, if a case-specific or nation specific analysis 
of the concerns with justice is made. Though we may be compelled to agree with many 
apprehensive conclusions that at the end of the day, it may be the lesser of the two evils, we 
have to humbly acknowledge that the lesser evil position reflects our philosophical and moral 
bankruptcy and our preference for the simple and the pragmatic over the fundamental and the 
conservative. 
 Fourthly, looking at the climate emergency arguments for climate engineering as to buy 
time for mitigation, we cannot fail to see situations where climate engineering projects may 
even curtail the available time in an otherwise non-geoengineered world for the survival of 
certain populations. For example, one of the worst fears about climate engineering is that it 
may even completely shut down the monsoon in Asia, particularly in India and Bangladesh. 
With about 70% of the rural population in India relying solely on the annual monsoon for 
their yearly sustenance, a sudden termination of the monsoon could cause irreparable and 
irrevocable damage to billions in the subcontinent within a short span of time.  
                                                          
22 Lee Lane, “Climate Engineering and the Anthroposcene Era,” in Will C. G. Burns and Andrew L. Strauss, 
Eds., Climate Change Geoengineering – Philosophical Perspectives, Legal Issues and Governance Frameworks 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 144. 
23 See Michaelson 1998 and 2013. 
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 Thus we confirm that anything less than a paramount attention to the concerns with 
justice will not suffice to justify climate engineering. Justice perspectives book us against any 
artificial conduits within the rhetoric for climate engineering. 
7.4.3 Correcting and Consolidating the Prevalent Assumptions 
On the one hand we havehighlighted the need for correcting some of the dominant 
patterns of arguments in the climate engineering debate and on the other we have confirmed 
some other perspectives. For example, firstly as a corrective exercise, our research 
categorically rejects the idea that climate engineering can be considered as the Plan A to 
combat the dangers of climate change, a hubristic presupposition shared by several 
proponents especially in the early days. As the awareness of the side-effects and consequent 
challenges of justice become vivid such rhetoric does not pass the reality test. In our 
intersection between the Rawlsian scheme and various concerns with justice in climate 
engineering, on three occasions we have challenged the assumption that climate engineering 
as a Plan A is least compatible with distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice. It 
also answers the question that we found open ended in the review of the literature as to what 
is the moral value of climate engineering consideration in the debate, as a Plan A or Plan B. 
Justice perspectives inform the debate that climate engineering be treated only as a 
supplementary tool to mitigation failing which there is little scope to defend climate 
engineering as a just exercise. 
 Secondly, as a consolidating exercise, our research endorses the viewpoints of formal 
bodies like IPCC and Royal Society that preference should be given to CDR techniques to 
begin with research and development. A recurrent observation in our research was the 
disequilibrium between SRM and CDR on the debate scenario. The current debate is 
predominantly focussed on the ethical implications of SRM technologies with inadequate 
attention paid to the CDR schemes. It was the recommendation made by Royal Society and 
IPCC that CDR schemes are less prone to yield harmful and irrevocable side-effects. 
Conversely, this finding is upheld by our research that most challenges to distributive, 
intergenerational and procedural justice due to seen and unforeseen side-effects are posed by 
SRM, and CDR is relatively better off with managing the side-effects that threaten justice. 
Major challenges to distributive justice resulted from the side effects of SRM. The sudden 
termination effect is an exclusive threat from SRM to intergenerational justice. The 
possibility of compounding the present climatic justice is mostly due to SRM. While CDR is 
not fully risk-free, its risks seem to be somewhat more surmountable relative to SRM.As we 
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observed elsewhere, the future course of the debate along the CDR line will contribute 
significantly towards the future dynamics of the debate. 
 
7.5 Justice in Climate Engineering: Future Directions 
7.5.1 The Nod for Research and Development 
 If the conditions for just climate engineering can be met and the challenges are 
surmountable, the nod for moderate research and development seems warranted at this point 
in the interest of justice mainly for two reasons. Firstly, to ensure justice at an otherwise no 
exit situation, and secondly, to ensure that as much homework is done for ensuring justice in 
an unavoidable circumstance of having to deploy climate engineering. What if mitigation 
fails and climate engineering not developed? The aftermath is unlikely to be as bad as the 
challenges to justice from climate engineering. Invoking climate engineering for other than 
anthropogenic reasons may enable better understanding. For instance, let us imagine what 
happens if a catastrophic solar maximum24 is causing an abnormal rise in the global 
temperatures. Studies have shown that the solar minimum and the solar maximum can cause 
changes in regional weather patterns.25 The dangers of anthropogenic climate change 
worsened by an abnormal solar maximum may become a justifying ground for a certain 
nation or nations to geoengineer temporarily failing which there can be serious injustice 
meted out to such populations. In terms of justice, though climate engineering does not enjoy 
the force and substance to be a formidable policy option as of now, there can be situations 
where outright negation of climate engineering can be equally detrimental to the cause of 
justice. 
 However, in the interest of justice the protocol for field research should keep it to the 
minimum level in the first phase with the objective to collect data and information. Ethical 
judgments cannot be done in a vacuum, and we need reliable and tangible scientific data to 
make fair ethical judgments. Conversely, as this objective of research does not imply the nod 
for development, which will be subject to approval or disapproval based on the feedback 
from the research, it avoids the slippery slope of the research leading to deployment. The 
objection of research funding being diverted cannot weigh against climate engineering as this 
is pertaining to the existential problem of the survival of the species26 –a vital condition under 
                                                          
24 Solar minima and maxima are the two extremes of the sun’s 11-year activity cycle. At solar maximum, the 
sun with increased number of sunspots erupt solar flares into space. See, Wikipdedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_minimum. Accessed November 4, 2016. 
25 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_minimum. Accessed November 4, 2016 
26 See sections 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 5.2.1.3 and 6.4.4. 
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which climate engineering may be sanctioned in our analysis - that is formidable before any 
other research. Further, the sort of research and its governance as envisaged particularly by 
our analysis of the procedural justice ensures just background conditions and fair procedures 
for the research. 
 The involvement of the scientists from the nations that are supposedly vulnerable to the 
side-effects of climate engineering is to be ensured in the process of initiating research and 
development. For instance, greater involvement of scientists from India or Bangladesh in 
climate engineering researches since its early phase will result in a decisive attention paid to 
the impact of climate engineering on monsoon. As climate engineering is predicted to result 
in the partial or complete shutdown of the monsoon, it can aggravate the ill fate of the 
farmers in India and the surrounding countries. Given the present tragic fate of the farmers in 
India, it is very unlikely that Indian scientists will choose SRM schemes over CDR. The 
exposure of the Indian scientists to the harsh existential reality of over 12000 Indian farmers 
committing suicide yearly since 201327 is certain to influence the climate engineering policy 
of the country. These suicides are to a great extent caused by the impoverishment of the 
farmers due to the dangers of climate change. Any climate policy that may worsen the ill fate 
of the farmers is to be termed unjust in this context. Further, such concrete concerns will push 
to the fore with greater force the issues of harm and compensation. As for the future course of 
the debate, precise judgements on the justifiability of climate engineering will warrant more 
technology-specific, context-specific or even nation-specific analysis and assessment. While 
acknowledging the limitations of this research in this regard, it is proposed to be a proximate 
agenda for advancing the debate further along the line of justice. 
 It is to be recollected here that we have condemned partiality, national egoism, etc., 
only under the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The main contention is that parties under the veil 
of ignorance are not likely to choose climate engineering at all. The point of our arguments is 
that the choice of technologies for the global climate engineering policy can be influenced by 
the regional scientists. The representing scientists from vulnerable regions and nations will be 
sensitive to the dangers from otherwise harmful technologies to their region. This sensitivity 
will influence their preferences in policy decisions as absolute value-neutral judgements may 
be rare. 
                                                          
27Dhananjay Mahapatra, “Over 12,000 farmer suicides per year, Centre tells Supreme Court,” Times of India, 
May 13, 2017. Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/over-12000-farmer-suicides-per-year-
centre-tells-supreme-court/articleshow/58486441.cms. Accessed July 1, 2017. 
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7.5.2 Technology-specific and Context-specific Research Agenda 
 This research confirms the problematic outlined by many commentators on the ethics of 
climate engineering that the issue of framing and branding climate engineering is complex 
and complicated. Betz and Cacean (2012) had this observation as the predominant outcome 
of their review. It is our contention too that debate in the initial phase was more rhetoric than 
realistic, which led many proponents to go for hubristic technical nomenclature, which was to 
confuse and mislead the public and unwittingly invoking awful dissent. As we already 
observed in Chapter 3, even the strong proponents of climate engineering are now 
championing the rechristening of the technology to climate modification abandoning climate 
engineering. 
 What does the framing issue suggest to the concerns with justice? Any formulation that 
climate engineering can be just or unjust is vulnerable to the pitfalls of this framing 
problematic as any general formulation will miss precision and clarity as to which form of 
climate engineering may be just or unjust. So too, when we lay the conditions for ensuring 
justice in climate engineering, precision analysis will deem to correlate specific conditions 
with specific forms of the climate engineering technology. Intersecting justice with a generic 
nomenclature like climate engineering seems to imply uncritical generalisation that may not 
be helpful always. For instance, when Russia stands to gain a little from global warming and 
the Maldives stand to lose everything to global warming, permitting or not permitting climate 
engineering is intrinsically contradictory from the justice viewpoint. Ethical deliberations will 
be sufficiently fair if the contextual embeddedness of the issues is sufficiently regarded. An 
abstract generalisation of the limits of the desperate arguments does not rule out the desperate 
call and urgency for climate engineering in their contextual diversity. The whole of desperate 
argument may be differently conceived if the Asia-Pacific scientists or ethicists were to 
dominate the debate. For example, the debate on climate engineering as a potential ‘moral 
hazard’ to mitigation in the Western setting may be treated as a potential ‘moral impetus’ to 
mitigation in the Asia-Pacific context. For, the greater concern for the drastic consequences 
of climate engineering which may more adversely affect some nations, may force them to 
accelerate their attempts at the less demanding mitigation strategies.  
A recent report of the Imperial College London in regard to the remote impacts of 
climate change may be a potential indicator to the unjust impact of climate engineering. 
Scientists at the Imperial College London calculated the drastic impact of the emission of 
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sulphur dioxide in Europe upon rainfall in India.28 It was found that one of the worst droughts 
that hit India in 2000 was caused by the pollution from the Industries in Europe. Sulphur 
dioxide emission of Europe caused acid rain, diseases of heart and lung, and severe damage 
to the growth of plants. It affected over 130 million people. According to their calculations, 
the emissions from the main industrial areas of the Northern hemisphere resulted in a 
reduction of about 40% precipitation on the North-West India. The remarks of Apostolos 
Voulgarakis, of  the Imperial College, that “their research, along with other studies, showed 
the kind of problems that might result from attempts to use sulphur dioxide in a geo-
engineering scheme,”29 do share the similar concerns with justice that we have been 
discussing. Similar sort of region specific researches can help evaluate the concerns with 
justice in climate engineering in a more tangible manner. As for the future course of the 
debate, precise judgements on the justifiability of climate engineering will warrant more 
technology-specific, context-specific or even nation-specific analysis and assessment. While 
acknowledging the limitations of this research in this regard, it is proposed to be a proximate 
agenda for advancing the debate further along the line of justice. 
 
7.5.3 Call for an Eastern and Indian Perspective 
 It has been noticed in our review of literature that the debate on the ethics of climate 
engineering, at least in the medium of English, is mostly conducted by the Northern and 
Western scholars from the developed countries with inadequate representation from the 
developing countries of the Eastern and Southern part of the globe. Not many ethicists and 
social scientists from Asia, Africa or South America are seen on the debate scene, though 
these regions are very vulnerable to the potential risks from climate engineering. This 
research may be considered as a recommendation to advance the research from the Eastern 
and Southern perspective as well. 
It is hoped that this research will give impetus to more academic and ethical engagement 
with climate engineering in India. Many Indian scientists are involved in climate engineering 
research along with European and American scientists. The ministry of earth sciences in India 
have planned out an $8 million project for carbon sequestration. All the more India is one of 
the countries most vulnerable to the risks of climate engineering. Despite these factors not 
                                                          
28 See, Ian Johnson, “European pollution helped cause one of India's worst-ever droughts, researchers show,” 
Independent, April 21, 2017. Available at  http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/european-pollution-india-
drought-worst-ever-sulphur-dioxide-geo-engineering-grantham-institute-a7694491.html. Accessed July 1, 2017. 
29 Ian Johnson 2017. 
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much has been done in India exploring the social and ethical implications of climate 
engineering, let alone the concerns with justice. As our review of research has shown, the 
only peer-reviewed paper on climate engineering from India available on Google scholar 
dealt not with climate change climate engineering, but with climate engineering in its 
traditional geological sense.30 Three of the leading English national dailies in India have 
published an aggregate of about 25 short write-ups beginning with 2009, some of which are 
reproductions from Guardian31 and New York Times. Thus we hope that this study will fill up 
some gap in the academic literature by underscoring the need for offering an Indian 
perspective. 
7.5.4 Appropriating Human Rights and Environmental Justice 
We have seen that a firm commitment to affirming and respecting the universal 
human rights against all odds is essential for ensuring justice in climate engineering. While 
the issues of human rights deserve their legitimate space in a research on justice, our 
methodic focus on the research question has withheld our attention from engaging the issues 
of human rights in detail. Engaging the issues of justice in climate engineering with the tragic 
state of affairs with human rights as shown by Thomas Pogge (2002) emerges as a rewarding 
and compelling stream of research in the immediate future. Thomas Pogge’s startling 
findings such as 44 percent of human population has only 1.3 percent of global income, 826 
million poor people do not have enough to eat, nearly one-third of the deaths are due to 
causes related to poverty, 80% of the global income is possessed by the 15% of the 
humankind, etc.,32 impose themselves upon our research as inviting substantial appropriation 
from the perspective of climate engineering justice. 
Given our exclusive focus on our research question, we have not dwelt systematically 
upon the issues of environmental justice in climate engineering. While recognizing this 
limitation, this research recommends the intersection between environmental justice and 
justice in climate engineering as a priority for future researches. 
 
 
                                                          
30 See Chapter 3; 3.4.1.3 
31 See for example, Scientists warn of risks from geoengineering, The Guardian Newspapers Limited, April 3, 
2013; published in The Hindu; http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-in-school/scientists-warn-of-risks-
from-geoengineering/article4575114.ece. Accessed April 10, 2017. 
32 Thomas Pogge (2002). 
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7.6 Conclusion 
 In this concluding chapter we had been retrospective in our approach and content 
consolidating mainly the responses to the research question. It has also been introspective 
about the literary and conceptual merits and contributions of this research. Recognizing the 
limits of the research, we also proposed some research agenda for the future course of 
research. On the whole we attempted to look at the overall debate landscape from a much-
needed philosophical perspective as well. 
 To conclude this study, we will summarily look at our entire research project. We 
began this research by framing the research question in order to situate the research in its 
perspective: can climate engineering be developed in a just manner compatible with the 
Rawlsian principles of distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice? An approach 
described as analytically expository and dialogically hermeneutical was also devised. The 
normative tool for tackling the research question has been precisely the Rawlsian principles 
of distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice. Hence a significant deal of the work 
was spared for discussing the Rawlsian scheme in various chapters relative to the aspect of 
justice under consideration.  
A historical and scientific familiarity with the technology under debate was achieved 
in the second chapter that was followed by a review of the landscape of the ethical debate 
over climate engineering in the subsequent chapter. On the historical line, it has been 
observed that though climate engineering is considered popularly as a modern engineering 
technology, it is the latest stage in a technological continuum. The review of the literature 
noticed the extreme divide between the proponents and the opponents as well as the areas of 
consonance between them. Analysing and weighing the diverse argument structures in the 
review, we picked up one of the urgent and crucial streams in the debate – the issue of justice. 
Engaging the issue of justice was considered to be of a foundational nature in advancing the 
debate on the ethical desirability of climate engineering.  
Picking up the various normative tools of the Rawlsian theoretical frame on the 
distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice, we attempted a dialogue between Rawls 
and climate engineering to see if climate engineering could be developed in a just manner. It 
has been found that as of now the climate engineering proposals do neither meet the 
requirements of distributive justice, nor of those of intergenerational or procedural justice. 
While it has been found that the odds are much against climate engineering and climate 
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engineering presents itself more to be a challenge to justice, we also proposed a number of 
conditions that will make climate engineering somewhat more compatible with the 
viewpoints of the Rawlsian distributive, intergenerational and procedural justice. In dealing 
with procedural justice, we saw that if such radical conditions are met, procedurally climate 
engineering carries the potential not only to facilitate justice but also to eradicate the 
prevalent forms of climatic injustice across the globe.  Our analysis showed that for ensuring 
justice in climate engineering, the platform of climatic justice at large has to be ensured first. 
However, we also noticed that the scope for materialising such an ideal procedure is very 
dim. 
 
The complexity of the debate is only aggravated by a deeper engagement with the 
issues of justice and our preparedness for justice in climate engineering calls for 
unprecedented levels of political goodwill and determination, international collaboration and 
conservatively alternative ways of life. What we could say with certainty is that under certain 
conditions climate engineering cannot be regarded as just on the Rawlsian view of justice. 
This does not necessarily mean that climate engineering cannot be just under any 
circumstance. 
 
A retrospective introspection of the findings of our research particularly in chapter 
seven underscored the equally deserving attention to be paid to the wider and fundamental 
epistemic, conceptual, philosophical and existential issues at stake in the climate engineering 
debate that are often overlooked due to the pick and choose approach reflected in the 
treatment of the issues in isolation. The East-West and North-South interface is of vital 
importance in the prospective development of the ethical discussions along the line of justice. 
Searching and developing new paradigms of cosmology and anthropology informed by the 
latest developments in the natural sciences and re-appropriating the ethics of climate 
engineering in general and of justice in particular under those emerging paradigms is further 
helpful for a systemically fair statement on the content of justice in climate engineering. 
Reassuring justice pre-eminently calls for rediscovering our authentic existence as an 
ecological and social coexistence. It places the ethics of climate engineering in the larger 
existential Sitz im Leben of our ways of living, patterns of consumption, standards of 
distributions, of our ability to see the diverse nuances of a complex issue systemically, and to 
resolve them radically and rationally. We also do not fail to observe and appreciate the 
symbolic but powerful self-criticism of this generation seen on the debate scene that is a 
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tribute to the undying critical rationality of the present humanity. A sustained call for 
commitment to justice means to recognise that we have not allowed our reason to be 
completely stolen by simple and short-sighted solutions to complex problems. 
 
Citing Rawls again may well define the contribution of this work to the climate 
engineering debate altogether: “[W]e are in a better position to assess how serious the 
existing imperfections are and to decide upon the best way to approximate the ideal.”33We 
may be permitted to quote the popularly “anti-ecological” Bacon, with whom we opened this 
work, again to conclude this work - but this time, out of context – “[t]he mechanical 
inventions of recent years do not merely exert a gentle guidance over Nature’s course, they 
have the power to conquer her and subdue her, to shake her to her foundations.”34Even the 
wildest foresight of Bacon four centuries ago would not have had climate engineering in 
mind here. But that the reality may be unwittingly getting ready to strike now literally as 
Bacon metaphorised, we hope our work may be judged as a catalytic homework to scrutinise 
our climate engineering ambitions to avert any early return of the yang – the compounded 
climatic injustice – and to summon the feeble but gentle voices of the yin – the call to restore 
climatic justice; to use the proverbial Chinese categories again.  
                                                          
33 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 272. 
34 Bacon, “Thoughts and Conclusions on the Interpretation of Nature or a Science of Productive Works” 
(Cogitata et Visa) (written 1607), in Farrington, Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. 
Press, 1964); p. 93; see also pp. 96, 99. 
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